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A BSTR A C T
M ulti-A gent O pportunism
by
James H. Lawton 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2005
The real world is a complex place, rife with uncertainty, and prone to rapid change. 
Agents operating in a real-world domain need to be capable of dealing with the 
unexpected events tha t will occur as they carry out their tasks. While unexpected 
events are often related to failures in an agent’s plan, or inaccurate knowledge in 
an agent’s memory, they can also be opportunities for the agent. For example, an 
unexpected event may present the opportunity to achieve a goal th a t was previously 
unattainable. Similarly, real-world multi-agent systems (MASs) can benefit from the 
ability to exploit opportunities. These benefits include the ability for the MAS itself to 
better adapt to its changing environment, the ability to ensure agents obtain critical 
information in a timely fashion, and improvements in the overall performance of the 
system.
In this dissertation we present a framework for multi-agent opportunism  tha t is 
applicable to open systems of heterogeneous planning agents. The contributions of 
our research are both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, we provide an 
analysis of the critical issues th a t must be addressed in order to successfully exploit 
opportunities in a multi-agent system. This analysis can provide MAS designers and 
developers im portant guidance to incorporate multi-agent opportunism  into their own 
systems. It also provides the fundamental underpinnings of our own specific approach 
to multi-agent opportunism.
Xll
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On the  practical side, we have developed, implemented, and evaluated a specific 
approach to multi-agent opportunism for a particular class of multi-agent system. 
Our evaluation demonstrates tha t multi-agent opportunism can indeed be effective 
in systems of heterogeneous agents even when the amount of knowledge the agents 
share is severely limited. Our evaluation also demonstrates tha t agents tha t are ca­
pable of exploiting opportunities for their own goals are also able, using the same 
mechanisms, to recognize and respond to potential opportunities for the goals of 
other agents. Further, and perhaps more interesting, we show th a t under some cir­
cumstances, multi-agent opportunism can be effective even when the agents are not 
themselves capable of single-agent opportunism.
xni
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C hapter 1
Introduction
We have developed a framework for multi-agent opportunism for agents operating 
in open, real-world multi-agent systems (MASs). Single-agent opportunism is the 
ability of an agent to alter its pre-planned course of action to pursue a goal that 
better achieves the agent’s or its designers’ objectives for its performance, based 
upon a change in the environment or in the agent’s internal state—an opportunity 
[Francis, 1997; Lawton, 1999, 2003]. Multi-agent opportunism refers to the ability of 
agents operating in an MAS to assist one another by recognizing and responding to 
potential opportunities for each other’s goals.
Our interest in multi-agent opportunism stems from a desire to improve the 
system-level performance and coordination of multi-agent systems operating in real- 
world environments. An MAS is a collection of individual agents operating in a com­
mon environment coordinating their activities to enable the performance of the group 
to exceed the capabilities of any individual member [Nwana and Ndumu, 1999]. There 
are many real-world problem domains for which multi-agent systems can provide su­
perior solutions, including information systems [Shehory et ah, 1999], oceanographic 
sampling [Turner and Turner, 2001; Curtin et ah, 1993], distributed sensor networks, 
electricity distribution, and personal travel agents [Nwana and Ndumu, 1999]. Most 
real-world MASs are necessarily open systems [Hewitt, 1991], in which the structure 
of the system itself may change dynamically. The component agents of an open MAS 
may not be known in advance, can change over time, and are often heterogeneous
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
[Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998].
The real world is an extremely complex place, rife with uncertainty, and prone to 
rapid change. Agents operating in a real-world domain need to be able to cope with 
its lack of predictability. Real-world agents need to be capable of dealing with the 
unexpected events tha t will occur as they carry out their tasks. While unexpected 
events are often related to failures in an agent’s plan, or inaccurate knowledge in 
an agent’s memory, they can also be opportunities for the agent. For example, an 
unexpected event may present the opportunity to achieve a goal th a t was previously 
unattainable. Similarly, real-world MASs can benefit from the ability to exploit op­
portunities. These benefits include the ability for the MAS itself to  better adapt to 
its changing environment, the ability to ensure agents obtain critical information in 
a timely fashion, and improvements in the overall performance of the system.
Taking advantage of an opportunity is a difficult task even for an individual agent. 
As summarized in Figure 1-1 , the opportunity must first be recognized, the action 
it facilitates must be determined, and the agent must decide whether or not it is 
appropriate to pursue the action at the current time [Francis, 1997]. For example, 
suppose you happen across a stream while walking in the woods. You would first have 
to decide if this event presents an opportunity by determining if you had some use for 
the stream outside the scope of your current activity. This decision is often based on 
the presence of opportunity cues, which are easily identifiable changes or conditions 
in the environment tha t indicate a potential opportunity. If you were to recognize 
the presence of a stream as an opportunity cue, you would then have to determine 
what action the opportunity is related to, such as to quenching your thirst or washing 
your hands. Finally, you would have to decide if it is currently appropriate to take 
advantage of this opportunity. For example, it would probably not be appropriate to 
stop for a drink while being chased by a bear.
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Opportunity Cue













Decide if Pursuit 
is Appropriate
Figure 1-1: Decision Framework for Single-Agent Opportunism
The exploitation of opportunities by agents operating in an MAS is an even more 
complicated process. In addition to exploiting opportunities for themselves, agents 
in an MAS must also be capable of recognizing if a given event or situation may be 
an opportunity for a goal of another agent in the system, or even for a shared group 
goal. If an agent believes it has recognized an opportunity for another member of 
the MAS, it must first decide whether it should notify the other agent, or handle the 
opportunity itself by taking some action on behalf of the other agent. For example, if 
an agent happens across an object it knows another agent is looking for, it can notify 
the other agent of the object’s location, or it might be able to acquire the object and 
deliver it to the other agent. To avoid conflicts, though, an agent would probably 
need to coordinate with the other agent before taking action on its behalf.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
To further complicate matters, it is possible tha t more than one agent will simulta­
neously recognize a potential opportunity. If the agents respond to the opportunity by 
simply notifying the interested agent, then the agent receiving this notification must 
be capable of handling multiple notifications of the same event or situation. Oth­
erwise, the response would almost certainly require coordination of actions among 
the agents involved. Continuing the above example, suppose two agents each find an 
object a third agent is looking for. As long as they each coordinate with the third 
agent, th a t agent can decide which should actually acquire and deliver the object. 
This approach also works even if the agents find different (but equivalent) objects.
Each of the decisions described above could require agents in an MAS to share 
a significant amount of information about each other. Because of this, our research 
has concentrated on addressing the critical knowledge-sharing and decision-making 
processes tha t are necessary for multi-agent opportunism. In particular, we have 
focused on the question: Can multi-agent opportunism he effective in systems of 
heterogeneous agents with little or no shared knowledge? T hat is, can open, real-world 
multi-agent systems benefit from being able to recognize and respond to opportunities 
for each other’s goals? Or will the lack of shared information be too restrictive to allow 
cost-effective opportunistic assistance? We have developed a framework for multi­
agent opportunism tha t assumes a minimal amount of shared knowledge. Based 
on experiments using an implementation of this framework, we show tha t multi­
agent opportunism can indeed be effective even when the agents have only limited 
information about each other’s capabilities. Further, through the empirical analysis 
described in Chapter 7, we quantify the effectiveness of multi-agent opportunism, as 
well as the lim itation on the shared information, in the context of a specific class of
MAS.
A second, related question tha t we have explored is: Are agents that are capable
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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adequate knowledge of each other? Our framework for multi-agent opportunism de­
scribed in this dissertation supports this conjecture. It provides agents with these 
capabilities, and, based on it, we are able define “adequate knowledge.” Further, we 
have determined tha t under some circumstances, we can obtain multi-agent oppor­
tunism even when the agents are not capable of single-agent opportunism.
The contributions of this research are both theoretical and practical. On the 
theoretical side, our framework for multi-agent opportunism provides the basis for an 
analysis of the critical issues tha t must be addressed in order to successfully exploit 
opportunities in a multi-agent system. These critical issues involve the type and 
degree of knowledge the agents must share, as well as the decision-making capabilities 
they must possess. This analysis can provide MAS designers and developers im portant 
guidance to incorporate multi-agent opportunism into their own systems. It also 
provides the fundamental underpinnings of our own specific approach to multi-agent 
opportunism.
On the practical side, we have developed, implemented and evaluated a specific ap­
proach to multi-agent opportunism for a particular class of multi-agent system. Our 
approach enables systems of planning agents coordinated through a middle agent 
(e.g., a matchmaker or a broker) [Klusch and Sycara, 2001] to  opportunistically assist 
one another achieve their goals, thus improving the overall system performance. We 
have achieved this by combining a particular form of single-agent opportunism known 
as predictive encoding [Patalano et ah, 1991] with an approximate decision-theoretic 
planning mechanism tha t allows the agents to make critical information-sharing de­
cisions. The planning mechanism uses a new abstract plan representation, Partial 
Order Plan Graphs (POPGs), tha t we developed specifically to support multi-agent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
opportunism. While the POPG representation was designed for this research project, 
it is still general enough to represent the features of most (if not all) techniques used 
in the area of classical (i.e., STRIPS-based [Pikes and Nilsson, 1971]) AI domain- 
independent planning [Smith, 2003].
We believe the contributions made by this approach are im portant for two key 
reasons. First, it should be applicable to many existing MASs. This is because 
we have leveraged well-understood technologies from the fields of AI planning (e.g., 
[Weld, 1999]) and MAS coordination (especially through middle agents) (e.g., [Wong 
and Sycara, 2000]), as well as the area of single-agent opportunism (discussed in 
Section 3.2). Second, our approach demonstrates tha t MASs can benefit from multi­
agent opportunism even when the agents share little or no common knowledge of 
such things as plans, goals, and capabilities. This is because we have started from an 
assumption tha t the agents will not be homogeneous, in tha t they will possess different 
capabilities and th a t it is likely they will have been created by different software 
developers. As such, we can make no guarantees on the amount and type of shared 
knowledge the agents possess, so we assume tha t they would possess little or no shared 
knowledge at all. Our results thus provide a baseline, dem onstrating tha t performance 
improvements can still be achieved even with these restrictive assumptions.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
motivating examples of how opportunities could be exploited in MASs. These exam­
ples are used throughout the rest of this dissertation to illustrate various points. In 
Chapter 3 we review existing work in opportunism, including well-known approaches 
to single-agent opportunism. In the next four chapters, we describe our framework 
for multi-agent opportunism. In Chapter 4 we present an analysis of the critical 
information-sharing and decision-making issues tha t must be addressed by any ap­
proach to exploiting opportunities in an MAS. In Chapters 5 and 6  we describe our
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
specific approach to multi-agent opportunism for systems of planning agents. In 
Chapter 7 we present an empirical analysis of the impact tha t our approach to multi­
agent opportunism has on the performance of a particular class of MAS. In Chapter 
8 , we discuss how our framework could be applied to other classes of MASs. Finally, 
in C hapter 9 we summarize the results of this research and compare our approach 
to other research areas that are related to multi-agent opportunism. We conclude by 
providing directions for future research for our framework.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C hapter 2
Exam ple Scenarios
In this chapter we present two example scenarios in which the agents are able to 
opportunistically assist one another satisfy their goals. These examples are used to 
illustrate our points throughout the rest of this dissertation. Note tha t in this chap­
ter we only present the domains along with some specific examples of opportunistic 
behavior within them. The mechanisms used by the agents to achieve this behavior 
will be explained in detail in the remainder of this dissertation.
2.1 Exam ple Scenario 1 -  P lanetary Rovers
Our first example domain is based on the standard planning benchmark domain 
Rovers, inspired by the planning problems for NASA’s Mars Rovers, and used in 
International Planning Competition (IPC-2002) [Fox and Long, 2002]. The domain 
consists of a collection of agents (rovers) th a t can navigate the surface of a planet, 
perform scientific tasks, and communicate information back to a stationary lander.
For this example, consider a scenario in which a group of rovers is performing 
various tasks in a working area consisting of 25 waypoints, arranged at the cells of a 
5 x 5  grid (see Figure 2-1). Each rover can travel among the waypoints and perform 
scientific tasks such as soil sampling, rock sampling, and taking pictures of objects 
of interest if they are visible from the rover’s current location. We will assume tha t 
rovers can only travel to the 13 waypoints shown in white in Figure 2-1 (i.e., the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Agent-0 Agent-1
WPIO W Pll WP12 WP13 WP14
WP15 WP16 WP17 WP18 WP19
Obi-lO
WP23WP20 WP21 WP22 WP24
obj-n Obj-12
Agent-3
Figure 2-1: Workspace partitioning for Rovers example MAS.
12 grey waypoints are inaccessible). There are thus a to tal of 65 different goals in 
this scenario tha t can be assigned to the rovers, namely 13 rock samplings (at the 
accessible locations), 13 soil samplings, and 13 objects to  be photographed, where 
each picture can be taken at three different levels of quality.
In this scenario we will also assume there are four rover agents, A i, . .. , A4 , with 
partially overlapping capabilities. The working area is divided into 4 partially over­
lapping regions (see Figure 2-1), one for each agent. Each rover agent can only travel 
within its designated 3 x 4  area, and thus can only be assigned goals for waypoints in 
this region. The goals tha t can be assigned to a rover Aj constitute its capabilities Q ,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and these are restricted to the sub-area in which this rover can travel. Each agent is 
thus capable of performing some 35 (of the 65) goals. At the beginning of each plan­
ning/execution cycle, each agent is assigned a set of goals Gi from its capabilities (i.e., 
Gi Ç Q ) such tha t no goals are assigned to more than one agent (i.e., Q  =  0). 
The agents each plan for their individual sets of goals and then execute tha t plan.
For this example we will assume tha t the agents’ activities are coordinated through 
the use of a middle agent, or more specifically a task broker [Klusch and Sycara, 2001], 
B. As each agent comes on line, it registers its capabilities with the broker B. As 
noted above, in this example an agent’s capabilities are descriptions of the goals it 
can satisfy. This is used to simplify the decision-making process of the broker. In 
this research, we are not concerned with the broker’s actual decision process or the 
details of its implementation. In general, however, a capability description language 
such as LARKS [Sycara et ah, 1999], CDL [Wickler, 1998], or DAML-S [Ankolekar 
et ah, 2 0 0 1 ], would likely be needed.
As a specific example of how agents could opportunistically assist one another in 
this scenario, suppose tha t rover Aq is assigned the goal go = have-rock-sam ple (WP7), 
but is unable to accomplish this goal (perhaps because it has insufficient resources). 
If Ao believes th a t there are other rover agents in the area tha t are also capable 
of taking this sample, it can ask them to try  to satisfy this goal opportunistically. 
One way to accomplish this would work as follows; when Aq suspends go, it would 
contact the broker, B, and request a list of agents, L, whose capability sets include 
have-rock-sam ple (WP7)h If we assume all of the agents are capable of taking rock 
samples, then from Figure 2-1 we can see tha t L = {Ag, A^, A3}. Aq would notify 
each of these agents (excluding itself, of course) tha t it has suspended its assigned
^W hile capab ilities like these  w ould norm ally  be rep resen ted  w ith  variab les (e.g., have-rock -sam p le(X )), 
we have p ropositionalized  th em  here for sim plicity.
10
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goal qq. Such a notification could be in the form of a message similar to the FIPA 
r e q u e s t - i f  directive [FIPA, 2002], which in this context would be interpreted by 
the receiving agents as a request to incorporate the suspended goal into their current 
plans if possible, and satisfy it if an opportunity to do so arises.
Alternatively, if the broker B has been designed to support multi-agent oppor­
tunism, Ao could simply notify B tha t it is suspending g^. B would determine which 
other agents are capable of satisfying go, and itself notify these other agents of the sus­
pended goal as described above. This approach would reduce the number of messages 
tha t would be needed to disseminate the request for opportunistic assistance.
Now suppose tha t the goal gi =  have-rock-sam ple(W P12) has been assigned to 
rover A i. Since Ai will be close to WP7 when it is satisfying g\, if it has sufficient 
resources it could adjust its intentions and satisfy go- It might do this by augmenting 
its current plan to take a detour to WP7 and take a rock sample there. If and when 
Ai does satisfy go, it would notify Aq tha t it has taken action its behalf. Aq would 
then notify the other agents in A  th a t the suspended goal had been satisfied. Alter­
natively, if the broker is being used for indirect notification, B could be informed of 
go's satisfaction, requiring it to notify the other agents.
Note tha t in this example the agents respond to opportunities to accomplish one 
another’s suspended goals by simply satisfying them and notifying the original tha t it 
has done so. In this domain this is a reasonable response, since redundant satisfaction 
of the goals does not cause conflicts. In other domains further coordination may be 
required. Other response options will be discussed in Section 4.2.2.
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2.2 Exam ple Scenario 2 -  A utonom ous Oceanographic 
Sam pling Networks
The second scenario, adapted from examples of Turner and Turner [2001, 1999, 1998] 
and Chappell et al. [1997], is taken from the domain of autonomous oceanographic 
sampling networks (AOSNs) [Curtin et ah, 1993]. AOSNs are multi-robot systems 
designed to collect data from the ocean over long periods of time. They are com­
posed of a variety of Vehicle and Instrument Platforms (VIPs), which are mobile 
and non-mobile platforms tha t support various data-gathering instruments. While 
we use examples from this scenario throughout this dissertation, we have not directly 
implemented our framework in this domain. In Chapter 8 , however, we do discuss 
the key differences between this domain and the Rovers example, as well as how our 
framework for multi-agent opportunism could be applied.
One way of controlling an AOSN is to treat it as an MAS [Turner and Turner, 
1998]. We should stress tha t our main interest in this example is the characteristics 
of the MAS, which itself is only one particular example of how an MAS could be used 
to support an AOSN. We have selected this particular example because it exemplifies 
the use of a particular class of MAS in a real-world domain.
For this scenario, assume there is a collection of agents assigned to accomplish 
the following tasks: (1) to characterize the tem perature and salinity of a volume of 
water, which we will call the background -survey-task , (2 ) to make a detailed survey 
of convective overturns (i.e., CONVEX events [Bub et ah, 1997]) when they occur, 
called the CONVEX-task, (3) to characterize the magnetic fields along the bottom  
(m agn etic -su rvey-task ), and (4) to collect rocks from areas tha t are unusually 
magnetic (r o c k -c o lle c t io n -ta s k ) .
We will further assume tha t the agents are realized as the hardware and control 
software of several VIPs. These VIPs include two highly maneuverable but slow
12





aco u s tic -lin k , 
radio, L B L
0
Mooring-Delta
R adio , ^  
a coustic -link
EAVE-Ariel
C D PS, acoustic-link, 
su rvey-m agnetom eter, 
CTD , transit, m anage
AUV-1 
^ D P S ,  acoustic-linkT 
CTD , transit, m anage
EAVE-Arista
C D PS, acoustic-link , 
su rvey -m agnetom eter 
co llect-sam ples, 





co n v ex -sen so r
aco u stic -lin k
Figure 2-2: AOSN-Layout (Adapted from [Turner et al., 1997]).
Experimental Autonomous Vehicles (EAVEs) [Blidberg and Chappell, 1986], A r ie l  
and A r i s t a , one lo n g -ran g e  autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), AUV-1, three 
navigational moorings. A b l e , B a k e r , and C h a r l i e , one communications mooring, 
D e l t a , a n d  one  C O N V E X - m o o r in g  [Bub et ah, 1997]. See Figure 2-2 for more 
information.
The CONVEX-task can be further broken down into a CGNVEX-detection-task and 
a CONVEX-survey-task. The CONVEX-survey-task can only begin after a CONVEX 
event has been detected, and will involve several agents capable of performing a CTD- 
survey. The CTD-survey capability means tha t the agent is able to take conductivity 
(from which salinity can be determined), tem perature and depth (CTD) measure­
ments in a volume of water. In the b ack ground -survey-task , we will assume tha t 
each agent will survey a given volume of water, returning to a communications moor­
ing regularly to download the collected data. We will also assume tha t each agent will
13
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perform some simple anomaly detection on the data before downloading it. Finally, 
the m a g n e tic -su r v e y -ta sk  will require agents capable of taking magnetic readings 
with a magnetometer in a volume of water (survey-magnetometer capability), while 
the r o c k -c o l le c t io n - ta s k  will require agents with both survey-magnetometer and 
collect-samples capabilities.
Before the agents actually begin operation, one is selected to generate a plan for 
accomplishing the mission (background-survey-task, CONVEX-task, m agnetic-  
su r v e y -ta sk  and r o c k -c o lle c t io n - ta s k ) . The planner agent decomposes the as­
signed tasks into subtasks, and uses this information to determine the group’s task- 
level organization (TLO) [Turner and Turner, 2001, 1999, 1998]. The TLO is an 
organization of roles with assigned tasks, with specific agents assigned to those roles. 
The TLO is used by the agents to coordinate their operational activities. In this 
example, the TLO is structured as a simple hierarchy, although other organizational 
structures are possible. The roles in the TLO are either labor roles, which are as­
signed tasks tha t actually do something in the world, or management roles, which are 
assigned tasks to manage labor roles or other management roles. In the hierarchy, 
labor roles occur at the leaves, while the management roles are the interior nodes (or 
the root). Figure 2-3 shows a possible TLO structure for our example scenario.
After the planning process, assume th a t the planner has assigned the following 
tasks to agents: The CONVEX-detection-task to the CONVEX-MOORING (leaving 
the CONVEX-survey-tasks unassigned); the back ground -survey-tasks to EAVE- 
ARIEL, EA V E-A r ista , and AUV-1; the m a g n e tic -su r v e y -ta sk  is assigned to the 
EAVEs, and the r o c k -c o l le c t io n - ta s k  to EAVE-ARIEL. We will assume tha t 
the EAVEs both have survey-magnetometer capabilities, but only E A V E -A riel has 
collect-samples capabilities. Also, we will assume the planner has assigned volumes of 
water to the background-survey agents such th a t AUV-1 is surveying the upper 50%
14









Figure 2-3; AOSN Organization. 
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of the volume, and the EAVEs are each surveying half of the remaining “bottom ” 
volume (25% of the total volume each). The planner has also determined (or is told) 
th a t two other mission-related tasks are needed: a lo n g -b a se lin e -n a v ig a tio n a l  
(LBL) task, which it assigns to MOORING-Ab l e , M ooring-B a k e r , and M ooring- 
C h a r lie , and a com m unications-relay-task , which it assigns to M ooring-D elta .
As a specific example of multi-agent opportunism in this scenario, suppose tha t 
E A V E -A rie l has suspended its r o c k -c o l le c t io n - ta s k  while it is performing its 
background-survey-task , and tha t EA V E-ARISTA has begun its m agn etic -su rvey-  
ta sk . If E A V E -A ris ta  knows about EAVE-ARIEL'S suspended r o c k -c o l le c t io n -  
ta sk , or more directly that EAVE-ARIEL has a suspended task tha t is missing knowl­
edge about the locations of unusual magnetic readings, E A V E -A ris ta  could notify 
EAVE-ARIEL if it discovers any such readings. E A V E -A rie l would then have to 
determine if it should suspend its current background -survey-task  to take advan­
tage of this opportunity, or to cache this knowledge for later. Note tha t in this case 
E A V E -A ris ta  is unable to collect rock samples on E A V E -A rie l’s behalf, since it 
does not possess the collect-samples capability.
16
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C hapter 3
O pportunism  in P lanning A gents
In this chapter we present background information on opportunism. We first present 
various definitions of opportunities and opportunism tha t are generally accepted in 
the literature. We then briefly review existing approaches to exploiting opportunism 
in agents tha t use plans to achieve their goals.
3.1 Definitions
Just what constitutes an opportunity is not always clear. Very few authors have even 
attem pted to define opportunities or opportunism, leaving it tacit. From the way it is 
used in the literature, we have identified two prominent views of what an opportunity 
is. We thus claim tha t an opportunity can be defined by one of the following:
1 . A situation or condition favorable for the attainm ent of a goal, or
2 . An unexpected change in the world th a t requires a response outside the scope 
of the current activity [Francis, 1997].
A subtle but key difference between these definitions is tha t the second focuses on 
a specific event which changes the current state of the environment, while the first is 
only concerned with the state, not how or when it got there. In addition, as the term  
is commonly used, opportunities are expected to be positive in nature, and are often 
unexpected, leading to a sense of serendipity.
17
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We thus define opportunism as: The ability to exploit an opportunity by altering a 
pre-p/oMned courae 0/ action to pursue a d%_^ ereut poaZ, bosed ou some c/toupe m t/ie
environment or in the agent’s internal state [Francis, 1997; Lawton, 1999, 2003].
Considering these definitions, there are a number of different views of what kinds 
of situations or events are actually considered opportunities. From the way they have 
been used in the literature, we have identified the following types of opportunities 
tha t an agent might encounter. We simply list these types here. We will explain how 
each has been exploited in Section 3.2.
• Satisfaction of suspended goals: An event or situation tha t might allow a sus­
pended goal to be satisfied [Birnbaum and Collins, 1984; Francis, 1997; Ham­
mond et ah, 1993; Patalano et ah, 1991; Simina and Kolodner, 1995; Pryor, 
1996; Pryor and Collins, 1992; Simina et ah, 1997, 1998]. A suspended goal is 
one tha t cannot be fit into an agent’s current agenda, and is thus postponed 
rather than abandoned [Schank and Abelson, 1977; Patalano et ah, 1991]. It 
may also be a goal tha t the agent intends to achieve later in its plan, but can 
be satisfied early if an appropriate situation is encountered.
Example: While performing a critical oceanographic sampling mission, an au­
tonomous underwater vehicle’s (AUV) power level drops below a certain 
threshold tha t causes a goal for recharging to be activated. The AUV de­
cides that, because the recharging source is too far away, it cannot pursue 
the new goal until it finishes the current mission, and so suspends it. Dur­
ing the mission, though, a support vessel enters the area where the AUV 
is working, presenting an opportunity to recharge before completing the 
current mission.
• Execution of standing orders (e.g., repeating goals): An event or situation th a t 
allows for the satisfaction of goals th a t can be accomplished repeatedly as condi-
18
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tions arise [Fasciano, 1996; Fiayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979; Hammond et al., 
1996; Turner and Turner, 1998].
Example: An AUV is told to always take a soil sample when entering a new 
port. The AUV enters Boston Harbor, where it has never been before, 
presenting an opportunity to take a soil sample in the new port.
Learning from failure: A failure in a plan or action can be an opportunity to 
learn [Fasciano, 1996; Hammond et ah, 1996].
Example: An AUV is given a mission to collect samples from a volume of 
water where there is a strong current. It plans a sampling pattern  tha t 
follows the direction of flow of the current. However, the current carries 
the AUV away from the sampling region before it completes its mission. It 
recognizes the plan failure, re-plans the mission to collect the samples while 
traveling against the current, and takes advantage of this opportunity to 
learn by storing the failed and successful plan in its memory.
Learning new /better method for future goal: An event or situation may point 
out a new /better way to achieve a goal. This type of opportunity applies to 
future goals, which may never come up [Simina and Kolodner, 1995; Simina 
et al., 1997, 1998].
Example: An AUV successfully completes a mission to take samples in a vol­
ume of water where there is a strong current, using a sampling pattern  
tha t goes against the current. Later, the AUV observes another AUV tha t 
performs a similar sampling mission in less time by using a sampling p a t­
tern tha t goes across the current. It takes advantage of this opportunity 
to learn by storing the new plan in its memory.
19
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• Searched-for situation: A situation o r condition tha t could lead to the attain­
m ent of some goal tha t occurs while it is specifically being searched for. During 
the  search, however, it is not known if the situation or condition actually exists, 
or how it will manifest itself [Birnbaum and Collins, 1984; Fasciano, 1996; Fran­
cis, 1997; Hammond et al., 1996; Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979; Simina and 
Kolodner, 1995; Simina et ah, 1997, 1998].
Example: An AUV is sampling a volume of water tha t is divided by a reef. It 
begins by taking samples on one side of the reef, suspending the sampling 
on the other side until it finds a way across. While it is taking samples 
along the reef, it finds a tunnel, allowing it to pass through the reef and 
complete its sampling task.
From these descriptions one can see th a t there are a number of different ways for 
an agent to take advantage of certain changes or conditions in its environment. In 
the next section we present several methods for an agent to exploit the various types 
of opportunities described above for its own goals.
3.2 Single-Agent O pportunism
The ability to exploit opportunities can be extremely beneficial to, and possibly even 
necessary for, planning agents for their correct functioning [Hammond et al., 1993; 
Francis, 1997]. There are a number of different approaches to enable an agent to 
recognize and exploit opportunities for its own goals (i.e., single-agent opportunism). 
They can, how ever, be broken into three general classes: active approaches, passive 
approaches, and hybrid active/passive approaches. In this section we discuss these 
general approaches, using specific example systems taken from the literature.
20
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3.2.1 A ctive  Approaches
W hen using an active approach to opportunism, some sort of process actively watches 
for a situation in which it can achieve its assigned goal or task. Systems employing 
an active approach tend to follow the first definition of opportunism given in Section 
3.1, focusing primarily on the opportunity recognition problem. Notable examples 
of systems using an active approach to opportunism include the blackboard-based 
opportunistic planning system of Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth [1979], the active goals 
model proposed by Birnbaum and Collins [1984], and the opportunistic learning sys­
tem included in MAYOR [Fasciano, 1996; Hammond et al., 1996], a real-time player 
of the SimCity simulation game.
The most significant advantage of an active approach to opportunism is tha t it is 
capable of recognizing any of the opportunity types described above in Section 3.1, al­
though implementations have focused on the searched-for situation opportunity type. 
T hat is, instead of watching for changes in the environment tha t may indicate an op­
portunity, the active processes examine the current state of the environment, watching 
for conditions favorable to the satisfaction of pending goals or tasks. However, this 
opportunity type can subsume the other types: the active processes may look for 
any state or condition desired, be it for the satisfaction of a task or goal (current or 
suspended), the execution of standing o rd e rs , or the chance to learn.
Further, agents using an active approach to opportunism are capable of exploiting 
execution-time opportunities [Hammond et ah, 1993; Pryor, 1996; Pryor and Collins, 
1992; Simina and Kolodner, 1995], as opposed to opportunities th a t occur at planning­
time. One way plans are used for controlling an agent’s activity is to separate the 
development of a complete plan from the execution of tha t plan. The first phase 
is referred to as planning-time, while the second is known as e x e c u tio n -tim e . The 
ability to exploit execution-time opportunities is especially im portant in real-world
21
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environments, since that is when many opportunities will occur. The approaches de­
veloped by [Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979] and [Birnbaum and Collins, 1984] did 
not include an execution component, and thus only considered planning-time oppor­
tunities. However, systems such as MAYOR (above) and IMPROVISOR (discussed 
in Section 3.2.3) do use an active approach for noticing and exploiting execution-time 
opportunities.
A final im portant capability of systems using an active approach is tha t they may 
be able to identify novel opportunities—those tha t may provide nonstandard solu­
tions but tha t were not specifically predicted [Wills and Kolodner, 1994; Simina and 
Kolodner, 1995]—because they need not anticipate every situation for the satisfaction 
of pending tasks or goals. To do this, the features being watched for by the active 
processes must be described abstractly enough to match any condition tha t might 
present an opportunity.
The core idea behind the active approaches—that active processes continuously 
watch the environment for opportunities—has been criticized as being an unlikely ex­
planation of human opportunity recognition [Hammond et al., 1993; Patalano et al., 
1991]. There are two key arguments behind this criticism. First, the idea is considered 
unlikely because of the computational demands: it is simply not computationally fea­
sible to constantly watch every aspect of the environment looking for opportunities. 
This problem is exacerbated when considering novel opportunities, since the compu­
tational load would be increased even more if a reasoner would have to make deep 
inferences about every observed environmental feature. Second, the active approach 
is not considered cognitively plausible. This is because of the cognitive resources tha t 
would be required, as described above, as well as because it does not take into ac­
count the fact tha t people regularly fail to recognize potential opportunities. A final, 
more subtle, problem with the active approach is tha t it lacks the intuitive sense of
22
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serendipity generally associated with opportunity recognition in humans.
However, none of these arguments are compelling for artificial systems operating 
in real-world domains. It is certainly likely tha t using active processes to continuously 
watch the environment for opportunities would have high computational demands in 
artificial systems, just as it does in people. It is not clear, though, tha t these de­
mands would be beyond the capabilities of the computer. In fact the existence of 
complex systems such as MAYOR dem onstrate tha t an active approach to oppor­
tunism is computationally feasible under some circumstances. Similarly, cognitive 
plausibility and a lack of serendipity are not im portant for artificial systems. Cogni­
tive plausibility can be im portant for dealing with poorly understood activities, such 
as opportunity recognition, tha t humans are often very good at performing. Under 
such circumstances, emulating the way people deal with these activities may lead 
to an efficient approach for artificial systems. This does not mean, however, th a t a 
cognitively plausible approach is necessarily the best approach for a computational 
system. Further, a lack of serendipity may be im portant for explaining models of 
opportunism in people (and may not be much more than an introspective artifact for 
that, either), but is of little importance to computational systems.
3.2.2 P assive A pproaches
Agents tha t utilize a passive approach to opportunism detect potential opportunities 
during the normal course of their processing. They spend few or no computational 
resources looking for opportunities. This does not mean tha t no com putation to 
detect opportunities is performed. Rather, systems using a passive approach pre­
determine the environmental cues th a t might indicate an opportunity for some goal 
or task, and then use an efficient mechanism to detect these cues during the normal 
course of processing.
23
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Systems tha t implement a passive approach to opportunism tend to subscribe to 
the second definition of opportunism given in Section 3.1, which is the ability to alter 
a pre-planned course of action to pursue a new goal, based on some change in the 
environment. As such, they require three particular capabilities for opportunistic 
behavior: the ability to recognize an opportunity, the ability to suspend or modify 
current goals or tasks to pursue an opportunity, and the ability to decide whether 
or not to pursue an opportunity in the current context [Francis, 1997]. The primary 
focus of most research, however, has been placed on opportunity recognition, often 
treating the latter two aspects incidentally.
Planning agents using a passive approach to opportunism are generally active 
planners [Hammond et ah, 1993], which are a class of planners tha t both produce a 
plan and then actively pursue and alter tha t plan in the face of a changing environ­
ment. T hat is, they are planners th a t interleave planning and acting. Because active 
planners are confronted with new goals during execution as well as during planning, 
complete re-planning is often impossible, or at least undesirable. Instead the new 
goals must be addressed by the planning system as they arise. Those goals th a t can­
not be fit into the current, on-going agenda of plans are suspended—postponed, but 
not abandoned—by the planner [Patalano et al., 1991].
A prominent method of passive opportunism involves the predictive encoding 
[Patalano et al., 1991] of suspended goals. W ith predictive encoding, suspended 
goals are associated at the time they are postponed with features of the environment 
in which goal achievement would likely be possible, and attached to the plan compo­
nents tha t may be associated with those features. It is considered predictive because 
the features tha t indicate the relevance of a plan are anticipated and used to index 
the goal [Patalano et ah, 1991]. W hen this happens, the planner must be able to 
anticipate the conditions tha t will potentially lead to satisfaction of the suspended
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goals. Thus, at planning time, it must have a clear idea of what an execution-time 
opportunity will look like [Hammond et al., 1993].
Some notable examples of systems employing passive opportunism include the 
UPS-like pickup/ delivery planner TRUCKER [Hammond et ah, 1993], its follow- 
on errand-running planner RUNNER [Hammond et ah, 1996], and the autonomous 
underwater vehicle (AUV) control agent Orca [Turner and Turner, 1998; Lawton 
et ah, 1999].
The most significant advantage of the passive approach is its computational effi­
ciency. Since opportunities are recognized through the reasoner’s normal reasoning 
processes (e.g., plan execution), little additional run-time processing is required. Fur­
ther, features such as plan preconditions and resource requirements can be used as 
opportunity cues. As these features are explicitly represented in planning systems, 
they are likely to be well defined, or a t least inferable, in the reasoner’s domain, thus 
keeping the extra computation tractable.
Unlike the active approach, we do believe the passive approach is cognitively 
plausible. Predictive encoding has been shown to be a reasonable model for human 
opportunity recognition [Patalano et al., 1991]. Also, unlike the active approach, the 
passive approach accounts for missing opportunities, since predicting every feature 
tha t could indicate a potential opportunity is a nearly impossible task in any real- 
world domain. Again, though, cognitive plausibility is an interesting, but not critical 
quality in planning agents.
Finally, as with the active approaches, systems using a passive approach can take 
advantage of execution-time opportunities. In fact, since they interleave planning 
and acting, these systems will necessarily exploit runtime opportunities. As we noted 
earlier, real-world environments tend to be highly dynamic and unpredictable, and 
are likely to be filled with such execution-time opportunities. As such, the ability
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to exploit these opportunities is very im portant for agents operating in this type of 
domain.
The biggest drawback to the passive approach to opportunism is that the number 
of opportunity types it can recognize is limited. In fact, the only opportunity type that 
has been directly addressed by research into this form of opportunism is for satisfying 
suspended goals. However, agents using predictive encoding could be augmented to 
recognize the satisfaction of the standing orders opportunity type, by permanently 
suspending a repeating goal. By its nature, though, the passive approach essentially 
precludes the recognition of the searched-for situation type opportunities.
A related and similarly im portant problem with this approach is tha t it requires 
the reasoner to know in advance what the execution-time opportunity cues might 
be. This could require arbitrarily deep inferencing, depending upon the number and 
type of possible cues the reasoner wishes to come up with. For example, suppose a 
Rover agent has a goal of transm itting data  back to the lander, which is suspended on 
the unmet precondition of being in line-of-sight with the lander. It might naturally 
select locations where it knows it can see the lander as potential opportunity cues to 
satisfy this goal. However, if it can reason th a t it could transm it the data to another 
Rover agent, which could in turn  relay the data to the lander, it could then include 
encountering another agent as an opportunity cue. This reasoning could be very 
computationally complex, depending on how long the chain of inferences is th a t the 
agent attem pts to make. Further, unless the cues are very abstractly specified (which 
would make recognition difficult), this all but precludes the possibility of recognizing 
novel opportunities, since by definition they are those events or conditions th a t could 
not be pre-determined.
Finally, in spite of the fact tha t the passive approach is significantly more compu­
tationally efficient than the active approach, it can, however, still be computationally
26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
complex. As mentioned above, pre-determining opportunity cues can be difficult. 
Further, although much of the research has been focused on opportunity recognition, 
this is only part of the problem. Once a reasoner determines tha t an event or condi­
tion may present an opportunity, it must then determine exactly what the event or 
condition may be an opportunity for, and whether it actually is an opportunity. If 
the event or condition is determined to be an actual opportunity, the reasoner must 
then determine if tha t opportunity should be pursued. Each of these decisions, which 
are included naturally in the active approach to opportunism, may themselves require 
significant inferencing.
3.2.3 H ybrid A pproaches
Systems using the active approach can recognize any type of opportunity, including 
novel opportunities, but their computational demands are not practical. Those using 
a passive approach are computationally efficient, but can only recognize opportunities 
tha t have been previously considered. There have been a number of attem pts at 
finding a middle ground between the extremes of these approaches, combining the 
best aspects of each along with other unique ideas. In this section we discuss these 
hybrid approaches.
IMPROVISER [Simina and Kolodner, 1995; Linda Wills and Janet Kolodner, 
1994] is a reasoning system capable of recognizing opportunities in the domain of 
creative design. ALEC [Simina et ah, 1997, 1998], essentially an extension of IM­
PROVISER, examines long-term problem solving and creative design as modeled 
after a case study of Bell’s invention of the telephone. Both systems combine pre­
dictive encoding with a limited number of active goals in order to recognize both 
anticipated and novel opportunities for suspended goals. By limiting the number of 
active goals tha t are considered, these systems can deeply analyze new events with
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respect to  just these goals, making the problem tractable.
The domain in which these systems are being applied does, however, simplify 
the recognition problem. As such, while the approach may be sound, it might not be 
generalizable to other, more complex environments. This is not to say design problems 
are not complex. Rather, the simplicity here is in the use of physical objects as the 
focus of recognition. Objects in general have well-defined, often easily recognizable 
features and characteristics. Abstract situations found in many planning domains 
are likely to have much less clearly identifiable features, requiring deeper analogical 
reasoning to identify novel opportunities.
PARETO [Pryor, 1996; Pryor and Collins, 1992] is a planner for a pickup/ delivery 
agent th a t utilizes a filtering mechanism for opportunity recognition for its active 
goals. PARETO's filtering mechanism is based on Pryor’s critical factor hypothesis, 
which states tha t the presence of a single factor is often crucial for the existence of an 
opportunity. The filtering process works by attaching reference features—labels for 
general functional properties of objects, such as “sharp,” “absorbent” and “sturdy” — 
to the representations of situation elements (objects found in the environment), and to 
pending goals. Pryor claims tha t reference features tend to be stable across situations, 
as well as being highly predictive and cheap to recognize. As objects are encountered 
in the world, their reference features are matched with those of pending goals. But, 
even if the reference features of an object matches those of a pending goal, it does 
not guarantee tha t encountering tha t object is an opportunity to satisfy tha t goal. 
Thus, more detailed inferences must be made to determine if the presence of the new 
object does actually constitute an opportunity [Pryor, 1996].
The use of a filtering mechanism appears to be a reasonable approach to dealing 
with the computational complexity of opportunity recognition, especially for novel 
opportunities, by reducing the number of potential opportunities the agent must
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consider. It is not without its problems, though. The critical factor hypothesis has 
yet to be supported by any substantial study—its validity has been taken so far from 
anecdotal evidence. Even assuming it is a valid hypothesis, it requires the a priori 
identification of reference features. This is the same limitation tha t Pryor claims 
predictive encoding has—the need for anticipated opportunity cues. If, however, a 
generic set of reference features could be identified, it should be more computationally 
efficient than determining opportunity cues for each goal individually. Further, Like 
IMPROVISER and ALEC, PARETO ’s problem domain uses the features of physical 
objects as its focus of opportunity recognition. The effects of this simplification are 
perhaps even more pronounced in PARETO, considering th a t reference features have 
been only defined with respect to physical objects. Identifying reference features for 
abstract situations has not been examined, and could be considerably more difficult.
MOORE is the opportunistic memory subsystem of the memory-based reasoning 
system Nicole [Francis, 1997], which is claimed to implement a complete theory of 
agency. According to Francis, such a complete system must include a memory com­
ponent capable of anytime, asynchronous retrieval based on the current context, a 
problem solver tha t can integrate new information at any time, and a meta-controller 
tha t can select which task to pursue based upon some measure of tha t ta sk ’s util­
ity. Further, in a system tha t implements a complete theory of agency, all reasoning 
processes must either be opportunistic themselves, or must be able to participate in 
opportunistic activity on the part of the agent’s overall reasoning system [Francis, 
1997^
MOORE was designed to be a generic, cognitively plausible memory system. Con­
text focusing is accomplished through the use of a unified blackboard system for all 
reasoning, working memory, perception and action processes. Processing any oppor­
tunity begins with a change to the blackboard, and any change in the blackboard.
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from any source, can represent a potential opportunity [Francis, 1997].
Through MOORE and Nicole, Francis has certainly addressed a number of key 
issues of potential importance to passive opportunistic systems, including anytime, 
asynchronous retrieval, context sensitivity, and the need for both internal and external 
retrieval cues. Like Pryor, Francis points out the need for a reasoner to be capable 
of determining when a potential opportunity should be pursued. One should note, 
however, tha t although these issues have not been specifically addressed by systems 
like RUNNER and TRUCKER, it would be possible for passive opportunistic systems 
to include these capabilities. For example, the reasoners discussed in Section 3.2.2 
use a working memory as a repository for both recording external environmental 
changes as well as the results of internal computations. As such, changes to  values in 
working memory could be used as opportunity cues, in a manner similar to  tha t used 
in MOOREs central blackboard.
It should also be noted that, while not specifically addressed, these shortcomings 
are already handled implicitly by systems using an active approach to opportunism. 
Recall tha t in such systems the active processes are constantly watching the environ­
ment for situations or events tha t present opportunities for the achievement of their 
given tasks or goals. Any given process can react asynchronously to other processes 
in the system. Further, the active processes can watch for any feature internal or 
external. For example, the items posted to the central data structures in both the 
Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth model (i.e., the blackboard) and in AIAYOR (i.e., the 
agenda) represent external environmental features as well the results of internal in­
ferences. These structures also already represent the operating environment, making 
the systems context sensitive as well. Finally, the decision as to when to  pursue an 
opportunity is also necessarily handled by the active processes; whenever the situa­
tion is deemed appropriate by an active process, as determined by whatever criteria
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the process has programmed into it, the corresponding task or goal is pursued.
3.3 M ulti-Agent Opportunism
To the best of our knowledge, there are no other research efforts tha t have studied 
or are currently studying multi-agent opportunism. There are a few projects that 
are examining some opportunistic methods in the context of multi-agents systems. 
There are also a number of projects tha t have studied related problems, as well as 
those tha t have inherent opportunistic capabilities, including coalition formation in 
multi-agent systems, agent coordination through plan merging, and team  formation 
in systems of agents. We review this related work later in Section 9.2, where we are 
able to discuss it in the context of our own approach.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we have defined the ideas of opportunities and opportunism tha t are 
generally accepted in the literature, and we have briefly reviewed existing approaches 
to single-agent opportunism in planning agents. In the next chapter, we present our 
general model for multi-agent opportunism, including a description of the types of 
opportunities tha t might arise in an MAS and a discussion of the difficult problems 
that must be addressed to achieve multi-agent opportunism.
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C hapter 4
M ulti-A gent O pportunism
In this chapter we present our general framework for multi-agent opportunism. In 
particular we discuss the various types of opportunities tha t an agent might encounter 
while operating in an MAS tha t would not otherwise be encountered if the agent were 
working alone. We also discuss the critical issues at the crux of the problem; the 
information-sharing and decision-making issues tha t the agents must address to be 
able to provide opportunistic assistance to one another.
We begin our discussion with a set of assumptions about the agents and the multi­
agent systems for our framework for multi-agent opportunism. These assumptions 
are;
1. We are working with an open multi-agent system, made up of a collection of 
heterogeneous agents, and operating in a real-world domain, th a t is capable of 
accomplishing tasks in the given domain. This assumption is essentially a base­
line for the problem, and covers such things as; a task-allocation mechanism 
exists, the capabilities of the various individual agents and the resources avail­
able are sufficient for the given tasks, etc. While we are assuming the MAS is 
capable of accomplishing the assigned tasks, we are not assuming th a t all such 
tasks do indeed get accomplished. T hat is, there may be situations where tasks 
are suspended and never completed.
2. The agents are able to communicate effectively with one another. This implies
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th a t the agents will understand the tasks, goals, and opportunity cues, etc. tha t 
are communicated to them.
3. The agents in the MAS are cooperative. We are assuming th a t the agents will 
cooperate with one another whenever possible, and tha t they will not inten­
tionally interfere with one another. However, they are still free to refuse task 
requests.
4. The agents may have little or no knowledge in common about each other’s 
capabilities, goals, plans, etc. This assumption makes explicit the lack of shared 
knowledge implied by assuming an open system of heterogeneous agents (above). 
This also represents a significant difference between this model and more formal 
teamwork models (e.g., [Tambe, 1997; Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Jennings, 
1995; Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Grosz and Kraus, 1996]), which assume tha t the 
agents have a great deal of knowledge in common.
5. A subset of the agents in the MAS are capable of single-agent opportunism. 
Specifically, we are assuming tha t agents can exploit opportunities for sus­
pended goals. This implies tha t at least some of the agents can suspend their 
own tasks/goals, recognize opportunities for the accomplishment of these sus­
pended tasks/goals, and respond to those opportunities by re-examining and 
possibly resuming the suspended tasks/goals. We are not assuming any partic­
ular approach to single-agent opportunism, just tha t some of the agents have 
the capability.
4.1 M ulti-Agent O pportunities
An opportunistic agent working alone needs only to be capable of exploiting op­
portunities for its own goals. The traditional approaches to opportunism, such as
33
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Figure 4-1: Workspace partitioning for Rovers MAS. (Repeated from Fig. 2-1)
opportunistic memory [Hammond et al., 1993] or active goals [Birnbaum and Collins, 
1984], specifically address exploiting this type of opportunity. These approaches are 
surveyed in Section 3.2 and summarized in Figure 1-1.
Agents operating in multi-agent systems, however, should also be capable of rec­
ognizing and responding to opportunities related to the goals of other agents in the 
MAS. In order for an agent to recognize this type of opportunity, it has to know 
something about what the other agents are doing. This presumably means knowing 
about the other agents’ current tasks and goals—both suspended and on-going—or 
at least about the cues that might identify an opportunity for the other agents’ tasks 
and goals.
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For example, consider the planetary rovers scenario from Section 2.1. Suppose 
rover Aq is assigned the goal go =  have-rock-sam ple (WPll) (i.e., obtain a rock 
sample from waypoint 1 1 ), but is unable to accomplish this goal (perhaps because it 
has insufficient resources). Further suppose tha t rover A% has been assigned the goal 
Qi =  have-rock-sam ple(W P12). Since Ai will be close to WPll when it is satisfying 
gi (see Figure 4-1), i f  i t  knows tha t A q  has suspended go, and if it has sufficient 
resources, it could adjust its intentions and satisfy go.
Similarly in the AOSN scenario, suppose tha t E A V E -A r ie l is given the goals 
of performing the temperature and salinity background survey as well as taking rock 
samples in areas with unusual magnetic readings. If E A V E -A r ie l decides to work on 
the survey goa l, the rock sam pling go a l will get suspended. If, however, EAVE- 
ARISTA knows about E A V E -A r ie l’s suspended rock sampling goal, then EAVE- 
A r is ta  can also be looking for unusual magnetic readings. If it detects any, it can 
notify E A V E -A r ie l of the location, and tha t agent can decide whether or not to 
pursue the opportunity.
There may be, however, suspended goals tha t an agent does not need to tell any 
other agent about. For example, consider the following situation: after collecting 
data for some time, one of the EAVEs enters a reduced-power state, causing a low- 
priority goal, g^, to recharge its batteries to be generated. Because this is not a 
critical condition, g^  is suspended and the EAVE continues with its survey. Suppose, 
though, tha t sometime later the EAVE is ordered to return to  M oo ring-D eltA, 
perhaps because the survey mission has been canceled. It can take advantage of this 
opportunity—unexpectedly being at the mooring—to recharge its batteries (satisfying 
gr), returning it to a normal power state. There is no point in the EAVE telling 
the other agents about its low-priority goal to recharge its batteries, since in this 
example the only help they could provide is the location of the mooring (which we
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can assume the EAVE already knows). This implies tha t each agent would not just 
want to arbitrarily broadcast knowledge about all of its goals to every other agents—a 
selection process would have to occur. Making this decision could be very difficult 
for an agent, however, since it may not have sufficient knowledge of what help the 
other agents could provide (e.g., how would the EAVE know tha t no other agent can 
assist it with g^?)- Designing a domain-independent selection process could thus be 
difficult.
In addition, for the agents to be able to recognize all possible opportunities for 
each other, it may not be sufficient for the agents to only know about each other’s 
suspended goals. An agent might also need to know about another agent’s active 
goals. An active goal is one an agent is currently making an effort to satisfy. There 
are situations where other agents can provide opportunistic assistance with an active 
goal, such as when an agent is searching for some object or environmental condition. 
For example, we know a C O N V E X  mooring  has as its primary (if not only) goal the 
detection of convective overturns. But suppose an agent doing the background survey 
detects a CONVEX event. T hat agent could notify the C O N V E X  m o o ring ’s task 
manager about the event, which could make the normal response of redirecting some 
agents to make a detailed survey of tha t region. As with suspended goals, a selection 
process is needed to determine which active goals might benefit from opportunistic 
assistance from other agents.
Finally, an agent operating in an MAS may also encounter a th ird  type of oppor­
tunity. This is an opportunity tha t relates to the satisfaction of a shared goal—one 
tha t a subset of the agents are working together cooperatively to satisfy. For exam­
ple, suppose a group of agents has been tasked with fixing up a playground, which 
specifically involves picking up trash and painting a fence. Suppose further tha t the 
paint for the fence has not yet arrived. The agents will all begin picking up trash.
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Figure 4-2: Decision Framework for Multi-Agent Opportunism
suspending the fence painting until the paint is delivered. Picking up trash and paint­
ing the fence are goals shared by the group. Suppose, however, th a t while picking up 
trash around a storage shed one of the agents discovers some paint left over from a 
previous job. This opportunity—the unexpected availability of paint—may allow the 
suspended fence painting shared goal to be resumed earlier than expected.
We believe tha t agents in a MAS can address opportunities for shared goals just as 
they would address opportunities for some other agent’s goals, as long as at least one 
of the agents has an explicit representation of the shared goal. We do not, however, 
directly address opportunities for shared goals in this research.
4,2 Framework for M ulti-A gent O pportunism
Our general framework for multi-agent opportunism is summarized in Figure 4-2. It 
presents a natural extension of the framework for single-agent opportunism summa-
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rized in Figure 1-1, described in Chapter 1. We will presume tha t we are working 
with a system of agents tha t meets the assumptions described at the beginning of 
this chapter. Thus, to enable these agents to assist one another in the opportunis­
tic achievement of their goals and tasks, our framework requires the addition of the 
following two key capabilities:
1. The ability for one agent to recognize an opportunity for another agent’s tasks/ 
goals. Just as with single-agent opportunism, the first step in exploiting an 
opportunity is recognizing it. The key to providing this ability in a multi­
agent environment lies in providing a method for the agents to obtain sufhcient 
information about each other’s goals, or at least what is impeding those goals.
2. The ability for an agent to respond to a recognized opportunity for another 
agent’s goal. The key to providing this capability lies in endowing the agents 
with appropriate decision-making processes so th a t they can determine when 
and how to respond to recognized opportunities. The responses tha t we consider 
are to simply notify one or more agents of the potential opportunity, or to take 
some action on behalf of another agent in response to the opportunity.
Examining ways to provide these capabilities in multi-agent environments has 
been central to this research. In the remainder of this chapter, we provide further 
details on these capabilities, as well as describe the specific issues th a t would have to 
be addressed by any approach to providing them. In Chapter 6  we present one such 
approach, along with a description of how we addressed these key issues.
4.2.1 M ulti-A gent O pportun ity  R ecogn ition
To enable agents to recognize potential opportunities for one another, we must provide 
a mechanism tha t will to allow them to recognize opportunity cues for other agents.
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Recall th a t opportunity cues are easily identifiable changes or conditions in the en­
vironment tha t indicate a potential opportunity. The agents could infer information 
about the goals and tasks (or conceivably even the opportunity cues themselves) of 
other agents, and determine opportunity cues based on this inferred information. 
Alternatively, the agents could explicitly share opportunity-related information with 
one another. We will discuss each of these possibilities in turn.
One way the agents could infer opportunity-related information would be if they 
possess a great deal of shared knowledge about each other (e.g., their capabilities, 
goals, plans, etc.). As discussed in Section 3.3, the agents might possess this degree 
of shared knowledge if they are organized using a model of teamwork [Tambe, 1997; 
Jennings, 1995; Grosz and Kraus, 1996]. Since each agent would know what every 
other agent is doing, they could watch for opportunities for other agents. Similarly, 
agents could infer missing information about other agents by assuming they are ho­
mogeneous and using information about their own capabilities, goals, plans, etc. We 
do not, however, believe tha t either of these types of inference is realistic in an open, 
real-world MAS because the agents are likely to be heterogeneous and would probably 
not have sufficient knowledge in common about each other.
The agents could also infer information about each other’s goals and tasks using 
a plan recognition mechanism. Generally speaking, agents using such a mechanism 
could monitor each other’s activities and infer their plans and goals. Using this in­
ferred information, one agent could then predict another agent’s needs for supporting 
the goals it is pursuing, and assist in meeting those needs when possible. Further, 
every agent in the MAS does not need to do the plan and goal inference. There may 
be a small number of agents, such as middle agents, which naturally have access to 
information about the activities of other agents in the MAS th a t can be exploited. 
This information could be used to infer the plans and goals of the various agents,
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with the inferred information being distributed to other agents as appropriate. This 
type of plan recognition is, of course, itself not a simple problem.
The alternative to inferring opportunity-related information would be for the 
agents to  explicitly share it with one another. We believe tha t this represents a 
more general and practical approach for open, real-world MASs. As such, in our 
study of multi-agent opportunity recognition, we have focused on the critical issues 
involved in the explicit sharing of opportunity-related information. These critical 
issues are:
• W hen (for which tasks or goals) should an agent request opportunistic assistance 
from other agents?
•  Exactly what opportunity-related information should the agents share?
•  How should an agent determine which other agents to share its opportunity- 
related information with?
W hich tasks or goals?
The first issue to be considered involves when an agent should request opportunistic 
assistance from other agents. Since we do not want agents simply broadcasting all 
information about their current active and suspended goals, a selection process should 
be used to limit requests to only those tasks and goals tha t other agents are likely 
to be able to provide help with. In this research, we have focused on requesting 
opportunistic assistance for suspended goals, using the reasons the agent is suspending 
the goal (e.g., unmet preconditions or missing resources) to select the opportunity 
cues. We believe the same mechanisms discussed here should also be applicable to 
providing opportunistic assistance with active goals.
The reasons for suspending goals may also be used to further limit when to request 
opportunistic assistance. That is, we would prefer to have the agents only request
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opportunistic assistance for goals suspended on reasons it believe other agents in the 
MAS can help with. For example, when a Rover agent suspends a soil sampling 
task because it no longer has sufhcient energy to go to the assigned location, it can 
notify other Rovers in the vicinity in the hope one of those agents can obtain the 
sample. If, however, the Rover suspends the task of transm itting data back to the 
Lander because the Lander is currently out of range, it should not request assistance 
from the other Rovers. Exactly how the agents can differentiate when other agents 
can provide help is is likely to require domain-specific knowledge, making a general 
approach difficult.
The agent must also decide when it is likely to be cost effective to request op­
portunistic assistance from other agents. This decision could be made using a utility 
function tha t takes into account the costs and benefits of receiving help in opportunis­
tically accomplishing a task. If the agent only considers its own costs and benefits, 
then it may come to the conclusion tha t obtaining opportunistic assistance for every 
goal is the rational thing to do. That is, if the agent believes th a t it can get another 
agent to satisfy one of its assigned goal without expending its own resources, then it 
is reasonable to expect tha t agent to request opportunistic assistance for tha t goal. 
While this may be better for the individual agent, it could be catastrophic for the 
MAS as a whole, especially if no agent satisfies its assigned goals.
Since we are assuming a collection of cooperative (or at least benevolent) agents, 
we would prefer tha t the agents consider the impact of multi-agent opportunism on 
the overall system. To do this, they should limit their requests for opportunistic 
assistance to just those goals tha t are likely to be satisfied by some other agent with 
as little impact as possible on the system ’s (aggregate) resources. As such, an agent’s 
decision should take into account the costs and benefits of receiving opportunistic help 
for itself as well as for other agents. The costs may include processing the request
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for assistance, watching for opportunity cues, and communication overhead. Benefits 
may include simply accomplishing the task early, accomplishing it at all, or meeting 
the preconditions of future tasks of this or other agents. Of course, while computing 
its own potential costs and benefits may not be difficult for an agent, determining 
the potential costs and benefits to other agents and to the system as a whole may be 
much more complicated. This is because in our heterogeneous environment, agents 
may not have sufficient information about one another to compute accurate values, 
making these decisions difficult.
W hat opportun ity-related  inform ation to  share?
Once an agent decides it can use opportunistic assistance from other agents, it must 
next determine exactly what information should be shared. The ultim ate objective 
is to allow one agent to recognize opportunity cues for another agent. In general the 
more one agent knows about what the other agents are doing, the more help it can 
provide. However, since we are assuming the agents are heterogeneous, and tha t they 
may not even know about all of the other agents in the MAS, the real question is just 
how little knowledge the agents can share to still be helpful to each other.
There are three possibilities for explicitly sharing opportunity-related information: 
cue sharing, for which the task-owning agent determines and distributes the oppor­
tunity  cues to the other agents; goal sharing, where the task-owning agent notifies 
the other agents of the tasks and goals for which it could use assistance; or some 
combination of these two, which we will call mixed sharing. We will examine each 
of these in turn. Recall tha t we are assuming the agents are able to communicate 
effectively with one another, which implies tha t the agents will understand the tasks, 
goals, and opportunity cues th a t are sent to them.
When using cue sharing, each agent determines the cues th a t might indicate an
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opportunity for one of its goals or tasks, and distributes these cues to the other agents. 
Often these cues are the unmet preconditions or missing resources of the method the 
agent is using to accomplish the goal or task. We use preconditions and resources as 
cues because they are often easily identifiable in a given domain and, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, they are often explicitly represented in most planning systems, making it 
possible to reason about them. The main advantage of cue sharing is that the agent 
selecting the cues is able to use contextual information about hovy it is planning to 
satisfy th a t goal. For example, the top-level manager of a group of AU Vs might 
select contingency organizations to fit anticipated situations (e.g., a CONVEX event 
is observed). This may be the only agent tha t can take advantage of the processing 
done in the organization selection process to determine opportunity cues.
Using this approach, however, may limit the novelty of the opportunities that 
could be exploited. This is primarily because it is difficult for the task-owning agent to 
determine the appropriate level of abstraction to use for opportunity cues. A remote 
agent may have different abilities and experiences tha t would allow it to recognize 
ways in which a suspended task could be satisfied tha t the task-owning agent would 
not have considered. For example, if one agent has a task of cutting a rope and asks 
other agents to help it find a knife (because th a t is what its plan says to use), another 
agent may not know tha t the pair of scissors it possesses might do the job, since it 
does not know why the knife is needed.
When using goal sharing, knowledge of the goals for which agents could use oppor­
tunistic assistance is distributed to other agents, leaving each agent to determine cues 
on its own. If the remote agent computes the opportunity cues, the original contex­
tual information is likely to be lost, but it will be able to use its own local knowledge 
of the world to select cues. Since we are assuming heterogeneous agents, it is possible 
tha t the remote agent could come up with and recognize a cue th a t the owning agent
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could not have. The above scissors-for-rope-cutting example demonstrates one such 
scenario. The task-owning agent would have to verify the novel opportunities (i.e., 
tha t it can actually use the scissors to cut the rope). But, verifying potential oppor­
tunities is a normal part of the second step in exploiting opportunities, determining 
the facilitated action (see Figure 4-2).
However, the use of goal sharing assumes tha t the remote agents are able to 
determine opportunity cues on their own, which may not be realistic in all MASs. 
We have assumed that, for multi-agent opportunism to be possible, at least some of 
the agents in the MAS are capable of single-agent opportunism. This implies tha t at 
least some of the agents are capable of both determining and detecting opportunity 
cues. However, it does not imply tha t they all can. It is possible for an MAS to 
contain agents tha t are capable of recognizing opportunity cues, but are not capable 
of coming up with the cues themselves (e.g., they may have the appropriate sensors, 
but no planning capabilities). Using strict goal sharing could thus leave out some 
agents tha t otherwise might be able to recognize potential opportunities.
Also, goal sharing may place a significant burden on the remote agents, since they 
must now compute a plan for satisfying the goal, determine the opportunity cues for 
themselves, and then watch for them. This is in contrast to the computational burden 
that cue sharing would impose, where the sending agent does the processing for the 
cue determination. In fact, even when using goal sharing, the originating agent must 
also compute opportunity cues for itself. This computation is not utilized by any 
other agent, and thus may result in wasteful redundancy.
It is possible tha t some combination of cue sharing and goal sharing may allow us to 
minimize the computational burden placed on the remote agents while maximizing the 
recognition of potential opportunities. One possible mixed sharing approach would 
require the task-owning agent to distribute both its opportunity cues and the goal
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to which they apply. This would allow the remote agents to examine the cues in the 
context of the related goal, which could enable them to recognize novel opportunities. 
It could also allow agents who cannot determine opportunity cues on their own to 
just use the ones sent to them, further increasing the possibility of noticing potential 
opportunities.
W hich  other agents?
Once an agent determines what opportunity-related information it will share, it must 
select the  other agents in the MAS to share it with. Here there are three possibilities: 
the agent could tell every other agent in the MAS, it could tell only the specific agents 
tha t it believes are best suited to assist it in recognizing opportunities, or it could 
defer the selection process to another agent, such as a manager or a broker. Note 
tha t the opportunity-related information may also be tailored for the selected agents, 
based upon their capabilities.
Telling every other agent would certainly maximize the potential for recognizing 
an opportunity. It may also be a cost effective approach when the number of agents 
in the MAS is small, or when the normal communication mechanism broadcasts mes­
sages to all agents anyway. However, when the communication mechanism performs a 
broadcast by sending many messages (e.g., one message to every agent), the commu­
nication cost would likely be prohibitive for all but small groups of agents. Further, 
every agent would receive the request, including those th a t could not recognize or 
respond to potential opportunities for the request. Each of these agents would have 
to examine the request and determine if it could provide opportunistic assistance, 
increasing the overall processing cost. This processing would be wasteful if only a 
few of the agents were capable of providing opportunistic assistance for the request, 
as well as distracting the agents away from tasks they could be working on.
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A potentially more cost-effective approach would be to have an agent select only 
those other agents tha t it believes would be able to recognize and respond to oppor­
tunities based on the opportunity-related information it provides. Since this informa­
tion contains descriptions of goals and tasks, or specific opportunity cues derived from 
those goals and tasks, the selection process would use knowledge of the capabilities 
and available resources of the agents in order to determine which to request oppor­
tunistic assistance from. For example, a Rover agent with a suspended soil-sampling 
goal would only notify agents tha t can also take soil samples.
The difficult part of this selection process involves how an agent knows about 
the capabilities and resources of the other agents in the MAS. But this is the same 
information the agents need for delegating tasks to other agents in the MAS tha t they 
cannot do themselves. As such we can exploit the task allocation support mechanisms 
tha t are available for the particular coordination mechanism being used. Naturally, 
the details of how an agent would obtain the required information would depend upon 
the specific coordination mechanism in use (e.g., a matchmaker would be queried 
when using middle agents, a request for bids from agents with the needed capabilities 
would be issued when contract nets [Smith, 1980] are being used, etc.). It is also 
likely tha t obtaining this information would be more difficult using some coordination 
mechanisms than with others. But, by using the existing coordination mechanism, we 
can take advantage of the existing infrastructure and the processing tha t is already 
being done with a little additional burden on the agents.
Similarly, an agent could tell one other agent, or perhaps a small number of other 
agents, about its opportunity-related information. The chosen agent or agents would 
in turn  select the other agents to distribute the this information to and forward this 
information. This might be desirable if a few agents in the MAS already possess 
knowledge of the capabilities and resources of the other agents in the MAS, reducing
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the need for the individual agents to conduct the selection process. Such agents 
would include matchmakers and brokers in MASs coordinated using middle agents, 
or manager agents in hierarchical organizations. Examples of both  of these approaches 
to using a middle agent to find agents with particular capabilities are given in Section
2.1. Further, this type of deferred notification would be particularly suitable in open 
MASs, where the structure of the system is not known by every agent, and the 
organizational knowledge is likely to be maintained by only a few agents. These 
agents will be in the best position to get the opportunity-related information to the 
agents with the right capabilities, even if the structure of the MAS changes.
4.2.2 M ulti-A gent O pportun ity  R esponse
After the opportunity-related information has been distributed to the appropriate 
agents, those agents can watch for potential opportunities to satisfy the opportunity 
requests. As we have previously noted, we are assuming th a t at least some of the 
agents are capable of recognizing opportunities for suspended goals, and thus we in­
tend to exploit this ability. For those agents tha t can potentially provide opportunistic 
assistance, there are two critical issues tha t must be considered:
• How can an agent decide if it should provide opportunistic assistance?
• How should an agent respond to a recognized opportunity?
Should th e agent respond?
Even if an agent is capable of providing opportunistic assistance, it may not be 
appropriate to do so. The agents must have a way to decide if supporting the goals 
of other agents would interfere with the achievement of their own goals, and if so, if 
the other goals are somehow more im portant.
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The agents could conceivably employ a negotiation mechanism to attem pt to find 
a globally optimal (or near optimal) re-allocation of the goals requiring opportunistic 
assistance, such as coalition restructuring [Shehory and Kraus, 1998] and multi-agent 
Markov decision processes (MMDP) [Boutilier, 1999; Goldman and Zilberstein, 2003]. 
While these methods will produce an allocation of goals among th a t agents tha t should 
lead to improved system performance, in general they require either a centralized 
mechanism to analyze the planned actions of the agents involved or an exchange of 
large amounts of plan-related information. Further, these methods are often very 
computationally complex, requiring an analysis of many thousands of actions and 
states even for simple coordination problems [Boutilier, 1999]. As such this approach 
is unlikely to be practical given our assumption of heterogeneous MASs with limited 
shared information.
The decision process an agent uses should, instead, utilize local knowledge almost 
exclusively, and be as computationally efficient as possible. T hat is, the decision itself 
should be opportunistic, in tha t the agent should analyze its current intentions (i.e., 
the actions it is currently planning to execute to satisfy its own goals) to determine 
if providing opportunistic assistance is feasible. As with the optimization approaches 
mentioned above, such a decision process should have to take into account the costs 
and benefits of helping satisfy some other agent’s goal, possibly at the expense of 
not satisfying its own goals, but based on the agent’s local knowledge. Because of 
its decision theoretic nature, even with the local restrictions a general approach to 
this issue could easily become intractable, so care must be taken when considering 
these decision processes. Limiting the decision to an analysis of current intentions, 
and avoiding re-planning, should help keep this tractable.
This decision process would likely be similar to the one used when an agent decides 
if it would be cost effective to request opportunistic assistance (Section 4.2.1). In fact
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these decision processes are more related than our presentation would indicate, in that 
knowing how an agent would decide if it should provide opportunistic assistance is 
likely to  influence the decision of when opportunistic assistance should be requested. 
T hat is, if an agent knows what costs and benefits are considered by agents when 
they receive requests for opportunistic assistance, it can better decide when (for 
which goals) to make those requests, as well as to wTich other agents.
H ow  to  respond?
After an agent decides tha t it should provide opportunistic assistance for a particular 
goal, it can begin “watching for” potential opportunities using its existing opportunity 
recognition capabilities (recall th a t we are assuming tha t an agent tha t decides it 
can provide assistance is capable of single-agent opportunism). Once a potential 
opportunity is noticed, the agent must then decide how to respond. There are three 
general responses an agent can take: it can ignore the potential opportunity, it can 
simply notify the interested agent or agents of the opportunity, or it can take some 
action on behalf of the interested agent in response to the recognized opportunity.
When the response is to notify the interested agent or agents, the recognizing 
agent must determine which agents might be interested in the recognized opportu­
nity. The obvious choice is to notify the agent tha t made the request for opportunistic 
assistance. But there may be other agents also interested in knowing about occur­
rence of the opportunity. Just as when an agent decides which other agents to share 
its opportunity-related information with (Section 4.2.1), the recognizing agent could 
notify every other agent in the MAS, or notify just a select set based upon their 
known capabilities. Similarly, a middle agent could be used both to find agent with 
particular capabilities, or as a means of indirect notification.
Under some circumstances, however, the agent tha t recognizes the opportunity
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may also provide further help by taking some action on behalf of the requesting 
agent. Continuing our rope cutting example from above, if one agent knows that 
another agent is looking for a knife so tha t it may cut a rope, and the agent has a 
pair of scissors (and knows how to use them), it may be able to cut the rope for the 
other agent and notify it tha t its rope-cutting task has been accomplished.
To avoid undesired side-effects, the goal-owning agent may need to include re­
stricting conditions as part of the opportunity-related information th a t it shares (see 
Section 4.2.1). For instance, the goal-owning agent may want to specify th a t the end 
of the rope should not be damaged, preventing another agent from considering using 
a more drastic cutting tool, like a chain saw.
As mentioned in Chapter 1 , the most straightforward way for an agent to deter­
mine if it should take some action on behalf of another agent in response to a potential 
opportunity is to coordinate with tha t other agent. This coordination could be car­
ried out through a simple “standard operating procedure” (e.g., always take an action 
if the cost is less than X), or through an agreed upon communication protocol. For 
example, the recognizing agent could notify the goal-owning agent of the potential 
opportunity. The notification message could also include a description of the recog­
nizing agent’s capabilities as registered with the middle agent (thus avoiding the need 
to query the middle agent). If the recognizing agent has the appropriate capabilities, 
the goal-owning agent could then request the recognizing agent to  carry out some 
action through the normal task request mechanism. As an added benefit, in the case 
where more than one agent simultaneously recognizes a potential opportunity for an 
agent’s suspended goal, this approach would allow the goal owning agent to decide 
which, if any, of the agents should take some action.
There may be situations, however, where it is not possible for the recognizing 
agent to coordinate with the goal-owning agent. Unfortunately there is no simple
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domain-independent way for an agent to decide on its own when it should satisfy 
another agent’s task. It would have to consider such things as the costs and benefits 
of performing the task, to both itself and the other agents. It would also have to 
consider if it would be appropriate to accomplish the task, as there may be side 
effects th a t it does not know about. Further, without coordination, multiple agents 
may end up taking action in response to a recognized opportunity, potentially causing 
conflict among the agents. Thus, when coordination is not possible, the best option 
is likely to be notification.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter we have presented our general framework for multi-agent opportunism, 
focusing on the the critical information-sharing and decision-making issues tha t must 
be addressed by any approach to providing this capability to an MAS. These key 
issues can be divided according to how they are used for supporting how agents can 
recognize and respond to potential opportunities. To enable agents to recognize op­
portunities for one another’s goals, the following questions must be answered: When 
ghould an apent regueat opportuniatzc aaawtance other ogenta? Fliact/ÿ what 
opportunity-related information should the agents share? and How should an agent 
determme which other agenta to ahare ita opportanitg-retated in/ormation withP Sim- 
ilarly, for an agent to be able to respond to a potential opportunity for another agent, 
the following questions must be addressed: How can an agent decide i f  it should 
provide opportaniatic aaaiatancef and Row ahoatd an agent reapond to a recognized 
opportunity? In the next two chapters we describe a specific approach to  incorpo­
rating multi-agent opportunism into a system of planning agents, paying particular 
attention to how we address these critical issues.
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C hapter 5
Planning and E xecution
The previous chapter describes a general framework for multi-agent opportunism, 
focusing on the critical knowledge-sharing and decision-making issues tha t would have 
to be addressed by any specific approach. While this general framework does provide 
im portant guidance, it is too abstract to be of practical use in a real-world MAS. 
In the next two chapters we describe a specific plan-based approach to multi-agent 
opportunism tha t should be applicable in most systems of agents th a t are capable of 
performing non-trivial planning tasks. The planning and execution scheme, described 
in this chapter, was developed especially to support opportunistic behavior of agents 
in various settings of shared knowledge. To preserve generality, this scheme does not 
assume tha t the agents are using any particular, or even the same, planning method­
ology. This is achieved by using a generic form of plan representation, with which 
we can represent characteristics of most (if not all) techniques used in the area of 
classical (i.e., STRIPS-based) AI domain-independent planning [Smith, 2003]. Fur­
ther, the selected planning and execution scheme readily supports a computationally 
efficient form of opportunism based on predictive encoding [Patalano et ah, 1993], 
in which potential opportunities are pre-computed and associated with existing plan 
elements. We present this model of multi-agent opportunism in Chapter 6 .
P ortions of th e  co n ten t of th is  c h ap te r  have been  published  in [Law ton an d  D om sh lak , 2003, 2004a; D om shlak 
and Law ton, 2003, 2004].
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5.1 A ssum ptions and M otivations
Our prim ary motivation for developing our plan-based approach to multi-agent op­
portunism  was to find a way to make it easy for a collection of heterogeneous agents 
to share information with one another about potential opportunities for their goals. 
We also wanted to facilitate the decision processes agents use related to pursuing 
potential opportunities. In order to understand how these motivations led to the 
approach described in this and the following chapter, however, we must first review 
the assumptions we are making about the agents and the world they operate in. We 
start w ith the assumptions described in the beginning of Chapter 4:
1. We are working with an open multi-agent system, made up of a collection of 
heterogeneous agents, and operating in a real-world domain, th a t is capable of 
accomplishing tasks in the given domain.
2. The agents are able to communicate effectively with one another.
3. The agents in the MAS are cooperative.
4. The agents may have little or no knowledge in common about each other’s 
capabilities, goals, plans, etc.
5. A subset of the agents in the MAS are capable of single-agent opportunism.
We will further assume tha t we are working with planning agents, and tha t the 
agents will have insufficient resources to satisfy all of their goals. The resource lim­
itation assumption has been included to produce situations where the agents must 
decide which goals they should attem pt to satisfy and which they should ignore. This 
naturally leads to situations where an agent can attem pt to get other agents to help 
it satisfy the goals it is not pursuing. This is not an unrealistic assumption. Real-
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world domains, such as the Rovers domain from Section 2.1, often contain agents 
with severe resource restrictions.
Given these assumptions, we decided to exploit the information contained in the 
agents’ plans to support multi-agent opportunism. We did not, however, want to 
require th a t the agents use any particular—or even the same—planning mechanism. 
Consequently, we needed to limit our assumptions about the plans these agents would 
use. To support this requirement, we determined tha t we needed to develop an 
abstract plan representation, as well as a mechanism for executing the represented 
plans.
The abstract plan representation had to serve two purposes. First, it would have 
to be able to represent plans generated by actual planners. We decided to focus on 
classical AI domain-independent planners, both because of their simple, yet power­
ful, capabilities, and because of the wide availability of existing planning systems 
[Smith, 2003]. This decision required tha t our plan abstraction be able to represent 
partially-ordered plan actions. Second, the plan representation would have to explic­
itly represent the information needed for reasoning about potential opportunities. As 
discussed in Section 4.2, for our model this meant th a t the plan abstraction would 
have to explicitly represent the preconditions, effects, and resource requirements of a 
plan’s actions.
We also needed to develop an execution mechanism for our plan representation 
tha t would allow an agent to select a course of action th a t best uses its limited 
resources, and allows it to reason about potential opportunities at runtime. As men­
tioned above, an agent may not have sufficient resources to satisfy all of its goals. 
However, when the agent generates a plan to accomplish these goals, it ignores this 
fact. Further, since we are assuming the agent is operating in a dynamic environment, 
the resources used by the individual plan actions may differ from what was expected.
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This means tha t there may be fewer (or more) resources for the remainder of the 
plan. Similarly, as opportunities arise to provide assistance to other agents with their 
suspended goals, the value of some of the goals in an agent’s plan may change. An 
agent m ust be able select a course of action to take during the execution of its plan 
tha t satisfies the most valuable goals with its limited—and changing—resources. In 
a partially-ordered plan, this course of action is a particular to tal order among the 
various partial orders of the plan’s actions. So as to impose as few restrictions on 
the agents as possible, we did not assume tha t the agents would be able to re-plan 
during execution. Thus the agents must be able to decide on the best course of action 
within their current plans without changing them. To make this possible, we needed 
to develop an execution mechanism for our plan representation th a t would enable an 
agent to select the next action at execution time tha t would most likely lead to the 
accomplishment of the most im portant goals.
The execution mechanism tha t we developed allows an agent to select a course 
of action in an approximate decision-theoretic way, using the expected action costs 
(described in terms of resource needs) and the externally assigned values of each goal. 
If during plan execution the agent realizes th a t it does not have the resources to 
accomplish all of its goals, our mechanism allows it to select the actions tha t will 
lead to the satisfaction of the most valuable goals. The mechanism is “approximate” 
in tha t tha t it does not consider all possible courses of action within a given plan. 
Rather, the analysis is limited to the average-cost, successful courses of action. As we 
discuss in the next section, without this restriction, the analysis would be intractable 
even for the simplest plans
To support multi-agent opportunism, our plan abstraction allows an agent to 
predictively encode extra goals tha t have not been assigned to it, but th a t may be 
suspended by other agents. This is a form of predictive encoding because the agent
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is pre-computing the opportunity cues and incorporating them into its plan, allowing 
the normal runtime execution mechanism to recognize and respond to potential op­
portunities. Initially, these extra goals would have no value in the agent’s plan, thus 
our plan execution mechanism will allow the agent to ignore them. If, however, at 
runtime another agent requests opportunistic assistance on one of these extra goals, 
an agent tha t has the goal already encoded in its current plan need only increase the 
goal’s value. The execution mechanism will automatically allow the agent to deter­
mine the best course of action. This provides an agent a consistent (and transparent) 
way to decide whether it should apply its resources toward one of its own goals or 
one of another agent tha t has been predictively encoded in the plan.
In the remainder of this chapter we present the details of our plan representation 
and execution mechanism. In the next chapter (Chapter 6 ), we will describe how 
our plan-based approach can be used to support both single-agent and multi-agent 
opportunism, including an explanation of how the approach addresses the key issues 
presented in Section 4.2. We begin our discussion with a detailed description of the 
assumptions we are making about the agents and the environment they operate in.
5.2 A bstract M odel of M ulti-A gent P lanning and Execution
To represent an abstract multi-agent system, we have defined a model th a t both is 
based on models generally accepted in the MAS community and satisfies the assump­
tions described in the previous section. The model we are using is very similar to 
those used by Shehory and Kraus [1996] and Ogston and Vassiliadis [2001], but has 
been extended to express opportunistic behavior.
We model a multi-agent system as a collection of benevolent agents {Ai, • • ■ , A„}, 
where each agent A, is associated with a set of capabilities Q  =  {c*^ , • ■ ■ , Q,}, and 
a set of resources R  =  ■ ■ ■ , Each r* . indicates the amount of the resource
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class Yj (e.g., time, energy, etc.) tha t agent A, currently has. We currently only 
model consumable resources in this way, using plan conditions for reusable resources. 
For example, o n -b o ard (cam era i, Ag) would indicate tha t A2 currently possesses 
the reusable resource camerai.
In the  related models mentioned above, the difference between the capabilities and 
the resources is not very clear. To clarify this point, in our model the capabilities of 
(m agent coTregpond to tfie goak tfiat con be oaatgned to A^ . For example, consider 
a team  of three planetary rovers Ai, Ag and A3, where both A% and Ag are equipped 
with cameras, while A3 is not. In this group, the goal “have picture of location L I” 
is in both  capabilities sets Ci and Cg, but not in C3. For any given domain, we 
will let C  be the (possibly infinite) set of all goals tha t can be accomplished in the 
domain—i.e., the set of all possible capabilities. Thus for each agent A,, Q  C C.
The definition of capabilities in terms of a possibly infinite set of goals may at 
first appear to make our model intractable. To address this issue we assume th a t we 
are working with discrete, finite domains. For example, in the Rovers domain, we 
identify a finite, discrete set of locations for the various sampling and imaging goals. 
Most real-world domains can be made finite in this way. More im portant, in Chapter 
7  we show tha t this assumption is only necessary for one case of our approach to 
multi-agent opportunism, where the shared knowledge among the agents is limited to 
just capabilities.
In addition to the acting agents {Ai, ■ ■ ■ , A„}, we assume there is an agent B acting 
as a task broker [Klusch and Sycara, 2001]. We use B to simplify the description of 
the information flow in the system: The primary job of B is simply to dispatch the 
goals of the system to the various agents. B ’s decision process and implementation 
are not im portant for our work. The only thing we assume about B is tha t it will 
assign goal g to agent A, only if g € Q .
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Given a set of goals G, =  ,gi^} Ç Q , agent A, plans for this set of
goals, and begins the execution of the generated plan V. To better support more 
realistic domains, we assume tha t each goal g is annotated with its value Vg (which 
may be parameterized by various features such as deadlines, energy remaining after 
completion, etc.), and tha t the planning process takes these value functions into 
account. Goal value functions will be explained in more detail in later Section 5.3.1. 
Further, each plan action is assumed to have its resource consumption associated with 
it. In most realistic domains, resource consumption will not be certain and thus will 
likely be represented using a probability distribution.
During the execution of a plan V  by some agent A,, several aspects of the world 
could change, impacting the relative attractiveness of V. For instance, any of the 
following may occur:
• Ai is assigned an additional goal by B.
• The value Vg for some g G Gi changes (positively or negatively).
•  Some of the goals in G* becomes unreachable w ith respect to V.
•  The current resource levels are not as expected after executing some part of V. 
This may be due to such things as the resource consumption by the part of V  
executed so far has been significantly different (positively or negatively) from 
what was expected during planning, the unexpected addition of new resources, 
etc.
In such cases. A, should revisit its current course of action, possibly updating its set 
of active goals, and suspending goals it determines are no longer feasible. Normally, 
these suspended goals would be returned to the broker for redistribution to other
agents in the multi-agent system, or possibly abandoned completely. In our model,
though, Ai may attem pt to satisfy these goals opportunistically by fitting them into
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some other part of its current plan, or into the current plan of another agent in the 
multi-agent system, without re-planning. Our approach to this is discussed in the 
following sections.
5.3 Basic M odel for Planning and Execution
As we introduced in Section 5.1, our aim is to develop an abstract plan represen­
tation and corresponding execution mechanism that supports flexible, opportunistic 
behavior without execution-time re-planning. Instead of re-planning, we would like 
the agents to adapt to potential opportunities by reasoning about their current plans. 
Our approach, described in this section, was significantly inspired by the work on con­
tingency planning for planetary rovers [Dearden et al., 2002]. Our main motivation 
for adopting this formalism was to stay as close to real-world domains as possible.
5.3.1 P lanning
Following Dearden et al. [2002], we assume th a t there are two parts of a planning prob­
lem, qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative part of the problem is described 
using the prepositional STRIPS formalism in which both positive and negative pre­
conditions are allowed^ [Bylander, 1994]. By using a prepositional formalism, we can 
be sure tha t our example planning domains will have a discrete, finite set of goals, 
meeting our assumption discussed in the previous section. Each agent is associated 
with a description of its state (represented as a conjunct of valid propositions), a set of 
goal propositions to be achieved, and set of possible actions, each of which is charac­
terized by its preconditions and effects. In what follows, we denote the preconditions 
and effects of action A  by prec(A) and effects (A), respectively.
The quantitative part of the problem is described by the resource consumptions
'■This is also exac tly  th e  form alism  used for th e  first level of p lan n in g  co m p e titio n  [Fox an d  Long, 2002].
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of the actions and the values associated with each goal. Resource consumption is 
modeled using consumption probability distributions associated with each action. 
Goal values represent the contribution to the system of achieving the goal (i.e., its 
“global” value), and not just to the individual agent. Again following Dearden et al. 
[2002], we use a very general representation for goal values. They are modeled as 
functions of the resources available after achieving these goals. For example, suppose 
r  is the only resource used by an agent. It may represent such things as the amount 
of energy the agent has, or the amount time remaining before some deadline. If the 
value function Vg(r)  of goal g  is;
r  <  0
10. r >  0
then the value of g is 10  if we can achieve g with some amount of r  remaining (i.e., 
the agent hasn’t expended all of its energy, a key deadline hasn’t passed, etc), and 
0, otherwise. Of course, this representation may be unnecessary in many domains, 
thus goal values may also simply be constant functions (e.g., V g(r)  =  1 0 ) tha t are 
independent of r.
As with Dearden et al. [2002], in the planning stage we ignore the quantitative 
part of the problem, solving the STRIPS-based problem as if there is no resource 
consumption or difference in the importance of the goals. However, the difference 
between our model of planning and tha t used by Dearden et al. [2002] is tha t their 
model corresponds to the first stage of the Graphplan algorithm [Blum and Furst, 
1997], resulting in a planning graph, while we are interested in a structure tha t has 
properties of both a planning graph and a partial order plan [McAllester and Rosen- 
blitt, 1991]), without tying us to a specific formalism. In order to introduce the plan 
representation structure used in our framework, we will first briefly describe partial 
order plans and planning graphs. Note th a t we are not interested here in the planning
60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
SampleRock(p)
PRECONDITIONS: lo ca tio n (p ) A At(p)
EFFECTS: h s ( p )
TakePicture(p)
PRECONDITIONS: lo ca tio n (p ) A At(p)
EFFECTS: h p ( p )
N avigate(p, q)
PRECONDITIONS: lo ca tio n (p ) A lo c a tio n (q ) A At(p)
EFFECTS: -iAt(p) A At(q)
Figure 5-1: Operators for Rovers example.
process itself, but rather the representation of the plan created as a result of planning.
A partial order plan is a tuple { A ,0 ,C ) ,  where A  is a set of actions, O is a 
set of ordering constraints over A,  and £  is a set of causal links. For example, if 
A  = {Ai, A2 , A3} then O  might be the set {Ai < A3 , A2 < A3}. These constraints 
specify a plan in which A3 is necessarily the last operator, bu t do not commit to a 
particular order on Ai and A2 . Naturally, the set of ordering constraints must be 
consistent, i.e., there must exist some to tal order satisfying them. A causal link has 
the form A, Aj, where A, and Aj  are actions and g is a proposition. Such a causal 
link denotes the fact tha t A, produces (i.e., has the effect) q which is required by Aj 
(i.e., used to satisfy a precondition of A j ) .  Ordering constraints are imposed among 
the actions to ensure tha t other actions do not threaten the causal links.
For example, consider a simple problem th a t is based on the Rovers domain used 
in the recent planning competition [Fox and Long, 2002]. Three of the operators
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Sam pleR ock(L2) hs(L2 )-— At(L2)--At (LI).
At(Ll)
ip(Ll)-
G oalS t a r t
Sam pleR ock(L l)
T a k e P ic tu re (L l)  _____
N a v ig a te (L l,  L2)
Figure 5-2: Partial order plan for the Rovers example.
available to an agent (simplified for ease of presentation) are shown in Figure 5-1, 
where the propositions hs(p) and hp(p) stand for “have rock sample” and “have 
picture” from location p, respectively. The relevant part of the initial state of the 
agent is At(Ll) A -ihs(Ll) A -ihp(Ll) A -ihs(L2), while the goals are hs(L l), hp(Ll), 
and hs(L2). Figure 5-2 presents the relevant part of a possible partial order plan 
for this problem, where the solid edges represent the causal links (labeled with the 
corresponding propositions), and the dashed edges represent the ordering constraints 
tha t are not trivially entailed by the causal links^. It is easy to see th a t there are two 
totally ordered plans consistent with this partial order plan, and the only difference 
between them is the relative positions of SampleRock(Ll) and T akeP ictu re(L l).
In contrast, a planning graph is a directed graph arranged into alternating levels 
of proposition nodes and action nodes. To be precise, in what follows we describe 
a solved planning graph, which is the representation of a plan resulting from the 
GraphPlan algorithm. As we are only interested in this end product, we will omit 
some details (e.g., mutual exclusion relations) tha t are only relevant during plan 
generation.
Level 0 of a planning graph contains all of the relevant proposition nodes tha t are
^ S ta r t  and  G oals nodes are  dum m y actions ac tin g  as a  p ro d u cer o f th e  in itia lly  valid  p ropositions and 
th e  consum er of th e  goal p ropositions, respectively.
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Figure 5-3: Solved Planning Graph for the Rovers example.
valid in the initial state. Nodes at level 1 are actions whose preconditions are met 
in the initial state. An edge in a planning graph th a t connects a proposition node q 
in level i to an action node A  in level i + 1 represents a precondition link. Similarly, 
edges from an action node A  in level j  to proposition nodes in level j  + 1 represent 
the effects of A. A  path from action Ai at level k  to action Aj a t level k-\-2  through 
proposition q a t level A; +  1 is equivalent to a causal link A^ Aj in a partial order 
plan.
The levels of a planning graph are used to impose ordering constraints between 
the actions. An action A  at level i cannot be executed until all actions at level i — 2 
have been executed. Actions at the same level may be executed in any order. NO-OP 
actions are used to carry unchanged proposition nodes forward in the graph.
Continuing with the Rovers example described above, Figure 5-3 presents the 
relevant part of the solved planning graph for this problem. Bullets (e.g “• ”) are used 
to represent NO-OP actions. Notice tha t even though planning graphs make explicit 
which actions may be executed “in parallel” at a given time, like partial order plans 
they only describe a partial ordering of these actions. Executing a planning graph 
still involves finding a valid total ordering of the actions.
To achieve a higher degree of flexibility for supporting plan-based multi-agent 
opportunism, we have merged characteristics of both partial order plans and planning
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.s(Ll)
.s(L2), t ( L l )
ip(L l)
Sam pleRock(L2)
Sam pleR ock(L l)
T a k e P ic tu re (L l)
N a v ig a te (L l,L 2 )
Figure 5-4: Partial order plan graph (POPG) for the Rovers example.
graphs into a structure that we refer to as a partial order plan graph (POPG). A 
PO PG  may be viewed as a partial order plan where the preconditions and effects 
are explicitly represented as propositions nodes. The action nodes are exactly the 
nodes of the original partial order plan (excluding the dummy start and goal nodes), 
while each proposition node is created by contracting the causal links corresponding 
to effectively the same proposition. Similarly, a POPG  may be viewed as a solved 
planning graph where the levels have been collapsed. Like a planning graph, a POPG 
contains two types of nodes: proposition nodes and action nodes. However, in contrast 
to planning graphs, a POPG is not a leveled graph, and the alternative schedules of 
the plan are captured by explicit ordering constraints. The PO PG  for the running 
example is depicted in Figure 5-4.
Now tha t we have described our abstract plan representation, we can return to 
the discussion on our model of planning. We assume th a t the qualitative part of 
the actual plan for a given problem instance is generated by an external planner and 
converted into a POPG, creating to a “skeleton” plan. This plan structure is then 
augmented with the quantitative aspects of the problem: The actions are annotated 
with their resource consumption distributions and the goal nodes are annotated with 
their value functions. The resulting structure is ready to be used in the execution 
stage.
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5.3.2 E xecution
Given an initial state, a set of resources, and a POPG representation of the plan 
enriched by the quantitative information about resource consumption and values of 
the different goals, the agent can begin to execute its plan. At each intermediate 
state s during the execution, the agent must make a decision about the next action 
to perform. As the agent is provided with a partially-ordered plan, there may be 
more than  one action applicable in the state s, given the current set of resources. For 
instance, in the initial state of the running example, both actions SampleRock(Ll) and 
T akeP icture(L l) are consistent with the plan represented by the POPG  in Figure 5-
4. In addition, however, observe tha t if we ignore the ordering links for the moment, 
the action N avigate(L l, L2) can be performed in the initial state as well. Clearly, 
if the agent has sufficient resources to accomplish all of its goals, performing this 
action will be irrational since the agent will lose its ability to achieve the goals hs(L l) 
and hp(Ll). On the other hand, if resources are limited and the goal lis(L2) is very 
im portant, it might be the case tha t the right thing to do is to forget about hs(Ll) 
and hp(Ll), and to perform N avigate(L l, L2), trying to achieve hs(L2) with as little 
risk as possible.
In general, deciding upon which course of action to take when there are several 
alternatives requires an estimate of how much value could be gained by each. Com­
puting these values exactly is intractable, as it requires taking into account not only 
the uncertain resource consumption of each action to be executed in the future, but 
also capturing in the model all possible results of potential future failures. However, 
adopting the method in which the resource consumption distributions are abstracted 
by Dearden et al. [2002], we outline an approximation m ethod for such a value esti­
mation.
An agent executes its plan by repeatedly selecting and executing one of its plan
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actions, A, th a t can be executed in the current state, s, with the current resources, 
p. Executing A  updates state s, creating the new (intermediate) state a{s,A),  and 
reduces the resources p appropriately. For ease of presentation, in what follows we 
assume th a t there is only one resource, and p is the amount of this resource available 
when the agent is selecting its next action, A. When estimating the value of perform­
ing a given action, instead of taking into account the precise resource consumption 
distributions, each action A  is annotated with (i) its expected consumption p(A) and 
(ii) the minimal resource level min(A) required to allow A  to be executed. This way, 
if p > min(A), then A  can be executed, its execution is assumed to be successful, and 
its resource consumption is expected to be p(A). Otherwise, if p < min(A), then the 
action is not executable, due to the risk associated with its failure. Note that, while 
p(A) is defined purely by the resource consumption distribution of A, min(A) must 
be specified explicitly as part of the problem specification.
Let actions(T’, s, p) (specified by Eq. 5.1) be the set of actions in the plan repre­
sented by POPG  P  tha t are executable in state s with p amount of resource available.
actions('P, s, p) = { A ^ V  \ prec(A) e  s A p >  min(A)} (5.1)
The value U{V,s ,p)  represents our estimate of how much value could be gained by 
executing plan V  with p amount of resource, starting at the state s. As is specified 
by Eq. 5.2, the value U(V,s ,  p) is computed by finding the maximum expected value 
tha t could be obtained by selecting each action A  G actions(T’, s, p) as the next action 
to be executed. T hat is, for any action A  G actions(T’, s, p), executing A in s with 
p will produce several valid to tal orders of the partially-ordered actions in V.  Each 
total order will result in some value being obtained through the satisfaction of some 
or all of the goals in V.  The maximum expected value th a t could be obtained by 
executing A  is thus the maximum of the values obtained by the various total orders 
starting with A.  Similarly, the maximum of the expected values of executing each
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action A  G actions(7^, s, p) is the expected value of the plan, U(V,s ,p) .
(7 (0 , g,p) =  0
(^('P,'S,p)= max [aC P ,A ,s ,p )+ /3(A ,p )]
a e a c t io n s ( P ,s ,p )
a (P ,  A, s, p) =  (7 (Refine(P, A, g), (r(g. A), p -  p(^4))
(5.2)
l ^ { A , p ) — ^  Vg{p -  p{A))
g eeffe c ts(A )
(5.3)
As specified in Eq. 5.2, the expected value of each action A G actions(P, s, p) 
is computed as the sum of two components. The /3-component is simply the value 
of the goals achieved directly by executing A. The cr-component is the value of 
the remaining plan tha t the agent will have after performing A. That is, it is the 
maximum of the expected values obtained by the various to tal orders of V  starting 
with, but not including, A.
The a- and /3-components are specified in Eq. 5.3 by a{V,  A,  s, p) and /3(A, p), 
respectively. The /3-component is computed by /3(A, p) in the obvious way; by com­
puting the sum of the values of each goal g, V g { p ) ,  tha t are satisfied as a direct result 
of performing action A (i.e., g G effects (A)) with resource p. The «-component is 
computed by a{V , A ,  s,p)  by recursively finding the value of the part of the plan V  
(i.e., the subgraph of PO PG  V)  remaining after performing action A in state s. This 
sub-plan is constructed by the procedure Refine('P, A, s), which appears in Figure 5-5. 
Refine essentially simulates performing action A in state s producing state a{s,A),  
and removes the parts of V  th a t would no longer be reachable from a{s, A).
Execution  E xam ple 1
To illustrate the process, we will first present an example where there are adequate 
resources to accomplish all of a plan’s goals. Consider the P O P G  of the running
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R efin e(P , A,  s)
1. C o m p u te  ct(s , A).
2. R em ove A  from  P ,  together w ith  all its ou tgo ing  edges.
3. U n til no m ore nodes can  be removed, ite ra tively  remove:
•  All th e  p roposition  nodes p  (together w ith  th e ir ou tgo ing  edges), such th a t  p  0  
a(s ,  A) ,  an d  th e  node p  has no incom ing edges, and
•  All th e  action  nodes A ', such th a t  for a t  least one of th e  p recond itions q E prec(A ') 
th e re  is no p roposition  node associated  w ith  q and  hav ing  an  ou tgo ing  edge to  A '.
4. R e tu rn  th e  u p d a te d  p lan  V.
Figure 5-5: Procedure for updating POPG V  after performing action A.
example (Figure 5-6), which we will call Vi.  Let the the value functions of the goals 
be the constant functions: K s ( l i )  =  2 ,  Kp(Li) =  2 , and 14 s ( l 2) =  1 0 ,  and the resource 
consumptions of the actions be abstracted as follows (with the expected resource use, 
/i(A), equal to the minimum resource level, min(A), for ease of presentation):
A m (A)  =  m in(A )
SampleRock(Ll) 3
T akeP icture(L l) 2
N avigate(L l,L 2) 10
SampleRock(L2) 5
For this example, suppose tha t the initial resource level pi = 20, and the initial 
state is simply si =  (A t(Ll))}, as shown in Figure 5-6. To begin executing this 
plan, the agent must select the first action to be performed. It would accomplish this 
by first computing the estimated value of V\  using (/("Pi, Si, pi) as specified in Eq.
5.2, and then selecting the action A E actions(Pi, Si,pi) th a t achieves tha t estimated 
value. The computation of (7(P i, Pi) begins by determining the available actions.





S am pleR ock (H )
T a k e P ic tu re (L l)
N a v ig a te (L l,  L2)
Figure 5-6: Vv- POPG for the Rovers example (repeated from Fig. 5-4).
which in this example are:
actions('Pi, Si, pi) =  {SampleRock(Ll), TakePicture(Ll), Navigate(Ll, L2)} 
Thus, the initial call to U { V \ ,  s i ,p i)  will be computed as:
= m a x <
« ( 7 1^ , SampleRock(Ll), Si, pi) -P /3(SampleRock(Ll), pi) 
o;(Pi, TakePicture(Ll), Si, pi) +  /3(TakePicture(Ll), pi) (5-4) 
« (P i ,  Navigate(Ll, L2), s i, pi) +  /3(Navigate(Ll, L2), pi)
The algorithm will consider these actions one at a time, beginning with SampleRock(Ll). 
Since SampleRock(Ll) satisfies the goal hs (L I ) , /?(SampleRock(Ll), pi) =  4hs(Li) =  2.
For the computation of « (P i ,  SampleRock(Ll), Si, pi), we will call:
S2 =  cj(si, SampleRock(Ll)) =  {At(Ll), hs(L l)}
and
P2 =  Pi — p(SampleRock(Ll)) =  20 — 3 =  17
Thus, the computation of a (P i ,  SampleRock(Ll), si, pi) is determined according to 
Eq. 5.3 as:
Ui  =  P(Refine(Pi, SampleRock(Ll), s i) , S2 ,P2 )
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it(L2)L t ( L l ) j
.p (L l|
Sam pleRock(L2)N a v ig a te (L l,  L2'
T a k e P ic tu re (L l)
Figure 5-7: Result of calling Refine(Pi, SampleRock(Ll), si).
The call to Refine(Pi, SampleRock(Ll), Si) will simply remove SampleRock(Ll) 
from V\,  along with its links, producing the POPG  V 2 shown in Figure 5-7. No 
proposition nodes are removed since they are all either in gg or have incoming edges. 
No other action nodes are removed since none of their precondition nodes have been 
removed, and thus they are all still reachable in the graph.
The computation of U\ =  (/(% , &2 , /%) proceeds as before by first determin­
ing the available action, actions(%, &2, /%), which is the set { T a k e P ic tu re (L l) , 
N avigate (L I, L2) }. Thus, Ui will be computed as:
o;(P2 , T akeP ictu re(L l), S2 , P2 ) +  /3(T akePicture(L l), P2) 
^CP2 ,a 2 ,P2) =  m ax{  (5.5)
« (7 2^ , N avigate(L l, L2), «2 ,^ 2) +  /3(N avigate(Ll, L2), P2)
As before, these actions are considered one at a time, starting with T akeP ictu re  (L I) . 
Since T ak eP ic tu re (L I) satisfies the goal h p (L l) , /3(T akeP icture(L l), P2) =  K p ( L i )  =
2. For the computation of 0 (7 2^ , T akeP ic tu re  (LI), sg, P2), we will call:
S3 =  (j(s2 , T akeP ictu re(L l)) =  {At(Ll), h s(L l), hp(Ll)}
and
Pa = P2 — /i(T akeP ic tu re(L l)) =  17 — 2 =  15 
70
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
,t(L l)) ----------------- >  N a v ig a te (L l,  L2)  ^ t(L 2))  > Sam pleRock(L2)  ^s(L2)j
Figure 5-8: P 3 : Result of calling Refine(P2 , TakePicture(Ll), S2 ).
Thus, the computation of « (7 2^ , T akeP ictu re(L l), S2 , P2) is determined according to 
Eq. 5.3 as:
U 2  =  t/(Refine(T’2 ,T akeP icture(L l),S 2 ) ,S 3 ,p 3 )
The call to Refine(T’2 , TakePicture(Ll), S2 ) will simply remove TakePicture (LI) 
from V 2 , along with its links, producing the POPG V 3 shown in Figure 5-8. No 
proposition nodes are removed since they are all either in 53 or have incoming edges. 
No other action nodes are removed since none of their precondition nodes have been 
removed, and thus they are all still reachable in the graph.
From Figure 5-8 we can readily see tha t there are no further choices in V 3 about 
what actions to take. Executing all of the remaining actions in V 3 , Navigate (LI ,L2) 
and SampleRock(L2) will require a resource level of /i(Navigate(Ll, L2)) +  
/i(SampleRock(L2)) =  10 +  5 =  15. Since ps = 15, it is expected tha t there are 
sufhcient resources to complete this plan. W ithout going through the details, it 
is easy to see tha t the the value of U2 is simply the value of the remaining goal, 
hs(L2), which will be computed as /3(SampleRock(L2), p )^ =  Ks(l2 ) =  10, where 
Pi =  Pa -  /r(Navigate(Ll, L2)) — p(SanipleRock(L2)).
The algorithm would next backtrack to Eq. 5.5 and consider N avigate (LI ,L2) as 
the next action to take in plan V 2 (i.e., the second step of the initial plan). It would
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,t(L2)) ------> Sam pleRock(L2)  fis(L2))
Figure 5-9: Vi. Result of calling Refine(7^2, Navigate(Ll, L2), S2 ).
thus compute:
a { V 2 , Navigate(Ll, L2), S2 , P2 ) +  /)(Navigate(Ll, L2), P2 )
Since N avigate (LI ,L2) does not directly satisfy any goals, /3(Navigate(Ll, L2), P2 ) 
0. For the computation of « (% , havigate(L l, L2), S2 , P2), we will call:
S4 =  (t(s2 , Navigate(Ll, L2)) =  {At(L2), hs(L l)}
and
Pi =  P2 — p(Navigate(Ll, L2)) =  17 — 10 =  7
Thus, the computation of « (% , Navigate(Ll, L2), S2 , P2) is determined according to 
Eq. 5.3 as:
Ui  =  i7 (Refine(P2 , Navigate(Ll, L2), S2 ), S4 , pi )
The call to Refine(iPi, Navigate(Ll, L2), Si) will first remove Navigate (LI ,L2) 
from Vi ,  along with its links. The proposition node At (LI) is next removed from V i ,  
since it has no incoming links and is not in S4.  Because At (LI) is a precondition of 
TakePicture ( L i ) , th a t action, along with its links, is also removed from Finally, 
since there are now no incoming links to the proposition nodes h p(L l) ,  this node is 
removed as well. The resulting plan, Vi,  is shown in Figure 5-9.
Again it is not difhcult to see from Figure 5-9 th a t the estimated value of this 
refined plan, f / 4 ,  is simply K s(l2) =  10. Since both  parts of Eq. 5.5 have been com­
puted, the algorithm would determine tha t the estimated value of V 2 , U{V2 , S2 , P2 ) =
72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
max((f/2  +  /3 (TakePicture(Ll),p2 )), (^^4 +  /3(Navigate(Ll, L2), P2))) =  max((10 +
2 ), (10 +  0)) =  12.
The algorithm would next backtrack to complete the computation of the first 
choice in Eq. 5.4 (i.e., if SampleRock(Ll) were selected to be the first action). This 
is computed as:
U ( V i , S i , p i )  >  Ui  + /?(SampleRock(Ll),pi)
> U 2 +  /3(TakePicture(Ll), P2 ) +  /3(SampleRock(Ll), pi)
>  /3(SampleRock(L2), pi) +  /?(TakePicture(Ll), P2 ) +  /9(SampleRock(Ll), pi)
>  K s (L2) +  K p ( L 2 )  +  K s (L1)
> 1 0  +  2 +  2 
>  14
T hat is, at this point in the evaluation of "Pi, the algorithm has determined tha t this 
plan can obtain at least a value of 14 with the given initial resources pi =  20. Note 
tha t since this is the sum of the values of all of the goals in P i , we know tha t this is also 
the maximum value tha t could be obtained by this plan. Thus the algorithm could 
stop its analysis at this point, even without considering the o th e r  possible courses of 
action through P i, since SampleRock(Ll) could be safely selected as the first plan 
action to be executed. We do not, however, currently use shortcuts like this (although 
it is planned for future work), and so we will continue describing the plan analysis.
It is not difhcult to see tha t selecting TakePicture (LI) as the hrst action would 
also lead to the value estimate P (P i, Si,Pi) =  14, since the actions TakePicture (LI) 
and SampleRock(Ll) do not interfere with one another’s preconditions. As such, 
we will not describe the details of the computation of the second part of Eq. 5.4. 
However, let us briefly look at the selection of N avigate  (LI ,L2) as the hrst action 
to execute from P i, (i.e., the third part of Eq. 5.4), which would be computed as:
o;(Pi, Navigate(Ll, L2), Si, pi) +  /)(Navigate(Ll, L2), pi)
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i t(L 2 ))  ------> Sam pleR ock(L2)  ^
Figure 5-10: Pg: Result of calling Refine(Pi, Navigate(Ll, L2), Si).
Since Navigate (LI, L2) does not directly satisfy any goals, / l(Navigate(Ll, L2), pi)
0. For the computation of o;(Pi, Navigate(Ll, L2), Si, pi), we will call:
Sg =  (t(s i , Navigate(Ll, L2)) =  {At(L2)}
and
P s  =  P i  — p(Navigate(Ll, L2)) =  20 — 10 =  10
Thus, the computation of a (P i, Navigate(Ll, L2), si, pi) is determined according to 
Eq. 5.3 as:
Pg =  P(Refine(Pi,Navigate(Ll,L2),Si),Sg,pg)
The call to Refine(Pi, Navigate(Ll, L2), Si) will first remove Navigate (LI ,L2) 
from P i ,  along with its links. The proposition node At (LI) is next removed from P i,  
since it has no incoming links and is not in Sg. Because At (LI) is a precondition of 
both SainpleRock(Ll) and TakePicture (L I ) , these actions, along with their links, 
are also removed from P i. Finally, since there are no incoming links to the proposition 
nodes h s(L l)  and hp(Ll), these nodes are removed as well. The resulting plan, Pg, 
is shown in Figure 5-10.
From Figure 5-10 we can easily see tha t the best value this plan could possibly 
obtain is 1 4 s(l2) =  1 0 , since the other two goals have been removed from the plan. 
Thus, the algorithm will complete the com putation of Eq. 5.4 as:
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(T(Pi, ai, Pi) =  max <
14 i f  A  = SampleRock(Ll)
14 i f  A  = TakePicture(Ll)
10 i / A  =  Navigate(Ll, L2)
The agent could then select either SampleRock(Ll) or TakePicture (LI) as the 
first action to perform, as both produce the maximum value for the plan. In this 
case, selecting Navigate (LI ,L2) as first action for P i would be irrational, since it 
precludes the accomplishment of some of the p lan’s goals, and thus leads to a lower 
estim ated value.
E xecu tion  E xam ple 2
For our second example, we will again consider the problem from Example 1, except 
now we will assume tha t the available resources are not sufficient to satisfy all of the 
p lan’s goals. Instead, for this example we will let pi =  16.
The algorithm would begin as in Example 1 by computing the estimated value of 
the initial plan. P i. Since we are using the same initial plan, the estimate U (Pi, si, pi), 
is again described by (repeated from by Eq. 5.4):
(/("PnSnPi) =  max <
a  (P i, SampleRock(Ll), Si, pi) +  /)(SampleRock(Ll), pi)
Q;(Pi, TakePicture(Ll), Si, pi) +  /3(TakePicture(Ll), pi) (5 6 ) 
o (P i, Navigate(Ll, L2), 5 i ,p i)  +  /)(Navigate(Ll, L2),pi)
When considering SampleRock(Ll) as the first action, o (P i ,  SampleRock(Ll), Si, pi) 
will again be computed as:
Ui =  U (Refine(Pi, SampleRock(Ll), Si), S2 , P2 )
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l p ( L 1 ) )T a k e P ic tu re (L l)
Figure 5-11: Result of calling Refine('Pi, SampleRock(Ll), Si).
with S2 again being defined as:
S2 =  cr(si, SampleRock(Ll)) =  {At(Ll), hs(Ll)}
but now p2 is:
P2 =  Pi  — /a(SampleRock(Ll)) =  16 — 3 =  13
The call to Refine('Pi, SampleRock(Ll), si) will once again produce shown in 
Figure 5-11 (repeated from Figure 5-7). As before, this leads to the computation of 
U{ V2 ,  S2, P2) as (repeated from Eq. 5.5):
a{V 2 , T akeP ictu re(L l), «2 , P2 ) +  /3(TakePicture(L l), P2)
(5.7)
a{V 2 , N avigate(L l, L2), S2 , P2 ) +  /?(M avigate(Ll, L2), pa)
Again following Example 1, when T ak eP ic tu re  (LI) is considered as the next 
action, 0 (^ 2 , T akeP ictu re(L l), S2 , P2) will still be computed as:
U2 = (7 (Refine(P2 ,T ak eP ic tu re (L l), S2), S3 , Ps)
where:
S3 =  cr(s2 , T akeP ictu re(L l)) =  (A t(L l), hs(L l), hp(Ll)}
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.t(L l)) ----------------- >  N a v ig a te (L l,  L2)  fet(L2)J  > Sam pleRock(L2)  |is(L2)j
Figure 5-12: % : Result of calling Refine('P2 , TakePicture(Ll), S2).
but now:
Ps =  P2 — p(TakePicture(Ll)) =  13 — 2 =  11
The call to Refine('P2 , TakePicture(Ll), Sÿ) will once again produce the POPG V3 
shown in Figure 5-12 (repeated from Figure 5-8).
Going a step further than we did in the first example, the algorithm would next 
select N avigate (LI,L2) as the next action (since there is no choice at this point), 
and compute (/('Pa, «3 , Ps) as:
( / (P 3 ,a 3 ,Ps) =  a ( P 3 ,N avigate(L l,L 2 ) ,S 3 ,p 3 ) -b /)(Navigate(Ll,L 2 ) ,p 3 )
=  ( / (Refine(P3 , Navigate(Ll, L2), S 3 ) ,  S4 ,  P4) +  0
where:
S4 =  cr(s3 , Navigate(Ll, L2)) =  |At(L2), hs(Ll), hp(Ll)}
and
P4 =  Ps — p(Navigate(Ll, L2)) =  11 — 10 =  1
The call to Refine(P3 , Navigate(Ll, L2), S 3 ) will produce the P O P G  Pg shown in 
Figure 5-13. The algorithm would try  to continue, but since P4 =  1 and 
min(SampleRock(L2 )) =  5, actions(Pg, S4 , p^) =  0, so P (P a , S3 , pa) =  0, making P2 =  
0  as well.
The algorithm would next backtrack to Eq. 5.7 and consider Navigate (LI ,L2) 
as the next action to take in plan P 2 . As in Example 1, it would again compute
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 >  Sam pleR ock(L2) ----- ^  (is(L2))
f W
Figure 5-13: Pg: Result of calling Refine(P3 , Mavigate(Ll, L2), S4 ).
a (P 2 ,N av igate(L l,L 2 ),S2 ,P2 ) as:
U4 =  P(Refine(P2 ,N avigate(L l,L 2 ) ,S 2 ) ,S 5 ,p 5 )
where:
S5 =  cr(s2 , Navigate(Ll, L2)) =  (At(L2), hs(L l)}
but:
Ps =  P2 — p(Navigate(Ll, L2)) =  13 — 10 =  3
The call to Refine(P2 , Navigate(Ll, L2), S2 ) will produce the POPG P 7  shown in 
Figure 5-14. The algorithm would try  to continue, but since ps =  3 and 
min(SampleRock(L2)) =  5, actions(P 7 , S5 , ps) =  0, so U4 = 0.
The algorithm would then determine that:
. U2 +  /3(TakePicture(Ll), P2) =  04- 2  =  2 
( / (P 2 ,a 2 ,P2 ) =  max '
U4 + /4(Mavigate(Ll, L2), P2) = 0  +  0 =  0
Backtracking to Eq. 5.6, since U (P 2 , S2 , P2) =  2, at this point the algorithm would 
know that when p% =  16, the best value this plan could obtain with SampleRock(Ll) 
as the first action is:
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t(L2)) ------> Sam pleRock(L2)  tis(L 2)
Figure 5-14: Py: Result of calling Refine(P2 , N avigate(L l, L2), Sg).
U {Vi , s i ,p i )  > Ui +/3(SampleRock(Ll),pi)
>  P 2 +  /?(T akePicture(L l), P2) +  /?(SampleRock(Ll), pi)
>  P 2 +  K p ( L 2 )  +  f ih s (L l)
> 0 + 2 + 2
> 4
As in Example 1, it is not difficult to see tha t selecting T akeP ic tu re  (LI) as 
the first action would produce the same value for P (P i, Si,Pi), 4. However, we will 
examine the selection of N avigate (LI ,L2) as the first action to execute from V\,  
(i.e., the third part of Eq. 5.6), which would again be computed as:
a  (P i, N avigate(L l, L2), Sp, pi) +  /?(N avigate(Ll, L2), pi)
The computation of a (P i, N avigate(L l, L2), Sp, pi) is computed as:
Ps =  P(Refine(Pp, N avigate(L l, L2), sp), sg, Pe)
where
and
Sg =  c r ( sp ,  N avigate(L l, L2)) =  |At(L2)}
Pe =  Pi — p(N avigate(L l, L2)) =  16 — 10 =  6
The call to Refine(Pp, N avigate(L l, L2), sp) will produce PO PG  P 5 as shown in 
Figure 5-15 (repeated from Figure 5-10). W ithout going through the details, it is 
not difficult to see from Figure 5-15 th a t P (Ps,sg ,pg) =  1 4s(l2) =  10, since pg >
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(L2)) ------> Sam pleRock(L2)  ^  ^ s ( L ^
Figure 5-15: Pg: Result of calling Refine(Pi, Navigate(Ll, L2), sp).
mm(SampleRock(L2)). Thus, the algorithm can now complete the computation of 
Eq. 5.6 as:
(/(P i, sp,pp) =  max <
4 i f  A  =  SampleRock(Ll)
4 i f  A  = TakePicture(Ll)
10 i f  A  =  Navigate (LI, L2)
Thus, unlike our first example, in this case, selecting Navigate (LI ,L2) as first 
action for Pp is the rational choice, since it leads to highest value for the given 
resources.
5.4 D iscussion
We conclude this chapter by examining the flexibility of our planning/ execution model 
with respect to the various possible changes in the environment tha t we listed in 
Section 5.2. First, sudden unreachability of goals, as well as uncertainty in resource 
consumption by the agent’s actions, is captured by the model implicitly. Second, if 
the values of some of the (still reachable) goals th a t the agent had planned to achieve 
have changed, the only thing tha t the agent should do is update the value functions 
associated with the corresponding goals in its plan. All the subsequent decisions will
implicitly take this change into account. In particular, if one of the agent’s goals,
g, becomes completely irrelevant (i.e., Vg = 0 ), the agent could easily update its 
POPG by removing the node g, along with exactly those action nodes tha t are used 
to “produce” this node g and are not used to produce any other goal. However, in
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the next chapter we show that the latter is not necessarily the best way to handle 
such situations.
The only part of the environmental dynamics tha t still seems to be problematic is 
assigning a new goal to an agent (i.e., a goal tha t is not captured by the current plan 
V).  Such a goal can be either completely new to the multi-agent group, or one of the 
goals th a t has been suspended by some other agent in the group. Clearly, a complete 
re-planning for the extended set of goals will solve the problem, and in many domains 
such a painful solution might be unavoidable. However, in the next chapter we argue 
that, at least for some practical domains, we can extend the above model of planning 
and execution in a way tha t re-planning can often be avoided.
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C hapter 6
Plan-B ased O pportunism
The model for plan creation and execution described in the previous chapter pro­
vides an agent with enormous flexibility in selecting its course of action. This flexi­
bility would in turn  allow agents operating in real-world domains to better adapt to 
dynamic environments, especially in terms of the opportunistic satisfaction of sus­
pended goals. In this chapter we discuss the way our model supports opportunistic 
behavior of the agents.
6.1 M odel of Opportunistic Execution
Figure 6.1 summarizes the POPG-based model of an agent’s planning and execution 
cycle as described in Chapter 5. Focusing on step 4e, we note that by taking a 
particular action A  from the plan P,  the agent may suspend one or more of its goals, 
namely those tha t are not achievable along all courses of action beginning with action 
A. The suspended goals could be re-planned for in the next planning-execution cycle, 
returned to the task broker agent B for re-allocation to another agent, or abandoned 
completely.
As discussed in Section 5.2, however, conditions may change during execution
Portions of th e  con ten t of th is  ch ap ter have been p u b lish ed  in [Law ton an d  D om shlak , 2003, 2004a,b; 
D om shlak and Law ton, 2003, 2004].
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L o o p  forever:
1. C h e ck  for and  process new goal assignm ents from  broker M, Gi C Ci,  w here Ci  is th e  set 
o f  th e  agen t A gs capabilities.
2. G e n e ra te  a  P O P G  V  th a t  achieves Gi  from  th e  cu rren t s ta te , s.
3. F o r  each goal g Gi ,  a n n o ta te  th e  corresponding nodes in V  w ith  Vg.
4. L o o p  un til (all g E G are satisfied) V (actions('P , s, p) =  0)
(a) E stim a te  th e  value U (V ,  s, p) of th e  cu rren t p lan  V  using  th e  value ite ra tio n  process 
in Eq. 5.2.
(b) C hoose a n  action  A  E a ctio n s(+ , s, p) th a t  ac tually  provides U { V , s , p ) .
(c) Perform  A,  resu lting  in th e  new  s ta te  cr(s, A )  an d  som e rem ain ing  am o u n t of resource 
/  <P.
(d )  Set V  =  Refine('P, A , s ) ,  p =  p , s =  a{s.  A) .
(e) S uspend  all th e  goals g th a t  are no longer reachable  in  P.
5. N otify  broker B of success/fa ilu re  of achieving each goal g E G o
Figure 6-1: Basic planning and execution cycle of a single agent.
such th a t a suspended goal may indeed become achievable. In this context, an agent 
would exhibit single-agent opportunism if it can detect and respond to events and 
situations tha t may allow one of its suspended goals to be satisfied. In our model, 
single-agent opportunism uses a form of predictive encoding [Patalano et ah, 1993], 
in which the agent examines its remaining current plan to find other places where a 
suspended goal may be achieved.
To support this behavior, an agent needs to be able to modify the structure of its 
current plan. Observe tha t nothing prevents us from enriching an existing POPG V  
with additional actions tha t might be inconsistent (i.e., cannot be merged together) 
with each and all possible complete executions of V.  For example, consider the 
(partial) POPG V  depicted in Figure 6-2(a). In Figure 6-2(b) this valid “seed” plan 
V  is extended to a new structure Ve A V  hy  adding the action N avigate(L l, L3).
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 >  Mavigate(L2, L3) |---- 3- ^ ( L 3 ^
(d)
Figure 6-2; Extending the “seed” POPG: (a) The initially constructed POPG  P; 
(b) EPO PG  Pg, resulting from the extension of P  by the addition of an alternative 
course of action Navigate(Ll, L3); (c-d) The result of Refine on Pg and the actions 
Navigate(Ll, L2) and Navigate(L2, L3), respectively.
In general, such an extension £  can be any valid PO PG  such tha t the root nodes 
(i.e., the nodes with no incoming edges) of £  are a subset of the proposition nodes of 
P  (i.e., £  is grounded in P ). Further, this plan extension process can be performed 
iteratively, allowing the plan to be extended as needed.
Clearly, the constructed plan Pg, which we will call an extended partial order plan 
graph (EPOPG), may not be a valid partial order plan, and this is actually the case 
with the EPO PG  depicted in Figure 6-2(b). However:
1 . It does contain at least one non-trivial, valid partial order plan, and
2 . At every execution state s, the agent will still choose an action providing it with 
the maximal expected reward.
The first statem ent appears to be obvious, since any single goal-achieving action
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by itself is a valid partial order plan. However, the fact tha t (i) we start with a valid 
“seed” plan for a given set of goals, and (ii) nothing from this plan is ever removed 
during the  extension process, further justifies this statement. Similarly, recall tha t 
every extension £  is itself a valid POPG. If the execution mechanism follows the 
course of action defined by an extension, even if some of the actions from the initial 
seed plan are removed, the plan will still contain at least this one valid plan.
The second statement is both less straightforward and very im portant, as maxi­
mizing the expected reward is the core part of our execution model. The soundness 
of this statem ent follows from the fact that, using the Refine procedure, the process 
of calculating U{Ve, s,p) via Eq. 5.2 exploits only valid total order sequences of ac­
tions from Ve, even if Pg is not a valid partial order plan. As discussed in Section
5.3.2, this is because the procedure for estimating a plan’s value defined by Eq. 5.2 
considers all valid total orders, while Refine prunes unreachable actions out of the 
plan. The completeness follows from the fact tha t the first parameter of [ /(P ,s ,p )  
in Eq. 5.2 decreases monotonically with the nesting depth. We observe, therefore, 
tha t completeness is preserved even if the constructed EPO PG  Pg contains cyclic 
dependencies.
In general, adapting a given plan to pursue additional goals can be computationally 
hard [Yang et ah, 1992]. However, an agent can examine and extend an existing 
(E)POPG Pg, since tha t structure is not required to represent a single valid plan. 
Thus, predictively encoding suspended goals for possible opportunistic execution in 
Pg can be performed much more efficiently than  by updating a plan tha t must remain 
consistent. More directly, suppose tha t after performing an action A, the procedure 
Refine removes from the current EPO PG  Pg an action A'  because one (or more) of 
A's precondition nodes have also been removed from Pg. Let us denote by P( the 
EPOPG resulting from the above refinement of Pg. If A was necessary for achieving
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Sam pleR ock(L l)
T a k e P ic tu re (L l)
N a v ig a te (L l,L 2 )
Figure 6-3: POPG for the Rovers example (from Fig. 5-4).
some assigned goal g, then g will have to be suspended. However, if there exists a 
PO PG  V  C Ve th a t achieves g, the agent could try  to predictively re-encode such 
a sub-plan V'  into the refined EPO PG  "P' using the EPO PG  extension approach 
described above, treating V'  as the chosen extension S.
For example, consider the EPO PG  presented in Figure 6-3 (repeated from Figure 
5-4). Suppose tha t the agent performs the action Navigate(Ll,L2) before execut­
ing TakePicture(Ll). The goal hp(Ll) would be suspended, because the sub-plan 
V '  =  {TakePicture(Ll)}  has been pruned by the Refine procedure. The remain­
ing plan could be extended by re-grounding V'  at any other appearance of a node 
At(Ll) in the EPOPG. The plan execution procedure would automatically reconsider 
opportunistically achieving hp(Ll) if and when it encounters TakePicture(Ll) again 
in the future. Unfortunately, in this particular example, there are no such places in 
our EPOPG, thus predictive encoding will be infeasible. As such, we need to seek 
alternative ways to achieve hp(Ll), such as multi-agent opportunism.
Recall from Section 5.1 tha t our general approach to multi-agent opportunism 
is to have the agents include extra goals in their plans, on the chance tha t some 
other agent in the MAS might suspend one of them. If at runtime an agent does 
in fact suspend a goal that has been predictively encoded as an extra goal in some 
other agent’s plan, the other agent would be in a position to opportunistically satisfy 
the suspended goal. But how does an agent determine which extra goals should be
86
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included in it plan?
Consider, for instance, an MAS {Ai, • • • , A„} executing plans P i, • ■ • ,Vn for the 
goal sets G \ ,  - ■ ■ ,G„, respectively. Suppose that, at some point agent A, suspends 
a goal g  E Gi ,  and notifies some of the other agents tha t it can no longer satisfy g.  
Since we are assuming the agents in the MAS are cooperative (or at least benevolent), 
we would like the other agents Aj (such tha t g E C j)  to at least consider whether 
they can achieve g  themselves and whether the corresponding changes in their course 
of action would be feasible.
For some agent Aj,  if g is not already reachable in Vj, and if Aj  is capable 
of minimal re-planning, then Aj  could create a new sub-plan V  just for achieving 
g starting from the current state. The (E)POPG Vj  could then be extended into 
the EPO PG  Ve to include V .  While considering actions in the future, the PO PG  
execution module of A j  (Section 5.3.2) will implicitly adjust its course of action with 
respect to this update. The suspended goal g will be opportunistically satisfied if 
A j’s conditions and resources permit. Although we do examine this approach in 
Section 6.2.3, recall tha t we have assumed th a t in general the agents are not capable 
of re-planning, and thus must consider other options.
In the more general case, when the agents are not capable of re-planning, then the 
plans V i ,  ■ ■ ■, V i - i i  Vi+i ,  - - - , cannot be changed, and any opportunistic assistance 
to Ai (if possible at all) must be based on them  as they are. Notice, though, tha t even 
without re-planning, it might be the case tha t g  is serendipitously present, and thus 
potentially achievable, in one of the POPG-represented plans Vj  (e.g., as a side-effect 
of A j ' s  primary activities). To opportunistically adopt g as a new goal, A j  needs only 
to properly increase the value of g,  updating the value function Vg in Vj .  Again the 
execution module of A j  will implicitly adjust its intention with respect to this update 
when considering future actions. Note th a t even if A j  has not abandoned g,  but has
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suspended it and predictively re-encoded it for possible opportunistic achievement in 
the future, the node g will still be reachable in Ve-
Let us consider some properties of this extension to our planning and execution 
scheme to  support multi-agent opportunism. First, because we are using predictive 
encoding, the runtime computational complexity of some agent Aj  providing oppor­
tunistic assistance to another agent A, is, as desired, kept low. In our model, updating 
a value function Vg is all tha t is required to determine a potential opportunity for a 
suspended goal g. This process is linear in the size of POPG Vj  in the worst case. 
Note th a t here we are only referring to the additional computation needed for oppor­
tunism. It is true tha t the worst case computational complexity of our action selection 
mechanism is exponential in the size of the plan. However, the size of a PO PG  is, 
in practice, often quickly reduced by the execution mechanism as unusable courses of 
action are removed. Also, in Section 9.3.1 we discuss various ways the efficiency of 
the action selection mechanism can be improved.
Second, the value of g is automatically compared to the values of other goals in Gj.  
As the choice of action in our scheme of execution is based on maximizing expected 
value, and since the value a goal g, Vg, represents its contribution to the system (and 
not just to the individual agent), achieving g will not come at the expense of other 
goals in G j  unless g is justifiably considered to contribute more to the MAS. Finally, 
even if agent A is not itself capable of single-agent opportunism, it may still be able to 
provide opportunistic support for other agents, as long as the goals suspended by these 
other agents are still reachable in the POPG  of A. This is interesting because we had 
initially considered multi-agent opportunism strictly as an extension of single-agent 
opportunism.
Returning to the discussion on our approach to opportunistic execution, one may 
rightfully say tha t if g were assigned as a goal to A«, it is not very likely th a t g would
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also appear in the plan of another agent. (In our Mars rovers example, indeed, why 
would a rover plan to sample rocks at a certain location if it was not assigned to so?) 
It again appears as if multi-agent opportunism without dynamic re-planning is not 
very promising. However, this is not necessarily the case.
Observe that nothing in our scheme for planning and execution prevents agents 
from planning for goals that were not assigned to them, i.e., goals having zero value 
from the local perspective of these agents. Since the decision mechanism behind the 
execution takes into account not only the value of the goals to be achieved, but also 
the risk behind the various courses of action (encountered via cumulative resource 
consumption), achieving a goal with a zero value will automatically be postponed. 
Similarly, if one of the goals that the agent has planned for becomes irrelevant, instead 
of removing this goal from the plan, the agent could simply zero its value function.
Now, recall tha t in our model each agent is characterized by a set of capabilities 
representing all the goals tha t can possibly be assigned to the agent. In general, 
instead of planning for just the set of goals tha t have been actually assigned to the 
agent, one can consider also planning for extra capabilities (goals) tha t have not 
been assigned to the agent, or even planning for the whole set of capabilities, and 
reasoning about the best course of action during execution, when the value of different 
capabilities is known better than during the off-line planning. This is, in fact, the 
key idea behind our approach to multi-agent opportunism, as it allows the agents 
to opportunistically satisfy goals tha t are suspended by other agents, since they are 
already part of their current plan.
Clearly, one may rightfully say tha t the whole set of capabilities may be huge, and 
even its explicit description may be intractable. Although we agree tha t in general 
nothing prevents the set of capabilities from being orders of magnitude larger than 
an average set of goals the agent is actually assigned, at least in some domains this
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does not seem to be the case. For instance, consider a group of planetary rovers that 
are constructed to fulfill some tasks on Mars [Estlin and Gaines, 2 0 0 2 ]. At least at 
this stage of planetary rovers development, the superset of goals tha t each rover can 
be assigned is not very large, yet this domain poses many challenging research and 
development issues. We do, however, believe tha t in general it will be necessary for an 
agent to  select and plan for a subset of its capabilities. In Section 7.1 we consider two 
domain-independent methods for selecting a specific subset of the opportunistically 
“most promising” capabilities to plan for. These methods assume tha t the agents 
will have very little shared knowledge about one another, and thus should provide a 
baseline of what is possible.
If planning for capabilities is considered to be as feasible as planning for the actual 
goals, technically nothing should be changed in the scheme of planning and execution 
described in Section 5.3. However, a plan generated to include extra capabilities, 
especially for the whole set of an agent’s capabilities, can be far from efficient with 
respect to just the actual goals tha t have been assigned to the agent. For instance, 
suppose tha t a rover located at location LI has been assigned a single goal of sampling 
the rocks at location LIOOO. If this particular rover is capable of sampling rocks at 
any of the thousand locations LI, 12, . . . ,  LIOOO, the constructed plan may take the 
rover from LI to LIOOO through all the locations in between, as if preparing this 
rover to perform the other rock samplings as well. At first view, this observation 
seems to point to a serious drawback of planning for extra capabilities instead of just 
for assigned goals. However, in Section 6 .2  we present several domain-independent 
methods to improve the efficiency of plans by avoiding unnecessary actions.
Finally, consider the value estimation process tha t an agent performs at every de­
cision point. We have already discussed tha t computing a precise value estimation is 
intractable for most, if not all, practically interesting domains. Therefore, we began
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our discussion with an approximate estimation provided by Eq. 5.2, as this approx­
imation procedure dramatically reduces the branching factor of the value iteration 
process. However, the complexity of calculating U{Ve, s,p)  is still on the order of the 
number of alternative valid sequences of actions consistent with Ve, s, and p, which in 
worst case is obviously exponential in the number of actions in Ve- Therefore, to ob­
tain tru ly  practical execution schemes one would have to examine various techniques 
to limit the depth of value iteration with as little loss of decision accuracy as possible.
We believe that there are several ways to provide a good estimate of U { V e , s ,  p), 
which in turn  could be used instead of Eq. 5.2 starting from a certain depth of the 
value iteration process. For instance, the method introduced by Dearden et al. [2002] 
for off-line backpropagation of goal values to the internal nodes of a Graphplan-based 
planning graph would serve as a good starting point. In particular, it should be 
possible to apply this method to the non-leveled graphical structures such as POPG 
and EPOPG. Generally speaking, using this method, each action node A  is associated 
with a value function Va {p ,  s )  th a t provides an approximation of the combination of 
a { V ,  A, s, p) and j3{A,p) from Eq. 5.3. While we have not fully explored this sort of 
efficiency improvement, it is an im portant part of our planned future work (Section 
9.3.1).
6.2 Making PO PG s M ore Efficient
In the previous section we noted tha t planning for extra goals can lead to inefficient 
plans. This is because such plans may lead an agent to execute unneeded actions on 
the chance tha t an extra goal would be suspended by another agent. To make the 
plans more efficient, we need to find a way to create a plan tha t can opportunistically 
satisfy extra goals as they arise (i.e., when they are suspended by other agents), yet 
efficiently satisfy the assigned goals when no opportunities are present.
91
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In th is section we address this issue by considering three domain-independent 
approaches for creating plan extensions. Two of these approaches, planning with 
shortcuts and predictive plan repair, operate during the off-line planning stage, while 
the th ird , reactive plan repair, augments the current plan at runtime when goals are 
suspended. In Chapter 7 we present the results of an empirical evaluation of these 
approaches.
6.2.1 P lann ing  w ith  Shortcuts
For planning with shortcuts, each agent first generates a plan for all of its assigned and 
extra goals, and then augments the structure of tha t plan by adding “shortcuts” to 
the assigned goals. Shortcuts are actions (or short sequences of actions) th a t bypass 
the segments of the plan devoted strictly to support predictively encoded extra goals. 
For example, given the plan in Figure 6-2(a), the action Navigate(L2,L3) added in 
Figure 6-2(b) can be seen as such a shortcut to the goal At(L3).
We will begin by assuming tha t each agent A is assigned k goals by the broker B, 
and tha t A selects k' additional goals to plan for on the expectation tha t they may 
lead to opportunistic execution. As in the basic approach (Section 6.1), A creates a 
plan V  for all of these k + k' goals. Since the external planner cannot differentiate 
between the assigned and extra goals, it will produce a plan tha t satisfies all of the 
goals in a manner tha t it considers “efficient”—often based on minimizing the number 
of actions. We would, however, like the agents to be able to dynamically skip those 
actions tha t do not contribute to achieving any of the goals tha t currently have a 
positive value.
Consider, for example, the small POPG s shown in Figure 6-4, where the circu­
lar and rectangular nodes stand for proposition and action nodes, respectively, and 
doubly-circled propositions stand for goals. Figure 6-4(a) shows a base plan for fc =  3
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Figure 6-4: Example POPGs: (a) Base plan; (b) Extended plan; (c) Extended plan 
with shortcuts; (d) Base plan with repairs.
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assigned goals, while Figure 6-4(b) shows a plan V  for these k and some extra k’ goals. 
The white nodes in Figure 6-4 represent the additional actions and conditions needed 
to accomplish these k' = 2 extra goals, while the numbered black nodes correspond 
to the nodes in the base plan. Figure 6-4(c) shows the plan Vsj constructed from V  
by automatically adding shortcuts (shown as dark gray nodes) devoted to bypass the 
actions only needed for achieving the extra goals.
Adding shortcut nodes to V  in this way makes Vs an EPOPG as discussed in 
6.1. The real question is, however, how do we determine where to place the shortcut 
actions? Our approach is to trace through a total order of the plan P , finding the 
start and end nodes of “skippable” sections. For each pair of start and end nodes, 
we can generate a plan fragment tha t bypasses the corresponding section of the core 
plan.
To formally specify the notion of skippable sections of a plan, assume tha t an 
agent A is assigned k goals Ga = {9 1 , 9 2 ^  ■■ ^Qk} (with V (g,) >  0 for 1 <  i <  fc), and 
tha t it also selects an additional k' goals Gg =  ( 9k +i , 9 k +2 ,  • • •,  9k+k'}  (with E(gj) =  0 
for k V  1 < i < k + k'). Further, let V  be the plan generated for all k V  k' goals, 
and A  =  {«1 , 0 2 , . . . ,  ün} be a total order of its n actions consistent with the ordering 
induced by the POPG. For each pair of actions a«, aj G A,  we say tha t a* <  aj if 
i < j .  This sequence of actions is implicitly associated with a sequence of n + 1 states 
{so, &i,.. -, 5„}, such tha t sq is the initial state, and for 1 < i < n, a, moves the agent 
from state to state Sj. Let a{g) denote the action th a t actually satisfies some goal 
g G Gq U Ge, i.e., a(g) =  is the action such th a t 9  G Sm, but for 0 <  z < m, g 0  a,. 
Consider the assigned goals {gi,g2 , ■■■ , 9k}  numbered according to their achievement 
along the total order A.  T hat is, for 1 < i < j  < k, if a(gi) ^  a(g^), we know 
<  «(%)-
Suppose tha t for some pair of assigned goals g,, g,+i G Ga, we have an extra goal
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g G Ge, such tha t a(g,) < a{g) < a(gi+i). Let a  (g,) =  Oj and a(gi+i) =  ai. To 
allow bypassing the actions needed only for achieving g, we can first create a plan 
fragment V'  with s'q = Sj (i.e., the initial state of "P' is the state produced by action 
üj) and the goal conjunct G-p' =  s/_i (i.e., the state immediately preceding action 
ai), and then attach V'  to V, properly grounded at the appropriate proposition nodes 
in Sj and  supporting the proposition nodes of S(_i. This will create an alternate 
path around the skippable section, as illustrated in Figure 6-4(c) by the segments 
with dark  gray nodes. Adding such shortcuts preserves the completeness of the plan 
with respect to the assigned goals G a since the structure resulting from replacing the 
actions aj+i, . . .  ,a;_i in V  with the plan fragment V  is a valid partial order plan 
that, given an unbounded amount of resources, achieves all the assigned goals Ga-
Given a POPG  tha t has been extended with shortcuts, the agent would execute 
it in the usual way as described in Section 5.3.2. If during execution the agent 
is notified by some other agent tha t one of the extra goals, g G Gg, predictively 
encoded into its plan has been suspended, g ’s value would be adjusted appropriately 
and the execution mechanism would automatically decide whether to execute the 
actions leading to satisfying g. Alternatively, if at runtime the value of one of these 
extra goals g remains zero, the execution mechanism would automatically select the 
shortcut path to follow, avoiding the actions used for satisfying g, since this would 
be a lower cost path. In the unlikely event th a t the costs of the paths are equal, a 
shortest-path heuristic could be used. This ensures the the extended plan performs 
at least as well as the base plan.
Observe further tha t the to tal set of proposition nodes in Gp/ can be large, as it 
corresponds to the entire state However, in general there is no need to plan for 
all the propositions of since many of them  may have no effect on the applicability 
of the remaining part {a^,.. ., a„} of V.  Therefore, w ithout loss of either soundness
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or completeness, we can assign Gpi to contain only the propositions of s;_i tha t act 
as pre-conditions of some actions in {a/ , .. ., o„}. That is:
Gp' =  S(_i n  prec(a) (6.1)
a>ai
6.2.2 P red ictive P lan  R epair
For predictive plan repair, we again assume tha t each agent A is assigned k non­
zero-valued goals Ga =  {gi, g2 , . . . ,  gfc}, and tha t it also selects an additional k' (zero­
valued) goals Gg = {gk+i,9 k+2 , ■ ■ ■ ,gk+k'}- Unlike in planning with shortcuts, how­
ever, the agent initially generates a plan V  only for its k assigned goals G„, and then 
expands V  to include actions tha t accomplish the goals in Gg. For illustration, such 
a plan V  for achieving fc =  3 assigned goals is depicted in Figure 6-4(a). Figure 6 - 
4(d) shows an expansion Vr of V,  achieved by augmenting V  to include extra actions 
(shown in borderless gray) to satisfy the additional k' = 2 goals. The proposition 
nodes connected by double-ended arrows in this figure represent identical conditions. 
Thus we can see tha t the repair returns the plan to the same state.
As with the formalism for planning with shortcuts, let A  =  {«i, 0 2 , . . . ,  a„} be a 
total order of the actions of the current plan V.  To expand V  with respect to an 
extra goal g & Gg, the agent selects from its action set an action a th a t provides g
and has the best support in V  among all such actions. T hat is:
a = argmax < max {|sj H prec(a')|} > (6 .2 )
a ' s . t .  5Geffects(a') J
where argmax{jF} returns the element e G domain  for which jF(e) is maximal. Simi-
domain
larly, s, is the corresponding state supporting o, i.e.,:
Si = argmax {|sj fl prec(a)|} (6.3)
SjGSo, . . .ySn
To preserve the opportunistic nature, the agent should avoid predictive encoding of 
extra goals having insufficient correlation with the current plan. T hat is, the nature
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of opportunism is to take advantage of situations that already exist (or are likely to 
exist) in an agent’s intentions. Adding a goal to an existing plan tha t would require 
the agent to deviate from tha t plan significantly would not be opportunistic. For 
instance, in our evaluation discussed in the next chapter, s, is required to meet some 
fraction of a ’s preconditions (half, in our case, which was selected without extensive 
empirical testing), otherwise g is not considered to be a potential opportunity. Other 
measures, such as considering the difficulty of achieving certain preconditions for the 
goal, could also be used. We have not, however, considered any in this research.
Given the core plan V, and an action/state pair a and Si as above, the agent 
starts by creating a plan fragment V  for s), =  a, and Gp/ =  prec(a). Let s' be the 
state resulting from applying V  in g,, and s" be the state resulting from applying a 
in s'. Next, the agent creates another plan fragment V"  for Sg =  s" and Gp" = Si 
(i.e., V"  returns to the initial state for V'), and concatenates V , a, and V " . Again, 
as with planning with shortcuts, the resulting “side-loop” Vr is attached to V  by 
linking it to the appropriate proposition nodes in a, (see Figure 6-4(d)). As with 
planning with shortcuts, the resulting plan would be executed as usual by the agent. 
If during execution the agent is notified by some other agent th a t one of the extra 
goals, g G Gg, predictively encoded into its plan has been suspended, g’s value would 
be adjusted appropriately and the execution mechanism would decide whether or not 
to follow the sub-plan Vr- Alternatively, if at runtime the value of one of these extra 
goals g remains zero, the “side-loop” Vr added for achieving g will automatically 
be pruned. Thus, if during the execution of Vr all the extra goals Gg remain zero 
valued, the execution of Vr will be equivalent to executing the core plan V.  Since 
the execution mechanism always picks the most cost-effective course of action among 
those achieving maximal expected value, this ensures tha t the extended plan performs 
at least as well as the base plan.
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Finally, as with planning with shortcuts, Gpn =  s* can be replaced with the 
specification as in Eq. 6.1. However, as the extra goals G g are considered one by one, 
the whole process of plan repair is incremental with respect to Gg. Therefore, Gpn as 
described in Eq. 6.1 should be based on the current plan (i.e., the core plan with all 
the previously considered repairs), and not on the core plan for the k assigned goals 
only. This is necessary to ensure new plan repairs do not prevent previously added 
repairs from satisfying their extra goals if the corresponding opportunities arise.
6.2.3 R eactive P lan  Repair
Planning with shortcuts and predictive plan repair are two forms of predictive en­
coding th a t can be adopted by agents which are not capable and/or not allowed to 
adjust their plans at execution time. If, however, some degree of online plan ad­
justm ent is possible, the agents can adjust their intentions as they learn about the 
suspended goals of other agents, without having to “guess” and plan for any extra 
goals in advance.
In this case, one may consider a reactive variant of predictive plan repair. Follow­
ing the predictive plan repair approach, here again each agent generates a plan V  for 
its k assigned goals. Unlike in the purely offline approaches to predictive encoding, 
however, the agents do not select any additional goals. Rather, when an agent is 
notified about some other agent’s suspended goal, it uses the plan repair mechanism 
described in Section 6.2.2 to fit the goal (if possible) in to the remaining portion of 
its current plan.
A significant advantage of this approach is tha t the agents only plan for goals 
tha t actually get suspended. They do not waste any effort preparing for goals on 
the chance they might lead to opportunistic execution. Rather, they can focus their 
resources on considering opportunities for goals tha t they know cannot otherwise be
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satisfied. The reason we consider reactive plan repair in our analysis is two-fold. 
First, th is approach corresponds to what we expect is the minimal form of online 
re-planning, preserving the qualitative core of the plan generated off-line. Second, as 
such, this approach provides us with yet another reference point for evaluating the 
attractiveness of purely offline forms of predictive encoding, the main interest of our 
work here.
6.3 Addressing the Critical Issues
We conclude this chapter with a discussion of how we have addressed the critical 
knowledge-sharing and decision-making issues from Chapter 4 in our plan-based ap­
proach to multi-agent opportunism. It is not difficult to see tha t these issues are 
highly intertwined, in tha t a choice of how one of these issues should be solved will 
influence how one or more of the other issues are addressed. For our approach, the 
first issue we tackled was question 4, how the agents should decide when it is feasible 
to provide opportunistic assistance.
We arrived at the decision process embodied in the POPG  execution mechanism by 
assuming heterogeneous planning agents. Since we could not guarantee any particular 
planning mechanism, we needed to limit our assumptions about the plans these agents 
would use. This led us to develop the PO PG  representation, which focuses on the 
information needed to make decisions about potential opportunities: partially ordered 
actions with explicitly represented preconditions, effects, and resource requirements.
In defining the execution method, our interest was to provide a mechanism tha t 
would enable an agent to select the next action at execution time tha t would most 
likely lead to accomplishment of the most valuable goals, with an understanding tha t 
the agent is situated in a dynamic environment. This provides an agent a consistent 
(and transparent) way to decide whether it should apply its resources toward one of
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its own goals or one of another agent tha t has been predictively encoded in the plan.
The execution mechanism also provides the agent with a natural way to determine 
when it must suspend a goal. As such, limiting when to request opportunistic assis­
tance to  just suspended goals was a straightforward decision. Interestingly, though, 
the action selection procedure described in Section 5.3.2 could also be used to deter­
mine which active goals in the current plan might benefit from requesting opportunis­
tic assistance. That is, the plan value estimation procedure defined by equations 5.2 
and 5.3 could be used to identify “high-risk” goals, such as those with an expected 
cost th a t is just below some threshold of the currently available resources. We have 
not, however, pursued this idea, leaving it for future work.
Our POPG-based approach also quite naturally leads to satisfaction of suspended 
goals as the response to opportunity recognition. In this case, opportunity recognition 
is embodied in the action selection mechanism, which determines when conditions 
are favorable to pursue actions supporting a predictively encoded goal of some other 
agent. Similarly, the choice of action-taking as the response to opportunity recognition 
would seem to necessitate the use of goal-sharing as the method of determining what 
opportunity related information an agent should share. As we show in the next 
chapter, this is indeed an effective pairing given our MAS model.
The plan-based approach described here, however, is not limited to just satisfying 
suspended goals for other agents in response to  opportunities. The POPG represen­
tation would allow any condition tha t can be described as an effect of a plan action 
to be viewed as a “goal” to be predictively encoded. For example, suppose tha t 
the condition ci =  have-rock-sam ple (WP7) is a precondition for some other set of 
actions in the plan, Vi, for agent A,, and is not itself an assigned goal. If A, could 
identify that is necessary for the achievement of a suspended assigned goal, gi, then 
requesting opportunistic assistance for Ci would actually be cue sharing. Determine
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what preconditions to use for opportunity cues in a domain-independent manner is 
not a simple matter, however, and is thus also left for future work.
Finally, the use of a middle agent to determine which other agents to request 
opportunistic assistance from is a direct consequence of our MAS model. T hat is, in 
the approach described here the agents defer to the task broker, B, the decision of 
which agent should receive requests. The broker, in turn, uses its local knowledge of 
the capabilities of the agents in the MAS to select just those agents tha t can satisfy 
a given suspended goal. Since we are assuming an open MAS, we must also consider 
agents entering and leaving the system. When a new agent joins the system, it 
registers with the broker, and is included in the next cycle of planning and execution.
If the new agent joins during an ongoing cycle, then some potential opportunities 
might be missed (i.e., the new agent may posses some information another agent 
could use), but missing opportunities is acceptable in our framework. When an agent 
leaves the MAS gracefully, it tells the broker about the change, which in tu rn  informs 
the other agents in the MAS if they need to cancel any goals. Of course, if an agent 
just “dies,” the broker never knows, and there is nothing tha t can be done. Any extra 
goals tha t other agents may have been attem pting to opportunistically satisfy will 
not get canceled. On the other hand, if the recently deceased agent was unable to 
satisfy those goals, then having other agents try  to satisfy them  is a good idea.
In summary, our POPG-based approach to multi-agent opportunism addresses the 
critical issues from Chapter 4 as:
• When to request opportunistic assistance? Currently just for suspended goals, 
but “high-risk” active goals could also be used.
• W hat opportunity-related information should be shared? Currently goal-sharing, 
but cue-sharing could also be supported.
• Which other agents should be sent requests? All agents with appropriate capa-
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bilities, deferred through the task broker.
W hen to provide opportunistic assistance? Determined by the POPG plan exe­
cution scheme, primarily by the approximate decision theoretic action selection 
mechanism.
How to respond to potential opportunities? The suspended goal is satisfied. Sat­
isfying unmet preconditions could be supported as well.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C hapter 7
Em pirical Evaluation
The previous chapters describe a plan-based model of multi-agent opportunism 
tha t is applicable to open systems of heterogeneous agents. In this chapter we describe 
our implementation of that model, along with the results of an empirical evaluation 
of the model in the simulated multi-agent environment.
7.1 Experim ental Setup
Suppose that, as described in Section 6.1, an agent A, considers planning not only 
for its assigned goals Gi, but also for a limited set of its other, opportunity-wise 
“most promising,” capabilities. Can we determine in a domain-independent way 
how to select which extra capabilities to include? Can we generate enhanced plans 
containing extra capabilities tha t allow the agents to take advantage of opportunities, 
but without significant overhead if those opportunities never occur?
In an attem pt to address these questions, we have implemented an evaluation 
testbed for MASs, in the form of a discrete-event simulation, using our planning 
and execution scheme. The benchmark problems we have used in the evaluation are 
based on the Rovers example described in Section 2.1. The simulator is w ritten in
P o rtio n s of th e  con ten t of th is  c h ap te r  have been  pu b lish ed  in [Law ton an d  D om shlak , 2004a,b; D om shlak  
an d  Law ton, 2004].
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Figure 7-1: Workspace partitioning for Rovers MAS. (Repeated from Fig. 2-1)
Common Lisp: the experiments were run on several Sun workstations (UltraSparc III 
processors, running at either QOOMhz or 650Mhz).
As described in Section 2.1, the working area of the rovers consists of 25 waypoints, 
arranged in a 5 x 5 grid (see Figure 7-1). Each rover can only operate within a given 
3 x 4  waypoint region of the grid. W ithin its assigned region, an agent can perform 
various scientific tasks such as soil sampling, rock sampling, and taking pictures of 
objects of interest if they are visible from the rover’s current location. To reduce the 
problem’s complexity tha t would be caused by a large number of potential goals, we 
have limited the number of locations where scientific tasks can be performed to 13
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(those w ith  a white background in Figure 7-1). Thus, there are total of 65 different 
goals th a t  can be assigned to the rovers by the broker, namely 13 rock samplings, 13 
soil samplings, and 13 objects to be photographed, where each picture can be taken 
at three different levels of quality.
The evaluation was performed on problem instances involving teams of 4 agents, 
{A1-A 4 }, with partially overlapping capabilities: The working area of the team was 
divided into 4 partially overlapping regions (see Figure 7-1), and each rover could 
operate only within its designated area. The scientific tasks tha t a rover A, can 
perform constitute its set of capabilities Q . These are restricted to tasks at the 
waypoints within the agent’s region of operation. As mentioned above, we have 
restricted which waypoints will actually have goals associated with them, thus each 
agent will be assigned goals at only 7 of the 12 waypoints in its designated region. 
This way, each agent is capable of performing 35 of the 65 possible goals.
A 5 x 5  grid was selected because it is the smallest grid tha t would allow symmetric 
patterns of overlapping regions (and thus capabilities) such tha t there are waypoints 
accessible by exactly 1, 2, 3 and all 4 agents. For example, WPl is accessible by only 
agent Aq, WP5 can only be reached by agents Aq and A2 , WPll is accessible just by 
agents Aq, Ag and A3 , and WP1 2  is the only waypoint tha t all agents can get to. The 
symmetry in the region assignments is im portant because the goal assignments are 
generated at random, and we did not want to skew the load of any the agents.
At the beginning of each planning/execution cycle, each agent A, is assigned a 
set of goals Gi from its capabilities (i.e., Gi Ç Q ) such tha t no goals are assigned to 
more than one agent (i.e., fj- G, =  0). Although this is a reasonable assumption for 
the Rovers domain, it is possible in other domains the goal assignments may indeed 
overlap. However assuming the goals are uniquely assigned allows us to focus on the 
effectiveness of planning for extra capabilities. The agents begin by planning for their
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Procedure: T02P0
Input: a valid total-order plan ( a i , . . . ,  a„)
Output: an equivalent partial-order plan {A ,0 ,C )
for i =  n to 1 do 
Add Oj to A
for p G Preconditions{ai) do 
Choose k < i such that:
71 I such that [k < l  < i )  f \{p e  NegativeE f  fects(ai))
A dd fflfc A  Oi to C 
end for
for p e Nega t iv eE f  fects(ai)  do 
for j  = {i —  1) to 1 do
if p € Preconditions{aj) then  
Add üj <  Ui to O 




R eturn ( A , 0 , E )
Figure 7-2: Modified T02PG algorithm (adapted from [Ambite and Knoblock, 2001]).
individual sets of goals using a domain-independent planning methodology. In our 
experiments the agents used the FF planner [Hoffmann and Nebel, 2001], but any 
“off-the-shelf” planner capable of producing plans for the IPC-2002 domains should 
be applicable. Since the IPC-2002 required the planners to produce a totally ordered 
plan, we used a version of Ambite and Knoblock’s [2001] T02P0 algorithm (Figure 
7-2), modified to include proposition nodes as well as action nodes, to produce the 
POPGs.
For the results reported here, an evaluation was performed on 100 randomly gener­
ated problem instances where each agent was assigned k  =  4  goals. Given a problem 
instance for which the agents have generated individual plans [Pi, . . . ,  7 4^ , let EC{Vi) 
be the expected amount of energy required for Aj to fulfill its plan P, completely. 
Fach agent was allocated a fraction Si of E C  (Vi), where Si is randomly chosen from a 
uniform distribution within [0.5, 1.5]. In addition to the k  assigned goals, each agent 
was allowed to choose and plan for another k '  = 3 capabilities, basing its choice on the 
knowledge available about the other agents. Recall tha t the idea is to select goals th a t 
might get suspended by other agents at runtime, thus predictively encoding potential
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opportunities. Since the focus of the evaluation has been on potential contributions of 
exploiting severely limited shared knowledge, in our experiments we have considered 
two different levels of such knowledge:
1. Individual Capabilities (CK): The agents have complete knowledge about each 
o th e r’s capabilities. Therefore, each agent A, chooses for itself k' goals from:
[ J  (Ci n  — CiCi =
\  J
i.e., from the capabilities tha t A, shares with other agents tha t are not already 
in its set of assigned goals Ci.
2. Individual Coals (CK): The agents have complete knowledge about the goals, 
including their values, tha t have been assigned to every agent by the broker. 
Thus, each agent Aj chooses for itself k' goals from:
a,
i.e., from the assigned goals tha t happen to be in the capabilities of A,, but are 
not already in its set of assigned goals Gj.
It could be argued tha t the situation where the agents have no knowledge about 
each other would provide the true baseline for this evaluation. If, as discussed in 
Section 6.1, it was feasible for the agents to plan for their whole set of capabilities, 
even this extreme case could allow the agents to assist one another opportunistically. 
But as this is impractical due to the com putational demands, when the agents share 
no knowledge about each other they would have to select a limited number of extra 
goals to include in their plans by making (possibly domain-specific) assumptions 
about one another’s capabilities. Alternatively, the agents could choose extra goals
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from the ir capabilities entirely at random. While we certainly cannot dispute tha t 
this would represent an extreme condition of “severely limited shared knowledge,” 
we believe that in most situations in the cooperative MASs that we have assumed, 
it is reasonable to expect tha t the agents would be able to determine each other’s 
capabilities. Thus, we have used the CK  condition as our baseline.
Given a particular level of shared knowledge (i.e., CK or GK), the agents need 
a way to  select which of the candidate extra goals to predictively encode into their 
plans th a t best exploits tha t knowledge. In Section 6.1 we indicated tha t we were 
interested in domain-independent methods for selecting these extra goals. To tha t 
end, for these experiments we have developed two separate choice functions, one for 
selecting extra goals from each of the two agent capability subsets described above, 
Ci and Gi- More accurately, the two functions, which we will refer to as CAPS^, and 
GOALy, represent classes of functions for selecting extra goals in different ways. We 
will explain each in turn.
First, let us consider the CK case, where the agents only share knowledge of 
each other’s capabilities. Let UJ=i Cj (n is the number of agents) be a disjoint 
partition of Q, such tha t C j  consists of the capabilities of A, tha t are also part of 
the capability sets of exactly j  other agents in the system. The first n — 1 (in our 
experiments, three) choice functions C A P S i , . . .  C A PS„_i correspond to randomly 
choosing k' extra goals from C j , . . . ,  C f ~ ^ ,  respectively. An additional choice function 
for the case of CK, denoted as CAPS^orm, picks k' extra goals from Ci at random, 
where the random choice is not uniform, but normalized with respect to the above 
partition of C,. The motivation behind this selection process is to attem pt to normalize 
the chance tha t any given capability will be selected as an extra goal by only one 
agent. Thus, greater weight is given to capabilities shared be fewer agents, while 
capabilities shared by many agents have a lesser chance of being selected. Specifically,
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let 7  =  YTjZi \Cl\/j- The probability of choosing g G Cj is given by l / y j -
Next we consider the G K  case, where every agent knows about the goals, along 
with their values, tha t have been assigned to one another. This level of knowledge is 
better than  in the C K  case, since the agents can limit their selection to goals that 
they know actually have a chance of being suspended by some other agent. We would 
like the G O A L y  choice function to take advantage of this additional knowledge. One 
obvious choice function, which we will call GOALmax, would have agent A, select 
the k' capabilities with the largest values in Gi- These would be the goals tha t are 
expected to make the greatest contribution to MAS. To compute GOALmax, each 
agent Aj could sort Gi in descending order by value (i.e., Vg), and then select the first 
k' goals from the sorted list. Two additional choice functions th a t we will consider, 
GOALmin and GO Ahmed, correspond to choosing capabilities with the lowest and 
median values in Gi ,  respectively. GOALmin would be computed by sorting Gi  in 
ascending order by value, and again selecting the first k' goals from the list. For 
GOALmed, Gi  could be sorted in either order, selecting the middle (median) k' goals. 
Median is used instead of mean for this choice function because it guarantees at least 
one of the k' goals will have the actual middle value.
7.2 Evaluation
For the purpose of this evaluation, a set of experiments with five separate cases was 
conducted. The results are presented in Figures 7-4 and 7-3. We will first explain how 
each experimental case was performed. We will then discuss the results presented in 
the figures. Fach case was performed on the same 100 problem instances involving 
teams of 4 agents with partially overlapping capabilities as shown in Figure 7-1. In 
each problem instance the agents were assigned k = 4 goals. Fach of these goals 
was assigned a constant value, Vg, randomly drawn from from a uniform distribution
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within [1,100]. The performance measure was the total goal value obtained by the 
MAS, computed as the sum of the values of each goal satisfied. For the cases tha t 
involved including extra goals in the plans, the agents selected an additional k' = 3 
goals.
For the first case (the control case), the agents created and executed plans for the 
k assigned goals in each problem instance on their own, without using multi-agent 
opportunism. We will refer to this as the “No MAOpp” case. The results are shown 
as the “No MAOpp” lines in Figs. 7-3 and 7-4. This case shows how well the MAS 
performs under normal conditions, and thus serves as our baseline.
In the second experimental case, which we call the “Basic” case, the agents created 
and executed plans for the k+ k '  assigned and extra goals using the basic methodology 
described in Section 6.1. They did not use any of the plan enhancement techniques 
described in Section 6.2. A total of seven experimental runs were performed for 
this case. For the first four Basic runs ( “Basic” in Fig. 7-3), the agents only shared 
knowledge of one another’s capabilities (i.e., the CK  case). In these runs, the agents 
selected the k' extra goals using the four CA PS^ choice functions. For the remaining 
three Basic runs ( “Basic” in Fig. 7-4), the agents had knowledge of one another’s 
assigned goals (i.e., the GK case). In these runs, the agents selected the k' extra 
goals using the three GOALy choice functions.
In the third experimental case, the agents again created and executed plans for the 
same k + k' assigned and extra goals used in the “Basic” case. They then enhanced 
those plans using the planning with shortcuts methodology described in Section 6 .2 . 
We refer to this as the “Shortcut” case. As with the Basic case, seven experimental 
runs were performed for this case: four using the CAFSa, choice functions ( “Shortcut” 
in Fig. 7-3) and three using the GOALy choice functions ( “Shortcut” in Fig. 7-4) to 
select the extra goals.
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For the fourth case, which we will refer to as the “P P R ” case, the agents used the 
predictive plan repair methodology to enhance their plans. That is, the agents created 
initial plans for the same k assigned goals as used in the “Basic” and “Shortcut” cases, 
and then  enhanced those plans to include the same k' extra goals using the repair 
procedure described in Section 6.2. Again, seven separate experimental runs were 
performed in this set using the CA PS^ and GOALy choice functions to select the k' 
extra goals ( “P P R ” in Figs. 7-3 and 7-4).
For the fifth experimental case, which we will call the “R PR ” case, the agents used 
the reactive plan repair mechanism from Section 6.2. T hat is, the agents initially 
created plans for just the k assigned goals (again, the same k assigned goals as used 
in the previous cases). They repaired these plans at runtime (if possible) to include 
goals th a t had been actually suspended by other agents. Because this methodology 
does not encode extra goals in the plans, the CAPSj, and GOALy choice functions 
were not used. The results for this case are shown as the “RPR” lines in Figs. 7-3 
and 7-4.
The results of these experiments shown in Figs. 7-3 and 7-4 have been normalized 
against the baseline case. No MAOpp. T hat is, the performance measure used for 
these experiments was the total value obtained for satisfying the assigned goals over 
all 100 problem instances. Since the values assigned to these goals have no units of 
measure, it would not be meaningful to present the results in terms of these values. 
The results presented are thus the to tal value obtained by a given experimental run 
divided by the total value obtained by the baseline case. No MAOpp.
In each of Figs. 7-3 and 7-4, the lower, light-colored horizontal line depicts the 
results for the No MAOpp control case. Since this is our baseline case, its normalized 
value is, by definition, 1.00. It is presented as a line instead of a set of bar graphs in 
these figures since it really represents a single value (i.e., none of the choice functions
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Figure 7-3: Normalized experimental results for capability-based selection.
were used in this case). Also, presenting it as a line spanning the entire graph makes 
it easier to visually compare the performance of the other cases to the baseline.
The results for the Basic, Shortcut, and PPR  cases are presented as bar graphs 
in Figs. 7-3 and 7-4. In Fig. 7-3, each of these cases is shown as a group of four bars: 
one for each of the CAPS,^ choice functions. Similarly, in Fig. 7-4 each case is shown 
as a group of three bars: one for each of the GOAL^ choice functions. The value 
of each of these experimental runs, represented by the height of the corresponding 
bar (where taller is better), is relative to the No MAOpp case. Thus a value of 0.98 
would indicate the performance of th a t run was 2 % worse than the performance of 
the No MAOpp case. Similarly, a value of 1.02 would indicate a 2% improvement over 
the baseline case. Finally, the upper, dark horizontal line in both graphs depicts the 
results of the reactive plan repair (RPR) case. As with the No MAOpp case, since 
no choice functions are used this result is really just a single value. It is thus easier 
to present this as a line instead of a bar graph.
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Figure 7-4: Normalized experimental results for goal-based selection.
The results of our experiments are also presented statistically in Table 7.1. Specif­
ically, Table 7.1 presents three key statistics for each plan repair method combined 
with each choice function. The column labeled “Difference ±  C l” presents the average 
improvement and confidence interval (at 95% conhdence) of the given experimental 
run compared to not using opportunism (i.e.. No MAOpp). This statistic is computed 
as the arithmetic mean of the per-problem-instance differences. Since we are using 
exactly the same problem instances, as well as the same random number seeds for 
each run, this is a better calculation of improvement than computing the difference 
of the average goal value of each run.
The column of Table 7.1 labeled “t-Test” presents the results of the paired two 
sample t-Test for means. Given the null hypothesis, H q, th a t the two approaches (i.e. 
not using opportunism and using multi-agent opportunism with the given technique) 
are equivalent in tha t they will produce the same (average) to tal value, this statistic 
represents the probability the results could have been obtained by chance if H q were
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true. Thus, when p  is less than our confidence threshold (0.05 for these experiments, 
representing 95% confidence in the results), we can safely reject H q. Finally, the 
column of Table 7.1 labeled “% Difference” presents the average difference in the total 
value obtained in the given experimental run as compared to not using opportunism.
Let us first consider the results of the Basic experimental case. From Figs. 7-3 and 
7-4 we can see tha t adopting multi-agent opportunism was only moderately effective 
when the agents knew about each other’s assigned goals (i.e., the G K  case), while it 
was actually harmful when the agents only knew about each other’s individual capa­
bilities (the CK case). It should be noted, though, tha t we cannot claim statistical 
significance for any of these results except the GOAL^aæ run (see Table 7.1). Because 
of the high variance in these results, we performed a second set of Basic runs on 400 
different problem instances. Because the problem instances were different, we cannot 
do a direct comparison. However, these runs confirmed the same general results with 
better statistical certainty: performance was generally slightly better in the GK  case 
(~3% improvement for GOAL^aæ, p < 0.000004; ~2% improvement for GOALmed, 
p < 0.006; GOAL/ou, was statistically equivalent to the baseline), and generally worse 
in the CK case (~ 2 % degradation for CAPSg, C A P S 3 , and CAPSnorm, P < 0.004; 
C A P  Si was statistically equivalent to the baseline).
At first glance, given the decision-theoretic nature of the execution module, this 
is a somewhat unexpected result: Since each agent is attem pting to maximize its 
(and thus the global) expected payoff, having more potentially valuable goals in a 
plan should only increase its flexibility, guaranteeing an improvement in the expected 
performance. Thus planning for extra goals, using either choice function, should lead 
to performance at least as good as when planning for only the assigned goals. The 
pitfall here is tha t this claim is sound only under an “all else being equal” assumption, 
i.e., only if we compare two qualitatively identical plans. In the case of plan-based
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M ethod Choice Difference ±  Cl t-Test (p <) % Difference
Basic G O A Lm m 4.91 ±  2 0 .2 0 0.634899357 0.76%
GOALjned 13.76 ±  2 0 .2 0 0.184883010 2.13%
GOALmax 23^9 ±  22.15 0.039436245 3.66%
C A P S i -5.54 ±  19.44 0.577778057 -0 .8 6 %
C A P Sg -13.27 ± 19 .33 0.181609496 -2.06%
C A P Sg -14.35 ±  17.64 0.113943304 -2.23%
CAPSnorm -13.61 ±  18.01 0.141788970 -2 .1 1 %
Shortcut GOAL^jn 3A97 ±  19.02 0.000493012 5.42%
GOAhjned 42bO ±  17.13 0.000004151 6.61%
GOALmax 53.34 ± 1 7 .9 8 0.000000075 8.27%
C A P S i 2&06 ± 17 .82 0.012783911 3.58%
C A P Sg 20.33 ± 1 8 .4 0 0.012783911 3.15%
C A P S s 1&06 ±  17.94 0T56734775 2.03%
CAPSnorm 17.94 ±  19.12 0.068872466 2.78%
PPR G O A Lm in 5P76 ± 1 ^ 6 3 0.000000003 8.03%
GOALmed 4&02 ± 1 A 6 3 0.000006048 &67%
GOALjnax 55.28 ± 1 & 8 7 0.000000005 8.57%
C A P S i 27.55 ±  17.52 0.002662352 ±27%
C A P Sg 35.76 ±  14.87 0.000007932 5.55%
C A P S 3 29.05 ±  17.12 0.001239015 4.50%
CAPSnorm 2&46 ± 1 6 .3 7 0.002947308 3.95%
RPR 43 A2 ±  15.45 0.000000286 6.73%
Table 7.1: Statistical Results for Rovers experiments
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predictive encoding, however, achieving k assigned goals using a plan created for 
these and some other k' goals can be far more complicated (and thus more risky and 
resource consuming) than achieving the k goals using a plan created only for them. 
These initial results are, in fact, the reason w e examined the various plan efficiency 
improvements described in Section 6 .2 .
We next consider the cases using the various plan enhancement techniques: Short­
cut, PPR , and RPR. From Figures 7-3 and 7-4, as well as from Table 7.1, it is easy to 
see tha t all three lead to an improvement in performance both over the baseline plan 
execution mechanism with no opportunism (No MAOpp) and over our original (Basic) 
approach to offline predictive encoding. Focusing first just on the results of the G K  
runs shown in Figure 7-4, w e can see tha t none of the three advanced techniques seem 
to dominate the other two, despite the significant differences in the way tha t they 
enhance the agents’ plans. One difference, however, between these techniques is in the 
time complexity of the corresponding planning and execution. In our experiments, 
the average execution time each agent spent per problem instance was 7.57 minutes 
with planning with shortcuts, 22.87 minutes with predictive plan repair, and only 
0.43 minutes with reactive plan repairh The corresponding execution time values for 
the runs without plan enhancements were an average of 2.34 minutes per problem in­
stance when using the basic approach, and 0 .0 2  minutes for the baseline NO MAOpp 
case. The dramatically shorter execution time for the reactive plan repair approach 
is not surprising, since the plans are modified only for goals th a t are known to be 
suspended. This leads to smaller plans to execute, with fewer contingency branches 
to consider, which in turn  allows for faster execution. However, recall th a t reactive
^Since these experim ents were ru n  on com parab le , b u t  n o t iden tical co m p u te rs , th e  precise re la tio n  
betw een these num bers m ay  slightly  vary. F u rth e r, since iden tica l com puters w ere no t available, an d  it 
requ ired  approx im ately  3 m on ths to  p erfo rm  these  experim en ts  as p resen ted  here, it was im p rac tica l to  
a tte m p t to  use ju s t  one com puter.
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plan repair is feasible only if some degree of online re-planning is allowed. Otherwise, 
since we cannot show a statistically significant difference in performance between the 
other two methods, our results favor the use of planning with shortcuts.
In some ways, the results obtained with plan enhancement techniques while ex­
ploiting the less informative CK knowledge (see Figure 7-3) may be considered even 
more impressive than the GK results. Recall tha t our Basic approach to multi-agent 
opportunism actually produced a reduction in system performance as compared to 
not adopting opportunism at all (see the Basic group of bars in Figure 7-3). The 
results for CK  with plan enhancements, however, show tha t we can significantly re­
duce the overhead involved in opportunistic planning, making adopting multi-agent 
opportunism attractive even in cases of limited shared knowledge.
It should be noted, though, tha t the limited number of possible goals in our 
experimental domain may make results for the C K  runs appear more attractive than 
they are. Recall tha t in this scenario each agent’s capability set contains only 35 goals. 
It shares 30 of these capabilities with other agents. In scenarios where the number 
of shared goals is greater, we would expect tha t the performance improvement due 
to multi-agent opportunism based on knowledge of shared capabilities to be reduced. 
But, our results also demonstrate th a t using multi-agent opportunism in conjunction 
with one of our plan enhancement techniques produces performance at least as good 
as, and often better than, not using opportunism at all. Thus, even as the number of 
shared goals increases, exploiting this knowledge can still lead to an improvement in 
performance with only limited additional overhead.
As with the GK  results, neither planning with shortcuts or predictive plan repair 
was dominant when exploiting CK knowledge. Both produced moderate performance 
improvements compared to the baseline of not exploiting opportunities (an average 
of ~3% for planning with shortcuts, and ~4% for predictive plan repair). But again.
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since we cannot show a statistically significant difference in performance between 
these two methods, the difference in their execution time complexities (an average 
of 12.77 minutes per problem instance for planning with shortcuts, 26.65 minutes 
for predictive plan repair, and 2.35 minutes for the corresponding unenhanced basic 
approach) suggests a preference for planning with shortcuts. Of course, if the agents 
are able to re-plan at execution time, reactive plan repair would again be the preferred 
choice.
It might be argued that, even with our plan enhancement techniques, the improve­
ments obtained by using multi-agent opportunism may not be worth the additional 
com putational burden incurred. Indeed, Figure 7-4 shows tha t predictive encoding 
results in ~7% average improvement over the baseline, non-opportunistic planning 
and execution, while in Figure 7-3 the improvement is only ~4% on average. However, 
notice th a t each problem instance has a total of 16 goals assigned to the system of 4 
agents. The value of each goal is selected at random from the uniform distribution 
between 1 and 100. Thus, the expected value of a goal is 50, and the expected total 
value of the 16 goals (if all were satisfied) is 800. Hence, a 7% improvement means 
an average increase of 56, or the equivalent of 1 goal tha t would have otherwise not 
been accomplished. Even a 4% improvement would provide an average increase of 
32, which would likely indicate the accomplishment of an additional, lesser-valued 
goal tha t otherwise would have been unsatisfied. Our statistical analysis (Table 7.1) 
verifies tha t such qualitative improvements do in fact take place, and tha t they are 
statistically significant.
Finally, we must examine the impact of the various choice functions, GOALj, and 
CAPSy, on the performance of our experimental system. T hat is, given a particular 
level of knowledge (i.e., GK or CK), which method of exploiting tha t knowledge 
results in the best system performance? We will examine the two different levels of
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shared knowledge in decreasing order of how informative they are.
F irst, consider the results achieved when the agents share knowledge of one an­
other’s goals (i.e., GK),  using the choice functions GOALmax, GOAL^m, and 
GOALmed- One may expect tha t predictive encoding of most the valuable potential 
opportunities (i.e., GOAL^ax) will make multi-agent opportunistic execution more 
effective. In fact the results depicted in Figure 7-4 appears to support this expecta­
tion.
How^ever, if we examine the results presented in Table 7.1, we cannot make this 
claim w ith statistical certainty for these experimental runs. This is because the confi­
dence intervals of the “Difference” value actually overlap (due to the large variance in 
the values), effectively making them statistically equivalent. We should note, though, 
tha t we can claim with statistical certainty tha t all of the “Difference” values obtained 
using the various GOAL,^ choice functions are indeed improvements, since they are 
all positive and the confidence interval is smaller than the difference value for each of 
them. This claim is further supported by the corresponding t-Test results.
For the experiments presented here, the evidence does appear to support the use 
of GOALmax as the appropriate choice function for GK. We believe, however, tha t 
in the general case of multi-agent opportunism, the attractiveness of some potential 
opportunity g for an agent A, is captured by a more complex relationship. In fact, 
given a lack of any domain-specific knowledge tha t would suggest favoring the most 
highly valued goals, we would actually recommend selecting the more average valued 
goals, which for our example domain is the GOALmed choice function.
Suppose tha t an agent is asked to estimate some quantity th a t depends on a 
random variable X ,  but the agent has only limited knowledge (or no knowledge at 
all) about the properties of X .  Adopting a Bayesian approach will lead the agent 
to base its estimation on the “most unbiased” assumption about X  (e.g., assuming
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uniform distribution in the face of zero knowledge about X ).  Now, consider the 
case of G K , where the agents know about one another’s assigned goals along with 
their values, Vg. When we consider the approximate decision-theoretic behavior of 
the agents when selecting their courses of action, the likelihood th a t an agent will 
suspend a goal g with a large value Vg is expected to be relatively small. This is 
because the agent assigned to achieve g will implicitly prioritize this goal. As such, 
including g as an extra goal in some other agent’s plan would be expected to be 
wasted effort. For similar reasons, the likelihood tha t an agent will suspend one 
of its least valuable goals is expected to be relatively high. However, even if some 
agent does predictively encode such a goal, achieving it will be least beneficial to the 
overall success of the MAS. Therefore, if the agents share no knowledge except the 
assigned goals and their values, a Bayesian approach will lead them to select goals 
tha t represent a balance between the their values and the likelihood th a t they will 
be suspended. In our system, the GOALmed choice function provides this balance 
because the goal values are uniformly distributed. Other value distributions may 
require the use of a different measure of central tendency other than  median. Notice 
tha t in our experimental scenario, as the allocation of capabilities is symmetric among 
the agents, and the process of generating problem instances is completely unbiased, 
following a Bayesian approach in this MAS should be the correct thing to do. While 
our empirical results do not dem onstrate a clear dominance of GOALmed, they are 
not inconsistent with tha t selection, in tha t the GOALmed choice function led to what 
we could characterize as an average improvement in system performance.
Now let us consider the results achieved when the agents only share knowledge of 
one another’s capabilities, using the choice functions C A P S i ,  C A P S 2 ,  C A P S 3 ,  and 
CAPSnorm- As with the case of GK, the results for CK  shown in Figure 7-3 do not 
indicate that one choice function dominates. Also as with GK, the statistical results
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for CK  in Table 7.1 show tha t the choice functions are again essentially equivalent, 
and th a t we can claim tha t the “Difference” values are indeed improvements for all 
but two case (C A PS 3 and CAPSnorm when planning with shortcuts).
We can again follow a middle-ground approach to recommending which choice 
function to use in the absence of domain-specific information. Consider the partition 
of agent A /s  capabilities {Cf} defined in Section 7.1. Since A, has no knowledge 
about the value of the goals tha t have been assigned to the other agents, assuming 
an identical value distribution over is at least as good as any other
assumption (and thus is preferred in the Bayesian approach due to its minimal bias). 
Similarly, we can assume tha t for each agent A, all the elements in its capability 
set Ci are equally likely to be assigned to A, as its actual goals. However, this 
assumption implies that, for i <l < m < n - l ,  the elements of C™ are more likely to  be 
assigned to some agent (and thus more likely to be suspended!) than the elements 
of C(. On the other hand, the actually assigned elements of are also more likely 
to be opportunistically accomplished by agents other than A*, because the likelihood 
of a “collision” on Cj is lower than it is on C%. In other words, while it is more 
likely tha t a capability tha t is shared by many agents will be suspended by some 
agent, it is also more likely tha t some other agent will be able to opportunistically 
satisfy tha t goal. Similarly, since the capabilities shared by only a few agents are 
less likely to be suspended, it is also less likely tha t some other will be able to 
opportunistically satisfy those goals. Thus the choice function C A P S n -i /2  can be 
arguably expected to lead to a better balance between the likelihood of a goal being 
suspended and it being predictively encoded by some other agent. While our empirical 
results again do not dem onstrate tha t C A P S 2 is the dominant choice function, they 
are not inconsistent with tha t selection. The results produced when using C A P S 2 
were superior (albeit weakly) for predictive plan repair, and essentially average when
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planning with shortcuts.
7.3 Sum mary
In this chapter we have described an empirical analysis of the approach to multi-agent 
opportunism  presented in Chapters 5 and 6 . In particular, in this study we have 
focused on examining how to improve the performance of an MAS through multi­
agent opportunism when the knowledge shared by the agents is severely limited. 
Our results demonstrate tha t with careful enhancement to an agent’s core plans, 
multi-agent opportunism does indeed produce results as least as good as, and often 
better than, not using multi-agent opportunism. Further, we have argued that, in 
the general case, the best way to exploit limited shared knowledge for selecting extra 
goals is through a “middle-ground” approach th a t balances the chances a goal will be 
suspended and the chances tha t another agent will be able to opportunistically satisfy 
it. In the next chapter, we examine how our approach to multi-agent opportunism 
may be used in systems of agents tha t differ from the MAS model tha t we have used 
in this study.
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C hapter 8
Other M ulti-A gent System s
In this chapter we discuss how our POPG-based approach could be applied to other 
types of multi-agent systems. Specifically, we will examine multi-agent opportunism 
in an autonomous oceanographic sampling network MAS (as presented in Chapter 
2 ), and an aircraft maintenance information system.
8.1 A utonom ous Oceanographic Sampling Networks
In Section 2.2, we introduced an example scenario for a specific type of autonomous 
oceanographic sampling network (AOSN) th a t uses a multi-agent system for collecting 
scientific data in the ocean. We again point out tha t this is only one particular 
example of how an MAS could be used to control an AOSN.
We base our example MAS on work th a t has been done in the CoDA project 
[Turner and Turner, 1998]. CoDA focuses on how to self-organize, control, and re­
organize large, heterogeneous systems of vehicles and instrum ent platforms to allow 
them to be effective AOSNs. The project takes a cooperative distributed problem 
solving (CDPS) approach to the problem in which a loosely-organized meta-level or­
ganization (MLO) first self-organizes to discover the capabilities present in the AOSN. 
It then analyzes the situation and AOSN and designs a task-level organization (TLO) 
to actually carry out the mission. This organization could be a hierarchy, a team, 
a consensus-based organization, or other organizations as the situation warrants. If
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later there is too much change in the situation for the TLO to continue effectively, a 
new MLO forms, which creates a new TLO to fit the changed situation.
Here, we consider one type of organization tha t can be produced by CoDA’s MLO, 
a hierarchy. To make the example more concrete, we will assume tha t the agents in 
this hypothetical AOSN are controlled by the schema-based planner Orca [Turner, 
1994]. This type of MAS differs from the Rovers example used throughout this dis­
sertation in two im portant ways. First, the agents are not using a “classical” (i.e., 
STRIPS-based) planning system to derive there intentions. Rather, the planner uses 
task decomposition to create a type of task network [Sacerdoti, 1977]. Second, the 
example MAS is coordinated as a hierarchy, which is a collection of cooperative agents 
organized into a network of manager and labor agents, instead of through a middle 
agent. We will address each of these differences in turn. One should note, how­
ever, th a t there is nothing about the AOSN domain tha t would prevent the agents 
from using classical planning or from using a middle agent for coordination. Fur­
ther, even within the context of this specific MAS, other approaches to planning and 
coordination could be used. Rather, we provide this discussion to demonstrate how 
the characteristics of the MAS exemplified in this case would affect the use of our 
framework.
For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume tha t the AOSN agents will 
operate in a manner similar to the agents in the MAS model described in Chapter 
6 . Specifically, we will assume tha t they will request opportunistic assistance for sus­
pended goals, will use goal-sharing as the opportunity cue selection method, and will 
respond to potential opportunities by satisfying the suspended goals when possible, 
notifying the other agents when done. Thus the following discussion will address how 
the agents can determine when they should provide opportunistic assistance, and how 
requests for opportunistic assistance can be directed to the most appropriate agents.
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8.1.1 AOSN Planning
Since th e  approach to planning used in the AOSN example is not based on classical 
techniques, we cannot directly use our POPG-based approach to multi-agent oppor­
tunism w ith these agents. We are left with two options: we can either adapt our 
POPG evaluation mechanism to work with plans expressed as task networks, or we 
can translate the task networks into POPGs. Since there are existing techniques 
for translating task networks into partial order plans, we believe the la tter option 
would be easier to accomplish (although still not trivial). As such, we will limit our 
discussion to this topic.
Task networks represent plans as a hierarchical network of nodes. The root node is 
a task node tha t represents the initial set of goals assigned to the agent. Task nodes 
are decomposed into subtasks, which may be primitive action nodes or other task 
nodes, possibly with constraints (e.g., ordering) relating the subtasks to one another. 
Primitive actions occur only as leaf nodes in the network. Task networks are generally 
considered to be more expressive than the STRIPS-based operators used by POPGs, 
in tha t they can represent recursive actions and complex constraints among the tasks 
[Erol et al., 1994; Lotem and Nan, 2000]. Thus, it is not a simple m atter to translate 
these plans into POPGs. Below we offer several options for how to address this issue.
If a task network expresses a complete plan, one in which all of the leaf nodes are 
primitive actions with well-defined preconditions, effects and resource requirements, 
there are two ways we can translate it into a POPG. We should note th a t it is not 
common for the schema-based plans used in our example AOSN to be complete. We 
will, however, address this case first for the sake of other task decomposition planners 
tha t may produce complete plans. Later we discuss what can be done with partially 
decomposed task networks.
For the first method for translating a task network into a POPG, if we assume
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the plan is valid, then we know there is at least one total order of the actions. If 
we can extract this total order of actions, then just as we did in our experimental 
MAS described in Chapter 7, we can use our modified T0 2 P0  algorithm [Ambite 
and Knoblock, 2001] to create a POPG. Alternatively, when we do not know or do 
not want to compute a total order of the actions, we could use a version of the 
algorithm presented by Lotem and Nau [2000] for translating task networks into 
STRIPS-based partial order plans, modified to explicitly include precondition and 
effect propositions as nodes, and derive the qualitative part of the POPG s from 
those plans. The quantitative part of the plan would be specified with the values 
of the assigned goals and the costs (resource requirements) of the primitive actions. 
Dummy actions, which are used to represent internal (non-primitive) nodes from the 
task network, would have no cost, as the cost of “performing” them  is really just the 
resource needs of the primitive actions needed to meet their preconditions.
A limitation of the translation algorithm described above is tha t it only works on 
non-recursive task networks. It can, however, be used on partially decomposed task 
networks, allowing us to relax the above complete plan assumption. Task networks 
may be only partially decomposed when using active planners (see Section 3.2.2)— 
those tha t interleave planning and acting. For instance, the planning component 
of Orca uses delayed commitment to decompose subtasks only when needed, in the 
runtime context in which they will be addressed [Turner, 1994]. Thus at any given 
time its current plan may be represented by a partial task network.
As an example, suppose tha t one of the EAVEs (e.g., E A V E -A r i e l ) has been 
assigned to sample a given volume of water (i.e., the background-survey  ta sk ) , and 
has decomposed tha t task into the (partial) task network shown in Figure 8-1. In this 
network, the plain boxes represent tasks or subtasks tha t must be decomposed, while 
the double-walled boxes represent primitive actions. Solid edges represent decom-
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Figure 8-1: AOSN task network (partial) for sampling a volume of water.
position links, while dashed edges show ordering constraints. Following the method 
described by Lotem and Nau [2000], we can translate this task network into the (par­
tial) POPG shown in Figure 8-2 As in Figure 8-1, in Figure 8-2 the double-walled 
boxes represent primitive actions. The plain boxes in this figure correspond to the 
decomposed tasks in the task network, and are thus in effect dummy actions. The 
elliptical nodes in Figure 8-2 represent the precondition and effect propositions of 
the action nodes. Artificial “task-done” nodes are used to represent the effects and 
preconditions of the dummy action nodes.
Once an agent translates its task network into a POPG, it could then use this 
structure to decide when it may provide opportunistic assistance. T hat is, when 
some agent. A,, notifies the MAS tha t it would like help in satisfying one of its sus-
^This P O P G  has ac tu a lly  been sim plified, e lim in a tin g  w h a t w ould be  re d u n d an t Sample(X,Y,Z) nodes.
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Figure 8-2: AOSN PO PG  (partial) for sampling a volume of water.
pended goals, g,, some other agent, Ay, could examine its intentions—as represented 
by its POPG V j —to determine if g« E Vj .  For example, EAVE-Arista may request 
opportunistic assistance in obtaining a sample from location {x l , y l , d l ) ,  which, as 
shown in 8-2, EAVE-Arlel intends to obtain.
Unless it produces a complete (total order) plan, it is unlikely tha t an agent using 
task decomposition to derive its plans will be able to make direct use of the POPG  
execution mechanism described in Section 5.3. It should, however, be able to incor­
porate the plan evaluation mechanism (Equations 5.3 and 5.2) into its task selection 
mechanism. For example, Orca uses a context-sensitive agenda manager to determine 
which task should receive the focus of its attention. A mechanism like this could be 
augmented to consider input from the PO PG  evaluation when determining which task 
should have priority. As the task network is expanded, though, the corresponding 
POPG  would have to be updated accordingly in order to ensure the task selection 
mechanism is working with current information.
A final consideration for applying our multi-agent opportunism approach to sys­
tems using task decomposition is how to incorporate planning for and predictively
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encoding extra goals into the task networks. The first question we must address is 
how will the agents select which extra goals to include? As long as the agents have ac­
cess to information about each other’s capabilities, or better still about their assigned 
goals, they should be able to select additional goals to plan for using the methods 
described in Chapter 7. In the next section we discuss how this information could be 
obtained by the agents in this AOSN example. Of course, as we indicated in Section 
6 .1 , an agent’s capability set may be huge, and even its explicit representation may 
be intractable. However, as discussed in Section 7.2, as long as we are careful in how 
we enhance the agents’ plans, we should still be able to exploit this knowledge for 
multi-agent opportunism and produce results as good as, and hopefully better than, 
not using it.
Once an agent selects a set of extra goals, they would have to  be predictively 
encoded into the agent’s plan. One way to do this would be to include them  in the 
root node along with the assigned goals, which would then be decomposed into a task 
network as usual. The task network could be translated into a POPG  and used as 
described above. An agent like Orca tha t interleaves planning and acting, however, 
may never actually decompose the extra goals. This should not be a problem, though, 
since the planner would begin to decompose an extra goal into sub-tasks when it 
actually gets suspended by some other agent (i.e., when its value becomes >  0). The 
existing task selection mechanism (augmented with the POPG  evaluation mechanism 
as mentioned above) would then determine if and when taking action to satisfy the 
suspended goal is feasible.
8.1.2 A O SN  C oordination
As we have seen from the Rovers example, the MAS coordination mechanism can be 
used to support multi-agent opportunism by allowing the agents to obtain information
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about one another (e.g., their capabilities and assigned goals), and help direct requests 
for opportunistic assistance to the appropriate agents. In the example AOSN MAS, 
we can exploit the hierarchical organization for both of these purposes.
As discussed in the previous section, the agents need information about each 
other’s capabilities and assigned goals in order to determine which extra tasks should 
be planned for and predictively encoded. In a hierarchical organization, agents can 
obtain information of this type from their task managers. While the managers may 
not have complete knowledge of the capabilities of the agents under their control (e.g., 
in our example MAS much of tha t information is lost when the MLO is dissolved), 
they should at least know about the capabilities related to the goals currently assigned 
to those agents. For example, consider the example AOSN organization from Section
2.2 shown in Figure 8-3 (repeated from Figure 2-3). Note that, as mentioned in 
Section 2.2, while we have used a hierarchy for the management structure in this 
example, it is not the only possible structure for an AOSN MAS. As long as the 
agents can communicate information about their capabilities, goals and opportunity 
cues through the network of managers, any organizational structure should suffice.
In the AOSN example, when considering its plans for the background-survey-task , 
E A V E -A rial can ask the manager of this task what other agents are involved, as 
well as what their capabilities are. The task manager (EA V E-A rista) would inform 
E A V E -A rial about the capabilities of itself and AUV-1, and it could even include 
information about other assigned tasks (e.g., the r o c k -c o l le c t io n - ta s k  of EAVE- 
A rista). E A V E -A rial might then decide to use this information to include other 
tasks (e.g., looking for unusual magnetic readings) to prepare for potential multi­
agent opportunities. Interestingly, since some agents are their own task managers 
(e.g., EA V E-A rista on the background -survey-task ), they could exploit informa­
tion they already possess about other agents, such as the capabilities of the agents
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Figure 8-3: Example of a hierarchical organization for the AOSN MAS.
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involved in the task they are managing, without communication.
Further, this scheme of querying task managers could also be used recursively, 
where task  managers query higher-level managers for information about larger sub­
coalitions. This capability would be im portant when agents with overlapping capabil­
ities have been assigned to different subtasks. In such a case it would be necessary to 
forward the query to other task managers to ensure the agents with the appropriate 
capabilities are informed of the need for opportunistic assistance. Alternatively, in 
situations where a given task requires agents with similar or overlapping capabilities 
(e.g., the background-survey-task , where the agents all collect the same type of in­
formation from different volumes of water), the best information would be expected 
to come from the immediate managers of groups of labor agents.
We can also exploit the organizational structure to distribute the opportunity cues. 
Since we have assumed tha t we are using goal-sharing, the opportunity cues in this 
example would be the suspended goals. W hen an agent suspends a particular goal, it 
would be sent up the management chain as an opportunity cue. As cues come up the 
chain, managers would determine which subordinate agents (or sub-groups) possess 
the capabilities to address the cue (i.e., the suspended goal) and would send it to the 
appropriate subordinates. Managers could determine which subordinates possess the 
required capabilities and resources by examining the same knowledge they use when 
allocating tasks to these agents. The agents receiving the cues would incorporate 
them into their own opportunistic processing, if possible, as described in the previous 
section.
8.2 Aircraft M aintenance Inform ation System
Another domain we will consider is a multi-agent information system, in which soft­
ware agents collaborate to assist in aircraft maintenance. This example has been
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Figure 8-4: Aircraft Maintenance MAS
loosely adapted from the multi-agent system described by Shehory et al. [1999], 
which was designed to support aircraft maintenance at Warner Robins Air Force 
Base. Briefly, our example repair process starts with a mechanic inspecting an air­
craft for problems. When a problem is found, the mechanic inputs a description to a 
user interface agent, which we will call the Mechanic Agent. This agent finds and con­
tacts information agents tha t maintain databases on previous repairs (HistoryAgents) 
and repair manuals (ManualAgents).
The information agents return documents describing previously performed repairs 
for similar problems and manual pages related to the possible repairs. The Mechan- 
icAgent (probably through interaction with the mechanic) would decide on the repair 
to be made and contact a SupplyAgent to obtain the needed parts. If the parts 
are in stock, the SupplyAgent arranges to have the parts delivered to the mechanic. 
Otherwise, the SupplyAgent would contact appropriate part Vendor Agents, acquire 
the needed parts, and then deliver them to the mechanic. When the repair has 
been completed, the mechanic documents the details of the actual repair made with 
the Mechanic Agent, who files tha t document with the local HistoryAgent for future 
reference.
As in the Rovers example, the agents in this MAS, shown in Figure 8-4, find one
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another through the use of middle agents, such as matchmakers or brokers. This MAS 
is a good example of an open multi-agent system, since the member agents are hetero­
geneous and may change over time. In fact in this example the agents are likely to also 
be geographically distributed over several repair bases. The agents in this MAS do 
not have a prion  knowledge of which other agents will service their requests, and may 
never know about all of the other agents in the MAS. For example, a MechanicAgent 
might find out which HistoryAgents had information relating to a given repair from 
a matchmaker, and then contact them directly with information requests. Similarly, 
the MechanicAgents may never know of the existence of VendorAgents within the 
MAS, since they never use them directly.
As in the previous section, for the purposes of this discussion we will assume tha t 
the Aircraft Repair agents will operate in a manner similar to the agents in the MAS 
model described in Chapter 6 . Specifically, we will assume tha t they will request 
opportunistic assistance for suspended goals, will use goal-sharing as the opportunity 
cue selection method, and will respond to potential opportunities by satisfying the 
suspended goals when possible, notifying the other agents when done. Further, since 
this MAS also uses middle agents, the questions of how agents find out about one 
another’s capabilities and goals, as well as which agents should receive requests for 
opportunistic assistance, could also be addressed as in our model MAS. Thus in the 
following discussion we will address how the agents can determine when they should 
provide opportunistic assistance. Specifically we will examine two key issues; how can 
an agent exploit its current plans to determine if providing opportunistic assistance 
is feasible, and how can it prepare its plans for supporting multi-agent opportunism.
An agent in this system (e.g., a MechanicAgent) would likely use query planning 
[Ambite and Knoblock, 2000] in order to assemble the needed information from the 
various agents. Query planning involves determining a (partially ordered) sequence of
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data retrieval and data manipulation actions to satisfy a user’s (or in this case, agent’s) 
information request. This type of planning allows for information from different 
sources to  be integrated in order to satisfy complex queries.
It has been shown [Ambite and Knoblock, 2000] tha t query planning can be done 
using classical operators, where the plan actions are often database-like operations 
(e.g., retrieve, join, union, etc.) with information items acting as preconditions and 
effects. As such, it should be possible to represent an information agent’s plans us­
ing POPGs, as long as we assume the information-based preconditions and effects 
can be represented propositionally. Knoblock [1996] has used functional predicates— 
predicates defined by functions tha t compute some variables given the values of other 
variables—to represent query plan preconditions in classical plans. Functional pred­
icates can represent plan conditions with enough detail for planners to reason over 
them, while still being abstract enough to represent information being gathered from 
different sources. Thus it is likely tha t a query-planning agent could make direct 
use of the approach discussed in Chapters 6  and 7 to exploit its plans for supporting 
multi-agent opportunism, with the possible exception of one im portant issue: resource 
usage.
The resource needs of plan actions, along with goal values, are used in our approach 
to enable an agent to determine its “best course of action.” T hat is, these values are 
used to allow an agent to both decide when it should suspend one of its own goals, 
as well as to determine when it should attem pt to opportunistically satisfy another 
agent’s suspended goal. In an information system, the “cost” of an action may be 
expressed simply as the expected amount of time needed to execute it, or possibly 
in monetary terms (i.e., a charge for accessing some information servers). In some 
domains, the cost of assembling needed information might be considered negligible, 
such as when the system’s users own all the resources. In other domains, gathering
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inform ation may have the potential to be extremely expensive, as when an aircraft 
must go into a hostile region to gather intelligence, or when a doctor must perform a 
biopsy to  gather information for a diagnosis.
W hen there are resource needs associated with the actions of an information query 
plan, it should be possible to make direct use of the POPG execution mechanism 
described in Section 5.3. It should also be possible to use the method for determining 
when to  suspend goals, as well as the mechanisms for determining when providing 
opportunistic assistance are feasible, which are discussed in Section 6.1.
For example, consider the (partial) query plan shown in Figure 8-5, which might 
be used by a MechanicAgent to obtain a plan for repairing a particular problem 
instance, F16-Rudder-123. The MechanicAgent must first obtain a recommendation 
for making the repair, which it can get from either a HistoryAgent or a human 
planner. The agent may know (perhaps from past experience) tha t it takes an average 
of 5 minutes to obtain a response from a HistoryAgent, and 24 hours to obtain a 
response from a human planner. If time is considered a valuable resource, then the 
rational choice for the agent is to query the HistoryAgent first to obtain the repair 
recommendation.
Consider the situation, however, when the HistoryAgent is queried but cannot 
return a recommendation, and the MechanicAgent has only been allocated a limited 
amount of time (e.g., 2 hours) to come up with a repair plan. In this case, using our 
PO PG  execution scheme would allow the agent to recognize tha t this plan is likely 
to fail (because is has insufficient resources). While it might be best for the agent 
to handled this failure by reconsidering its intentions, if, as in the Rovers example, 
we assume tha t the agents cannot re-plan at runtime, this failure would cause the 
agent to suspend the associated goal. This in tu rn  would lead the agent to request 
opportunistic assistance for the suspended goal. Similarly, an agent receiving notih-
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I  fe
Figure 8-5: Example Aircraft Repair Query Plan (POPG)
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cation of this suspended goal could examine its current plans to determine if it might 
be able to satisfy the goal opportunistically, and use our course of action selection 
mechanism to determine if it has the resources to help. Since we are assuming the 
agents in our MAS are cooperative, we would expect them to provide this assistance 
when possible.
There may be situations, however, where the cost of an action in a query plan 
is considered negligible. For example, a MechanicAgent executing the query plan in 
Figure 8-5 may not know (or care) how long information retrieval may take. It is still 
possible, though, for an agent to use a P O PG ’s unmet preconditions to determine 
when it should suspend a plan and request opportunistic assistance. While we have 
generally assumed throughout this dissertation tha t plan actions always succeed, ac­
tion failure is actually quite likely to occur in real-world systems. The result of action 
failure is tha t one or more conditions will not be achieved. When these conditions 
are preconditions of some future actions leading to a goal, these future actions cannot 
be performed. Either alternative actions will have to be performed to provide the 
needed preconditions, or the goal will have to be suspended.
Continuing with the example PO PG  shown in Figure 8-5, suppose th a t neither 
the HistoryAgent nor the human planner returns a repair recommendation (perhaps 
because of a communication failure). In this case, the repair-rec(F 16-R udder-123)  
condition will not be met, so the goal repair-p lan(F 16-R udder-123) will have to 
be suspended, and the agent may request opportunistic assistance with achieving this 
goal. The agent might use the goal itself as the opportunity cue (i.e., goal sharing), as 
we had assumed above. The agent may, however, be able to use cue sharing or mixed 
sharing as discussed in Section 4.2.1. T hat is, since the agent knows the specific 
condition tha t is impeding its plan’s progress (i.e., repa ir-rec(F 16-R udd er-123)) ,  
it may request opportunistic assistance in satisfying just this condition (cue sharing).
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or it m ay include both this condition and the suspended goal in its request (mixed 
sharing). Since the conditions in information query plans can themselves be viewed 
as information or knowledge goals [Ambite and Knoblock, 2000; Ram and Hunter, 
1992], agents using such plans are more likely to be able to utilize cue sharing or 
mixed sharing. This is because information held by one agent is, in general, more 
easily communicated to and utilized by another agent than “physical” preconditions 
(e.g., being at some location or possessing some object).
Although it may be straightforward to use unmet precondition to determine when 
to suspend a goal (and thus when to request opportunistic assistance), a lack of 
explicit resource needs in a query plan would make it difficult for an agent to use our 
plan evaluation mechanism (Section 5.3) to  determine its best course of action. T hat 
is, if there is some risk of having insufficient resources (e.g., time) to satisfy all goals 
in a query plan, but those resources are not explicitly represented or known, it would 
not be possible for an agent to  select a course of action tha t minimizes this risk. On 
the other hand, if the cost of executing a query plan is considered negligible, then any 
valid total order of the partially-ordered actions in a POPG would be equivalent. In 
this case, an agent would always choose to opportunistically satisfy another agent’s 
suspended goal (or intermediate precondition), since it can only increase the overall 
benefit to the MAS.
This brings us to our final consideration for multi-agent opportunism in query 
plans: When would an opportunity for one agent to help satisfy another agent’s 
goals even occur? That is, when would an agent’s plan already have a condition 
included tha t may be a goal or other precondition for another agent? It is true tha t 
some opportunities might occur naturally when two agents generate plans for similar 
activities (e.g., two agents may request the same pages from the ManualAgent). In 
this case, the approach described in this section would indeed be able to exploit
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these opportunities. But, in general such natural opportunities cannot be relied on, 
and so our efforts must be focused on artificially increasing the number of potential 
opportunities.
In th e  approach described in Chapters 6 and 7, we used the concept of planning 
for capabilities to predictively encode goals at planning time in one agent’s plan 
tha t might be suspended by another agent. If the agents had clear knowledge of 
each o ther’s information needs, such as the specific repairs they are working on, they 
could potentially make effective use of planning for capabilities. A situation where 
this would be beneficial is when the information servers charge for queries, and the 
rates are better for volume queries (e.g., the CARFAX service [CARFAX], which 
provides histories of used cars, charges one price for a single query, but only a few 
dollars more for unlimited queries). In this situation, the overall cost to the system 
could be reduced by the opportunistic aggregation of queries to certain information 
servers.
In the type of information system exemplified by our Aircraft Maintenance MAS, 
it appears unlikely, however, tha t a domain-independent approach to planning for ca­
pabilities would help increase the number of potential opportunities, for two key rea­
sons. First, without domain-specific guidance, the sheer number of different possible 
queries would likely prevent an agent from correctly guessing which extra conditions 
would be helpful to some other agent—after all, an aircraft has a lot of parts to repair. 
Second, in the given MAS structure (Figure 8-4), the agents all have access to the 
same information providers. Thus if one agent cannot satisfy its information needs 
with the information agents in the system, it is unlikely tha t another agent will be 
able to obtain this information even if it did have the foresight to predictively encode 
the appropriate information goal. This would not be the case, however, if the agents 
making information queries had access to different information providing agents, or
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if they used different methods for generating information query plans. Similarly, in 
the case of an open MAS, if a new information-providing agent joins the system after 
some agent suspends a goal, the change in the makeup of the MAS may also be an 
opportunity to provide the needed information.
So if planning-time predictive encoding will not benefit our information agents, 
and natural opportunities are unlikely to occur, it is likely tha t the agents will have 
to make the best use of runtime opportunities. That is, if the agents are capable 
of re-planning at runtime, then a form of reactive plan repair (Section 6.2.3) could 
be used to modify an agent’s plans when it learns about another agent’s suspended 
goals. It is not unreasonable to expect tha t query-planning agents could perform 
runtime re-planning, since responding to information queries is essentially an interac­
tive process. For example, if the MechanicAgent executing the plan shown in Figure 
8-5 finds out some other agent is missing some manual pages for the repair plan it 
is trying to obtain, the MechanicAgent may be able to augment its query to the 
ManualAgent to include the additional pages (on the hope tha t they are now avail­
able). A final possibility would be for the agents to store their “recent” query plans 
on the expectation tha t information they have already obtained might be useful to 
some other agent in the system. This would be useful when an information providing 
agent becomes unavailable. Note tha t unlike our previous approach, this would not 
exploit opportunities based on an agent’s future intentions, but rather on its current 
knowledge.
8.3 Summary
In this chapter we have shown how our POPG-based approach to multi-agent op­
portunism could be applied to other types of MASs, demonstrating tha t with some 
straightforward extensions this approach can be used in environments other than  the
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one for which it was designed. Specifically, in the context of an oceanographic sam­
pling network, we have discussed the changes tha t could be employed to utilize our 
approach when faced with a non-classical planning system, and when the agent’s ac­
tions are coordinated with something other than  middle agents (e.g., a management 
hierarchy). Similarly, in the context of an aircraft maintenance information system, 
we have described how query planners could exploit a POPG-based approach even 
when the resource needs of the plan actions are not available, and when planning for 
capabilities may not be feasible. These discussions show tha t the general applicability 
of our approach is indeed promising.
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C hapter 9 
Conclusion
In this chapter we briefly summarize our framework for multi-agent opportunism 
and discuss several key areas for future research. We conclude by arguing tha t our 
framework answers the thesis questions presented in Chapter 1.
9.1 Framework Summary
As we discussed in the introduction, multi-agent opportunism is the ability for agents 
to opportunistically assist one another to accomplish their goals. T hat is, agents 
must be able to recognize and respond to potential opportunities for the goals of 
other agents in the MAS.
In order to recognize a potential opportunity for another agent, an agent must 
have some knowledge about the other agents in the MAS. There are two ways agents 
can obtain this necessary information about each other; they can infer it, or the 
agents can explicitly share it. As inferring this information is likely to be too difficult 
in an open system of heterogeneous agents, we have focused our study on explicit 
information sharing. More specifically, we have determined tha t an agent designer 
must address these three key issues:
• For which task or goals should an agent request opportunistic assistance?
The agents should limit this to just those tasks or goals (suspended or active)
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which other agents are likely to be able to help satisfy. Determining this requires 
th e  agent to undertake a cost/benefit decision process.
• Exactly what opportunity-related information should the agents explicitly 
share? The agents should share the information tha t will best enable the other 
agents to recognize environmental cues tha t would indicate a potential oppor­
tunity. This may include the goals themselves, cues the requesting agents has 
determined for itself, or a mixture of both.
• W ith  which other agents should an agent share this opportunity-related 
information? An agent should share this information with the other agents tha t 
are most likely to have the capabilities to help satisfy the goal. Determining 
this will, in general, make use of the system ’s existing coordination mechanism. 
We have discussed how this could be done when the agents coordinate their 
activities using middle agents or through a simple hierarchy. Other coordination 
mechanisms are considered in Section 9.3.
For an agent to respond to a potential opportunity, it must be able to determine 
what an appropriate response might be, and when tha t response is even feasible. To 
provide agents with this ability, an agent designer must address these two issues;
• How can an agent decide if it should provide opportunistic assistance?
An agent should consider its current intentions—the actions it is already plan­
ning to take—to determine if they may provide a potential opportunity. The 
agent should also use its intentions to consider the potential impact tha t pro­
viding opportunistic assistance may have on its own goals. As we are working 
with planning agents, this decision process will often be a form of plan analysis.
•  How should an agent respond to a potential opportunity for another agent? 
The response may be to simply notify the other agent of the potential opportu-
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nity, or to take some action on the other agent’s behalf. An agent may decide to 
take some action using only local information (e.g., following a standard oper­
ating procedure), or it may need to coordinate its actions with the other agent. 
The costs and benefits of this response should be included when deciding when 
to  provide opportunistic assistance (described above).
Addressing the five key issues described above is critical to exploiting opportunities 
in a multi-agent system. However, just understanding these issues is not sufficient 
for knowing the feasibility or potential benefits of multi-agent opportunism in a real- 
world system. As such, we have also examined a specific approach to multi-agent 
opportunism for a particular class of MAS. This particular class includes systems of 
heterogeneous agents tha t use classical planning to determine their intentions, and 
tha t are coordinated using middle agents. By including this specific approach, we are 
able to demonstrate how our key issues can be addressed in a concrete setting. We 
are also able to provide an empirical analysis of the potential impact tha t exploiting 
multi-agent opportunism may have on a system’s performance.
For our specific approach, we have introduced a simple yet flexible model for plan­
ning and execution based on the abstract plan representation Partial Order Plan 
Graphs (POPGs). POPGs provide explicit representations of plan preconditions, 
effects, and resource requirements, all of which are needed when reasoning about po­
tential opportunities. This model separates the qualitative and quantitative parts of 
the planning problem, and is well suited for systems where online re-planning cannot 
or should not considered. The plan execution scheme embodied in this model trans­
parently allows an agent to determine when it should pursue potential opportunities 
for the suspended goals of other agents in the system. It also allows the agents to 
determine when they should suspend goals they are unlikely to be able to satisfy, and 
thus when they should request opportunistic assistance.
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In order for systems of planning agents to exploit potential opportunities for one 
another’s goals, the agents’ plans must contain actions tha t may lead to conditions 
favorable for producing potential opportunities. While these conditions may occur 
naturally, it would be more beneficial if these plans could be augmented to improve 
the chances of providing opportunistically favorable conditions. It is critical, however, 
tha t the plan enhancements do not interfere with an agent’s course of action when 
pursuing opportunities for other agents is not needed.
To improve the chances of providing potential multi-agent opportunities, our spe­
cific approach uses the notion of planning for capabilities to augment each agent’s 
plans. T hat is, the agents in our example system select additional goal conditions 
from their own capability sets to include in their plans, in the expectation tha t these 
goals might be suspended by some other agent in the system. The selection process 
used depends upon the information about the agents tha t is currently available. It 
may be simply the overlapping capabilities of the various agents, or it may be the 
actual goals tha t the have been assigned to the agents. Planning for capabilities is 
a type of predictive encoding, a passive approach to single-agent opportunism. Using 
such an approach allows the agent to pre-compute potential opportunity cues, rely­
ing on the normal runtime plan execution mechanism to recognize their presence and 
determine if pursuing them is appropriate in the given context.
Augmenting an agent’s plan to include additional goals, however, may lead to 
inefficiencies with respect to the agent’s assigned goals. As mentioned above, we 
need to avoid interfering with the agent’s regular course of action when it does not 
need to pursue potential opportunities. As such, we have examined three techniques 
for plan enhancement tha t allow the agents to avoid performing unneeded actions. 
In particular, we have considered two post-planning methods of enriching the core 
structure of a plan: one tha t adds “shortcuts” bypassing the segments of the plan
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devoted strictly to support predictively encoded extra goals, and one tha t predictively 
repairs the  core plan to include subplans achieving the extra goals. We have also 
examined an online approach tha t assumes the agents possess limited runtime plan 
repair capabilities. Using this approach, the agent attem pts to enhance its core plan 
only at the time it learns of a goal suspended by another agent.
In order to quantify the potential impact of our specific approach to multi-agent 
opportunism, we have conducted an empirical evaluation of a simulated MAS tha t 
incorporates our ideas. Through this study we have shown tha t with limited shared 
information, and even with no re-planning or plan repair capabilities, systems of 
heterogeneous agents can indeed assist one another opportunistically in accomplishing 
their goals. When the agents cannot do online re-planning, and the degree of shared 
information is limited to just the overlapping capabilities of each agents, the system 
performance improvement ranged from ^2%  to ~5%. Further, when the agents 
know what goals have been assigned to the other agents, the system performance 
improvement was even better, ranging from ~5%  to ~8%. Thus we can conclude tha t 
multi-agent opportunism is feasible, and can indeed improve the overall performance 
of this class of multi-agent system.
9.2 R elated Work
As we indicated in Section 3.3, to the best of our knowledge, there are no other re­
search efforts tha t have studied or are currently studying multi-agent opportunism. 
In this section we review several research areas th a t are related to multi-agent oppor­
tunism in various way, and compare them  to our approach.
Oliveira and Garrido [1995] have posited the idea of using cognitive cooperation 
facilitators (CCFs) to detect cooperation opportunities among agents with similar but
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complementary interests (i.e., goals). CCFs are similar to matchmakers [Klusch and 
Sycara, 2001], in that agents register their interests with them and they establish 
connections. Unlike matchmakers, CCFs are proactive in establishing connections 
between agents with similar interests. They also require the agents to register their 
interests (in the form of goals) instead of their capabilities.
W hile CCFs could be used to support multi-agent opportunism, the idea was 
never sufficiently developed to provide a complete model. That is, the primary role of 
CCFs was to identify potential opportunities among pairs (or perhaps small groups) 
of agents to cooperate on similar goals and notify those agents. The agents were 
then expected to negotiate among themselves how they could potentially help one 
another satisfy their goals. The authors did not specify how these negotiations could 
be accomplished, or even how the agents could determine if cooperation was, in fact, 
beneficial. That is, the CCF approach only addressed how to recognize potential 
opportunities, not how to respond to them.
Beyond the incompleteness of the model, there are two other im portant diffi­
culties with this approach. First, the requirements for agents to register their goals, 
which may change frequently, would likely lead to significant communication overhead 
keeping the CCFs updated. Second, the determination of similar but complementary 
goals is not well specified, and is likely to be highly domain specific, requiring tailored 
CCFs.
However, while the use of specialized CCF agents may not be directly usable in 
a model of multi-agent opportunism, it provides some insights. For example, if an 
interest-matching mechanism could be specified, then a matchmaker or broker agent 
could be modified to infer interests from match requests and notify interested parties 
of potential collaboration opportunities. This capability could potentially enhance 
the opportunity recognition capabilities of the model described in Chapter 6.
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Berennji and Vengerof [1999] use a coordination mechanism in which the agents 
exchange task information to achieve better system coherence. The experimental 
domain used is a modified Tile world [Pollack and Ringuette, 1990] environment. The 
tasks in this system were referred to as opportunities because they would appear as 
“goal tiles” at random locations and disappear after a random amount of time. At 
each tim e step, the agents would negotiate among themselves to determine how each 
of the tasks should be allocated, and then each of the agents would move toward their 
task ’s location.
Although this approach is not multi-agent opportunism as we have defined it, it 
may be able to achieve some of the same high-level goals. For instance, such an 
approach would be able to improve the overall system performance in a dynamic 
environment by taking advantage of the opportunistic appearance of goals. Similarly, 
this approach specifically attem pts to improve the coordination of the agents, going 
so far as to attem pt to optimize their actions.
This approach does not, however, meet our key assumptions. Specifically, the 
agents are assumed to be homogeneous in th a t they are all capable of performing 
any task. In fact it goes further in assuming th a t all of the tasks are of the same 
type, differing only in their value. Similarly, this approach requires tha t all of the 
agents share all of their task-related information with one another. As we have dis­
cussed throughout this dissertation, clearly homogeneous agents with complete (or 
even nearly complete) shared knowledge can opportunistically assist one another with 
their goals. Our model shows th a t even with limited shared knowledge, systems of 
agents with heterogeneous capabilities can also do this.
In Section 4.2.1 we discussed how an agent could conceivably infer another agent’s
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goals, plans, or even opportunity cues, to allow it to recognize potential opportunities 
for the other agent. This is as opposed to the explicit sharing of opportunity-related 
inform ation tha t is used in our framework. Busetta et al. [2001] have developed an 
approach in which agents assist one another by “overhearing” the communication 
messages of other agents, and offering suggestions to improve an agent’s plan, in the 
form of new information or additional actions. It is opportunistic in tha t the service 
providing agents are given information or commands from suggester agents tha t are 
not already available to them. The service providing agents are free to incorporate 
or ignore the suggestions.
To make this approach possible, the suggester agents must have a model of the 
service providing agents, as well as a representation of their mental attitude [Busetta 
et ah, 2001]. The authors accomplish this having the service providing agents pub­
licize their “public behavior model” which includes their current beliefs, goals, and 
plans. As we have discussed, it is unrealistic to expect tha t this degree of shared 
knowledge would be available in an open system of heterogeneous agents. As such, 
this approach is not a general model of multi-agent opportunism.
The area of multi-agent plan merging, which has been used by several researchers 
to improve coordination in an MAS, is also related to multi-agent opportunism. For 
instance, von M artial [1992] has created a taxonomy of multi-agent plan relations 
tha t identify both negative and positive interactions between two agent plans, along 
with a basic model of how to merge the plans to achieve coordinated actions. The 
negative relations identify actions within the plans tha t might lead to conflicts, such 
as an overlapping use of resources or the negation by one agent of the effects of 
another agent’s actions. Negative relations were generally addressed by adjusting the 
ordering or timing of the affected actions. The positive relations identify redundant
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and subsuming actions in the plans, where one agent is already performing actions 
th a t produce effects needed in the other agent’s plan. In cases like these, only one of 
the agents needs to perform the overlapping action(s).
An additional positive relation identified by von Martial is the favor relation, 
where one agent can satisfy the goal of another agent if tha t goal can easily be in­
corporated into its current plan. This relation is closest to our idea of multi-agent 
opportunism, as it can be used to identify situations where agents may be able to help 
one another in a more cost-effective way. In fact the reactive plan repair mechanism 
described in Section 6.2.3 essentially exploits a favor relation. In von M artial’s model, 
however, the identification of favor relations in plans, as well as the means to incor­
porate additional goals into the current plan, requires domain-specific information. 
Further, the model does not address using this relation to help satisfy suspended goals 
of another agent, although it should be possible to do so.
Similarly, Durfee and Lesser [1987] developed the Partial Global Planning (PGP) 
approach to enable agents to plan coordinated actions. Decker and Lesser [1998] 
later extended PGP into the Generalized Partial Global Planning (GPGP) approach. 
Where PG P primarily addressed conflicts between plans, GPGP also included von 
M artial’s positive plan relations. Both approaches provide a mechanism to allow 
agents to exchange their individual plans, identify parts of the plans th a t might 
require coordination, and propose plan modifications to achieve th a t coordination. 
Each agent would use the exchanged plan information to create a partial global plan 
to represent its own view of the global plan th a t encompassed the actions of other 
agents as well as its own.
PGP and GPGP were designed to support cooperative distributed problem solving 
(GDPS), where the agents collectively try  to satisfy some common goals through their 
individual actions. This is in contrast to the MAS model tha t we have assumed.
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described in Section 5.2, that characterizes the system as a loosely-coupled collection 
of agents acting independently to satisfy their assigned goals. We have adopted this 
model because it makes few assumptions about the amount and type of knowledge 
the agents share. This allows us to make claims about the feasibility of multi-agent 
opportunism  tha t are more general than if we assumed a CDPS model.
More recently, the work of Cox and Durfee [2003] has focused on finding synergies 
among multi-agent plans. Synergies are essentially von M artial’s positive relations, 
with a particular emphasis on subsuming and overlapping effects (instead of just 
actions) th a t would lead to plan merges. Cox and Durfee’s approach exploits hierar­
chical plans, where the plan is represented as a hierarchy of steps. Leaf nodes in the 
hierarchy are primitive actions, while interior nodes are abstract steps. The use of 
hierarchical plans allows this approach to find synergies at higher levels of abstraction 
than other plan merging mechanisms tha t focus on individual actions.
Finally, M. de Weerdt [2000] has developed a resource logic for multi-agent plan 
merging tha t allows agents to coordinate their plans by exchanging excess resources. 
In de W eerdt’s formalism, resources are an abstraction tha t encompass both the 
traditional notion of resources as well as the classical planning notion of preconditions 
and effects. De Weerdt has also proposed an auction-based mechanism tha t would 
enable agents to find needed resources for the coordination of their plans. It is not 
clear how the agents identify what resources they are lacking, though.
Each of these approaches does, in its own way, improve the overall coordination 
of the MAS by eliminating conflicts or finding synergies among the agents’ plans. 
However, none of them is adequate for providing a general model of multi-agent 
opportunism, for two key reasons. First, they each require the agents in the MAS 
to commit to changes in their plans. The very nature of opportunism implies tha t 
agents should assist one another as situations arise, not by formally committing to
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applying its resources to the satisfaction of another agent’s goals. While our own 
plan-based approach (Chapter 6) provides multi-agent opportunism by incorporating 
extra goals into the agents’ plans, the agents do not commit to these goals. Rather, 
the ex tra goals are pursued only they are determined to be needed and advantageous 
to the MAS.
Second, the plan merging approaches require the agents to exchange their plans, 
either w ith one another or with a central coordinator agent, so tha t they can be 
compared and merged. This requires the agents to share a great deal of information 
with one another, which we are explicitly trying to avoid. Further, for plan merging 
to take advantage of runtime opportunities, the exchange of plan-related information 
would have to occur any time an agent changes its intentions (e.g., when a goal is 
suspended). This would be a communication-intensive process. It would also be com­
putationally expensive, as plan merging is exponential in the general case [Cox and 
Durfee, 2003], and thus doing it repeatedly would likely be intractable.
The area of coalition formation in MASs also has some bearing on multi-agent op­
portunism. Much of the research in this area has focused on finding optimal coalitions 
among self-interested agents, often using game theoretic approaches [Kraus, 1997]. In 
such systems, agents form coalitions only when it will increase their own payoff. The 
MAS must then be designed to provide incentives for agents to cooperate, leading to 
better overall system performance [Kraus, 1997; Shehory and Kraus, 1998].
While opportunism has generally been ignored in this area of research, it is not 
unrealistic to expect tha t given the appropriate incentive (e.g., expectation of a re­
ward), self-interested agents would also be able to support multi-agent opportunism, 
using the mechanisms from our model. However, while it is less likely in a cooperative 
MAS, there is an increased risk th a t a self-interested agent would opportunistically
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take advantage of knowledge it obtains from another agent seeking assistance, a tactic 
the business world calls poaching [Clemons and Hitt, 2004].
Some of the work in this area, though, has looked into coalition formation in 
open systems of cooperative agents. For example, Shehory and Kraus [1998] have 
examined the selection of optimal coalitions in MASs coordinated using a match­
maker, where tasks arrive dynamically. This work is interesting since the approach is 
able to opportunistically reallocate tasks when new tasks arrive, by restructuring the 
coalitions when necessary. They do not, however, address any other mechanism for 
agents to  help one another with their assigned tasks, although it is conceivable tha t 
a suspended task could be treated as a new task, leading to opportunistic reallocation.
Finally we consider agents organized using models of teamwork, which refer to the 
formal coordination models tha t assume a small group of agents are coordinating their 
activities in support of a set of shared goals. We discuss these models as a contrast 
to our approach. That is, it is very likely tha t a team  of agents could support multi­
agent opportunism, essentially because of the amount of knowledge in common they 
are generally presumed to possess. However, this assumption is not realistic for the 
open real-world MAS we are considering.
One of the earliest formalisms for team coordination is joint intentions theory [Co­
hen and Levesque, 1990; Jennings, 1995], in which agents agree to cooperate on a joint 
goal and on how tha t goal will be jointly satisfied (i.e., what role each agent will play 
in a common plan). In a similar method called shared plans [Grosz and Sidner, 1990], 
and later collaborative plans [Grosz and Kraus, 1996], the agents are not required to 
commit to explicit joint commitments, but do operate from an understanding of the 
common plan to be executed and their roles within it.
Tambe [1997] has taken these approaches a step further by combining and ex-
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tending them  into the STE A M  formalism. This formal model of teamwork requires 
the agents to use both joint intentions and shared plans. The model also includes a 
protocol for establishing the intentions, selecting the plans, and establishing roles of 
each agent within the plans.
Given the amount of common knowledge the agents using one of these models must 
have, it should be straightforward to extend them to support multi-agent opportunism 
(although, to the best of our knowledge, this has not been tried). For instance, 
when using STEAM, one agent knowing the role tha t another agent is filling in 
the team  is sufficient for the first agent to know the other agent’s assigned tasks. 
Thus, opportunities can readily be recognized for other agents in the team, as well 
for shared team goals, and the appropriate agent notified. However, as mentioned 
above, teamwork is not a general model for multi-agent opportunism for the types of 
MAS we have assumed. This is because the agent teams must posses a great deal of 
shared information to operate, which cannot be relied upon in real-world systems of 
heterogeneous agents.
9.3 Future Work
In Chapter 8, we discussed in depth several areas of future research in the context 
of applying our POPG-based approach to multi-agent opportunism to other types of 
multi-agent systems. In this section we will address some other areas identified in 
this dissertation as targets for our future research efforts.
9.3.1 P O P G  C om plexity
One drawback of our POPG-based plan execution scheme is the computational com­
plexity of the action selection mechanism. Since this mechanism must consider essen­
tially all possible total orderings of the remaining actions in the POPG to determine
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Figure 9-1; Partial POPG  with costs and values.
the best course of action, its computational complexity is exponential in worst case. 
In our example Rovers MAS the plans tended to be somewhat “linear,” in tha t there 
was usually only one or two possible actions to choose from at any given decision 
point. This fact tended to attenuate the complexity problem somewhat, making our 
experiments tractable on plans with 25-30 actions for up to 8 goals. Requiring several 
seconds to  minutes to select the next action may be acceptable in domains like our 
Rovers example because the plans are at such a high level of abstraction. But in other 
domains stricter real-time constraints may make the use of our execution mechanism 
impractical. As such, we are particularly interested in reducing the computational 
complexity of our execution mechanism.
Interestingly, much of the computation done for action selection is redundant. 
Consider, for example, the partial POPG  shown in Figure 9-1, which is a simplified 
version of the example shown in Figure 5-4. Assume for a moment th a t this is a 
subgraph of some larger POGP, and tha t it appears at the tail of the plan. As long 
as our resource p > 5, the evaluation of this section of this plan will determine tha t a 
value of 15 can be obtained. It will, however, have to consider both orderings of the 
actions SampleRock(Ll) and T ak eP ictu re (LI) to determine this. Even worse, this 
subplan may have to be evaluated many times during the evaluation of its subsuming 
POPG, and in general as long as p >  5 the value will always be 15.
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We would like to use a caching scheme, similar to the back-propagation mechanism 
used in [Dearden et ah, 2002], tha t would reduce the redundancy in the computation. 
Specifically, we would like to associate with each node a caching function T  : (u, p)
V. T hat is, at each node, for a given level of resources p and in a given state a, there 
will be a cached value V. In our above example, if we ignore the state for the moment 
(i.e., let cr = any), then the function JF associated with the node At (LI) would be;
^(p) = <
0, p < 2
10, 2 <  p <  5 
15, p >  5
It should be possible to build this cache function dynamically. That is, if during 
the normal action selection evaluation of a given node n, the current state and resource 
level is not represented in JF, then the evaluation continues as if caching was not being 
used. When a value is determine, JF would be updated.
Although we did spend some time trying to implement a caching scheme in our 
simulated example MAS, the details of capturing and matching states and resources 
turned out to be a bit trickier than one would expect. Clearly one would not want to 
associate complete state descriptions, as they can be very large (leading to a trade-off 
between space and time). But we were unable to find a reasonable representation in 
the short time we spent on the problem. As reducing the time complexity of action 
selection could be a significant improvement to our approach, it is high on our list of 
future work.
9.3.2 A ctive Goals
Throughout this research project we have focused on the use of suspended goals as a 
way to determine when to request opportunistic assistance. This is not particularly
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surprising, considering suspended goals have often been a focus in research into op­
portunism  (e.g., [Birnbaum and Collins, 1984; Francis, 1997; Hammond et ah, 1993; 
Patalano et ah, 1991; Simina and Kolodner, 1995; Pryor, 1996]). Further, they offer 
an easy indication of when an agent needs help—when it has a goal it knows it may 
not be able to satisfy itself.
As we mentioned in Section 4.1, an agent may also benefit from opportunistic 
assistance with its currently active goals. In tha t section we discussed an example 
from the AOSN domain in which the C O N V E X - m o o r i n g  requests help from the 
other agents in detecting convective overturns. Such examples are likely to occur in 
many MASs. However, it is likely tha t identifying them will require domain-specific 
knowledge.
Our POPG-based approach to multi-agent opportunism provides two possibilities 
for a domain-independent method of identifying which active goals could benefit from 
opportunistic assistance. First, as was mentioned in Section 6.3, an agent could 
identify “high-risk” goals as those with an expected cost tha t is just below some 
threshold of the currently available resources. The expected cost of a particular 
goal can be computed as the sum of the expected costs of all of the actions in the 
current PO PG  tha t must be executed to satisfy the goal. Determining what a good 
threshold would be, or even if requesting opportunistic assistance for active goals 
would be beneficial, are issues tha t could readily be explored in our current simulated 
environment.
Similarly, an agent could request opportunistic assistance for an active goal based 
upon its value relative to the other assigned goals. For example, an agent may benefit 
from opportunistic assistance with unusually highly-valued goals, such as those with 
a value greater than the sum of all of the other assigned goals. While identifying 
such goals may be a simple m atter, determining the types of relationships among the
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goals values that would benefit from requesting opportunistic assistance would clearly 
require further analysis. Our existing experimental environment would allow us to 
study th is idea.
9.3.3 C ue Sharing
In the approach described in this dissertation, we have focused on using suspended 
goals for the opportunity-related information tha t the agents share with one another 
when requesting opportunistic assistance. This was a natural choice in our case, since 
the POPG-based planning and execution mechanism can readily be extended through 
planning for capabilities to prepare the agents for potential opportunities.
As mentioned in Sections 6.3 and 8.2, however, our POPG-based approach could 
also be used to support cue sharing as the means for determining opportunity-related 
information. As discussed in Section 6.3, the most direct way to use cue sharing 
would be if an unmet precondition of some agent’s suspended goal is in the capability 
sets of other agents in the MAS. Borrowing the example from tha t section, suppose 
tha t the condition Ci =  have-rock-sam ple (WP7) is a precondition for some other 
set of actions in the plan, Vi, for agent A,, and is not itself an assigned goal. If A, 
could identify tha t ci is necessary for the achievement of a suspended assigned goal, 
Qi, then requesting opportunistic assistance for Ci would be cue sharing.
Note tha t we can still use our resource-based decision process to determine when 
to suspend a goal with this type of cue sharing. That is, when we suspend some goal 
g  because of insufficient resources, we are also suspending the sequence of actions A  
from the agent’s plan V  tha t would lead to satisfying g.  If c is a precondition of 
some action a, E A, it must also be in the effects of some other action Uj  E V. The 
opportunistic satisfaction of c may mean tha t the agent will now not have to execute 
üj ,  freeing up resources tha t could allow it to resume trying to satisfy g.
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Similarly, as discussed in Section 8.2, we can also use cue sharing when a goal is 
suspended specifically because of some unmet precondition. This might be helpful 
when resources are not a limiting factor in plan execution, or simply when plan actions 
fail to produce their expected effects.
The difficulty for both of these situations is in determining what conditions should 
be used for opportunity cues. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, we wish the agent to select 
those conditions tha t are most likely to lead to the suspended goal’s satisfaction tha t 
are also conditions tha t other agents can help satisfy.
For instance, consider again the above example where agent A, has determined 
tha t condition C\ is necessary for the achievement of suspended goal g\. Unlike the 
above discussion, it is not actually necessary for ci to be in the capability set of some 
other agent in the MAS. Rather, ci only has to be an effect of some action in another 
agent’s plan to potentially be opportunistically satisfied. But, if it is not part of any 
known capability sets, it would be difficult for A, to determine which, if any, other 
agent could help satisfy ci.
In the information systems case the problem is a bit easier, since an unmet con­
dition is a description of information the agent does not possess. If tha t condition is 
critical to satisfying the goal, then the condition is a good candidate for opportunistic 
assistance from other agents. Further, the infrastructure of a distributed information 
system must necessarily provide a way to locate agents th a t can provide given types 
of information. Thus if an agent can find another source for the information needs of 
an unmet condition, it should use it as an opportunity cue.
In general, however, identifying conditions th a t would make good opportunity 
cues in multi-agent opportunism is likely to be more complicated. It is possible that 
a form of diagnosis may be needed to determine exactly what conditions are impeding 
progress towards a particular goal, with further reasoning being required to determine
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if the o ther agents in the MAS can help satisfy it. Since finding a domain-independent 
mechanism to support cue sharing would greatly enhance our framework for multi­
agent opportunism, it is an area we intend to study further.
9.3.4 O ther C oordination M echanism s
In our POPG-based approach to multi-agent opportunism, the MAS coordination 
mechanism is used for the discovery and distribution of information. In terms of 
discovery, the coordination mechanism is used to determine the capabilities of other 
agents in the MAS, and when possible, the goals that have been assigned to them. 
This information is used to decide which extra capabilities should be predictively 
encoded in each agent’s plans. As for distribution, the coordination mechanism is 
used to determine which agents are capable of providing opportunistic assistance 
for suspended goals. In our specific approach, we chose to use a middle agent to 
coordinate the activities of the other agents. The experiments described in Chapter 
7 indicate tha t this mechanism does allow the agents to obtain sufficient information 
about one another to make multi-agent opportunism feasible.
We would like to extend the experiments described in Chapter 7 by considering the 
performance impact of multi-agent opportunism when compared to using the middle 
agent to re-allocate suspend goals to some other agent in the MAS. The middle agent 
is in a good position to select another agent for the suspended goal, since it knows 
about each agent’s capabilities, and in principle has some idea of each agent’s current 
work load. We do, however, still expect multi-agent opportunism to result in better 
performance than this approach, for two key reasons.
First, if we maintain our assumption th a t the agents are not capable of runtime 
re-planning (otherwise this would just be reactive plan repair), then the broker would 
have to include the suspended goal in the next cycle of goal assignments. This would
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mean th a t  either some agent would be assigned more than the expected k goals, or 
tha t some other goal tha t would otherwise have been assigned during tha t cycle would 
itself be delayed. If the choice is to assign more than k goals to some agent A, then 
because the agents are already resource bound, it is likely tha t A will again not be 
able to satisfy all of its assigned goals, leading to more goals being suspended. Unless 
the broker is able to balance the load of the extra goal assignments, this could lead to 
a cascade of suspended goals, causing the system’s performance to degrade. If instead 
the middle agent delays some goal in the current cycle, even if it prioritizes the goals 
by value, there is a possibility of starvation of some goals, meaning tha t no attem pt 
at all will be made to satisfy them (even opportunistically).
Our second reason for expecting poorer performance when using the middle agent 
to reallocate a suspended goal to another agent is tha t it will limit the potential 
for opportunistic satisfaction. T hat is, the middle agent will select a single other 
agent to attem pt to satisfy the suspended goal. By not informing other agents of the 
suspended goal, opportunities for satisfying th a t goal in a more cost effective way 
may be missed.
We would also like to examine multi-agent opportunism in the context of other 
MAS coordination mechanisms. We would expect tha t each coordination mechanism 
would have its own strengths and weakness in term s of supporting opportunism, even 
going beyond information the discovery and distribution. It is exactly these issues 
tha t we would like to explore.
For instance, the contract-net protocol (CNP) [Smith, 1980] is inherently oppor­
tunistic in the way goals can be dynamically re-allocated at runtime. T hat is, suppose 
some agent, Ai, determines tha t it must suspend one of its goals, g, tha t it had con­
tracted to satisfy for some value, Vg. Using the normal CNP mechanisms, Ai can 
solicit bids from the other agents to determine if any of them  could satisfy g. If some
162
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
other agent, Ag, provides a bid to satisfy g at a cost less than Vg, then g can be 
opportunistically satisfied by Ag.
CNP alone, however, does not provide a complete model of multi-agent oppor­
tunism. As we can see above, it does provide a mechanism for agents to determine 
which other agents in the MAS to share their opportunity-related information with. 
Similarly, the decision process tha t agents use to compute their bids for a given goal 
does allow them to determine if they should attem pt to provide opportunistic assis­
tance. But CNP does not specify how the agents compute their bids, and so we do not 
know if the agents are basing their decisions on their current intentions. If we assume 
tha t they use planning to make this decision, then it is reasonable to expect tha t 
they could try  to opportunistically incorporate goals suspended by other agents into 
their current intentions, perhaps using a method like reactive plan repair described 
in Section 6.2.3. This would require the agents to be capable of runtime re-planning. 
While this does violate one of our key assumptions, it is not unreasonable in the 
context of CNP.
But even if the agents do compute bids for new goals based on their current inten­
tions, without modification CNP does not allow the agents to attem pt to incorporate 
a goal into their plans for possible opportunistic satisfaction. T hat is, just as with the 
plan-merging and coalition formation mechanisms described in Section 6.2.3, CNP 
requires agents to commit to satisfying their goals. As such, the agents do not, in 
general, have the flexibility to provide assistance on a truly opportunistic basis— if  
and when conditions permit. Rather, they agree to commit their resources and actions 
to satisfying the given goal. Further, it is possible tha t agents with losing bids may 
encounter opportunities to satisfy a suspended goal. But, since only the single agent 
with the winning bid commits to a given goal, these other potential opportunities 
would be missed.
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Also, CNP alone does not provide a way for the agents to determine when (for 
which goals) they should request opportunistic assistance, nor does it provide any 
m ethod for the agents to determine exactly what opportunity-related information 
they should share. If, as above, we assume we are working with a system of planning 
agents, then just as with our POPG-based approach the agents could use their plans 
to make these decisions. If we further assume tha t the agents use their plans to request 
opportunistic assistance for their suspended goals, then CNP does provide a way for 
the agents to determine when it would be cost effective to make tha t request. As 
described in the example above, if through the bidding process an agent determines 
th a t one or more other agents can possibly satisfy its suspended goal, g, for a cost 
less than  the goal’s value, Vg, then the agent should make the request for assistance.
In addition to analytically considering other MAS coordination mechanisms, we 
would also like to empirically examine multi-agent opportunism in the context of these 
other mechanisms. For example, in our existing experimental environment we could 
examine agents tha t use CNP for coordination, as described above, or a hierarchy as 
discussed in Section 8.1.1 For a hierarchy, unlike the approach described in Section 
8.1.1, initially we would use a classical planner to keep the changes to the agents 
manageable.
Of particular interest, though, would be to consider the impact of multi-agent 
opportunism on agents coordinated using models of teamwork (e.g., [Tambe, 1997; 
Grosz and Kraus, 1996; Cohen and Levesque, 1990]). Our belief is tha t since the 
agents in these models already possess a great deal of shared information, they could 
more easily exploit multi-agent opportunities. If fact it may even be feasible for teams 
of agents to infer potential opportunities for one another. The focus of the research 
described in this dissertation has been on finding the low-end of shared information 
tha t still leads to performance improvements due to multi-agent opportunism. An
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exam ination of teamwork models could provide us with a better idea of the high-end, 
since the  agents already share so much information.
9.4 Final Remarks
In this dissertation we have presented a framework for multi-agent opportunism that 
is applicable to open systems of heterogeneous planning agents. Our primary thesis 
question for this framework was simply: Can multi-agent opportunism be effective in 
systems o f heterogeneous agents with little or no shared knowledge? T hat is, can open, 
real-world multi-agent systems benefit from being able to recognize and respond to 
opportunities for each other’s goals? Or will the lack of shared information be too 
restrictive to allow cost-effective opportunistic assistance?
The analysis of our framework described in Chapter 7 specifically addresses this 
question. In tha t analysis, we examined the impact of multi-agent opportunism on a 
specific, but broadly representative, class of multi-agent systems. Our results indicate 
tha t even when the agents know only about the capabilities of other agents in the 
system, and even when no runtime re-planning is possible, multi-agent opportunism 
is indeed effective in improving the overall system performance. Further, when the 
agents are better informed with knowledge about what goals have been assigned to the 
other agents in the system, multi-agent opportunism is able to produce even better 
improvements in the system’s performance. Alternatively, our results also indicate 
that, unless the agents are capable of runtime re-planning, at least some a priori 
shared information is needed to make multi-agent opportunism effective.
A second, related question tha t we have explored is: Are agents that are capable 
0/  opportumtzea /or t/iemgekes oko capab/e, asmg t/ie same mecAamsms,
0/  recogatzmg aad respoadmg to opportuatties /or ot/ier ageats, gtrea t/iat tAeg /laae 
adegaate A;aow/edge 0/  eac/t ot/ierP
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If one were to only consider the abstract part of our framework (Chapter 4), the 
answer to  this question would be trivially yes. That is, if we assume tha t an agent 
is capable of recognizing and responding to potential opportunities for its own goals, 
it is not difficult to expect tha t they could also recognize and respond to potential 
opportunities for the goals of other agents given adequate knowledge of these goals. 
But through our specific POPG-based approach, we have gone a step further in 
tha t we have demonstrated in a concrete setting tha t agents can indeed use the 
same mechanism to recognize and respond to potential opportunities independent of 
whether they are for another agent’s goal or one of their own. Through our specific 
approach we are also able to describe what is meant by “adequate knowledge” for a 
particular class of MAS. Further, and perhaps more interesting, we have shown tha t 
under some circumstances, multi-agent opportunism can be effective even when the 
agents are not capable of single-agent opportunism.
Finally, the contributions of our framework for multi-agent opportunism are both 
theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, our framework provides an analysis 
of the critical issues tha t must be addressed in order to successfully exploit opportuni­
ties in a multi-agent system. These issues involve the type and degree of knowledge the 
agents must share, as well as the decision-making capabilities they must possess. This 
analysis provides MAS designers and developers im portant guidance to incorporate 
multi-agent opportunism into their own systems. It also provides the fundamental 
underpinnings of our own specific approach to multi-agent opportunism.
On the practical side, we have developed, implemented, and evaluated a spe­
cific approach to multi-agent opportunism for a particular class of multi-agent sys­
tem. Our approach enables systems of planning agents coordinated through a middle 
agent to opportunistically assist one another achieve their goals, thus improving the 
overall system performance. We have achieved this by combining a particular form of
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single-agent opportunism known as predictive encoding with an approximate decision- 
theoretic planning mechanism tha t allows the agents to make critical information- 
sharing decisions. The planning mechanism uses an abstract plan representation 
known as Partial Order Plan Graphs (POPGs) th a t we developed specifically to sup­
port multi-agent opportunism. While the POPG  representation was designed for this 
research project, it is still general enough to represent the features of most (if not all) 
techniques used in the area of classical (i.e., STRIPS-based) AI domain-independent 
planning.
We believe the contributions made by this approach are im portant for two key 
reasons. First, it should be applicable to many existing MASs. This is because 
we have leveraged well-understood technologies from both AI planning and single­
agent opportunism, and also because middle agents are widely used in coordinating 
multi-agent systems. Second, our approach demonstrates th a t MASs can benefit from 
multi-agent opportunism even when the agents share little or no common knowledge of 
such things as plans, goals, and capabilities. This is because we have started from an 
assumption tha t the agents will be heterogeneous, implying tha t they would possess 
little or no shared knowledge. Our results thus provide a baseline, demonstrating tha t 
performance improvements can still be achieved even with this restrictive assumption.
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